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This dissertation traces the reception of Antonio Gramsci’s works over a series of critical 
moments in the development of the Latin American left, including the transitions to democracy 
in Argentina and Brazil, Latin American subaltern studies in the academic sphere, and the 
rhetoric of “pink tide” governments of the twenty-first century, with a focus on Bolivia. My 
central argument is that Gramsci has appealed to Latin American intellectuals as a theorist of the 
state—notwithstanding his more frequent characterization as primarily a theorist of civil 
society—and that the different appropriations and deployments of Gramscian concepts such as 
the war of position and the integral state have been oriented, in one way or another, toward a 
defense of constituted as opposed to constituent power, and more generally toward the closure of 
constituted political subjectivities. The project is intended at once as a study of the historico-
political conditions of intellectual production in Latin America, and more specifically as a 
contribution to the scholarship on the long history of the centrality of the state in Latin American 
politics, as well as an examination, focused on a particular theoretical field, of modes of 
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Citing Lucien Goldmann and Raymond Williams’ uses of Lukács’s concept of reification, 
Edward Said calls attention in “Traveling Theory” (1982) to the tendency of theories that are 
transported across time and space and re-inscribed in historical and institutional contexts other 
than those to which they respond at their inception to lose some of their vitality or fossilize as 
cultural dogma. In a later essay, “Traveling Theory Reconsidered” (1994), he recognizes in the 
earlier text an ideological notion of originality and derivation in which every iteration is 
necessarily a pale shadow of its true form; in their displacement, theories can also gain critical 
force, breaking through limitations that constrained their initial formulation. This project is 
conceived as a study of the development of Latin American Gramscian theory from the 1960s to 
the present with both senses of Said’s “travelling theory” in mind. I read a set of genealogically 
interconnected texts in order to trace the iterations of a constellation of pivotal concepts drawn 
from the work of Antonio Gramsci in the intellectual production of the Latin American left that 
shift between critical and affirmative modes of politically interested theorization. 
 
The discipline of cultural studies emerged in the late 1960s claiming Gramsci as one of its 
key sources, and Gramsci’s influence continued with the expanding orbit of the field in the 80s 
and 90s, including the development of postcolonial studies. Gramsci’s reception as 
predominantly a theorist of the superstructure made him an essential author for a study of 
culture largely led by intellectuals with Marxist roots, or for a Marxism concerned with literary 
and other cultural products. Raymond Williams writes in 1977 of the Gramscian concept of 
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hegemony, “whatever the implications of the concept for Marxist political theory . . . the effects 
on cultural theory are immediate. For ‘hegemony’ is a concept which at once includes and goes 
beyond two powerful earlier concepts: that of ‘culture’ as a ‘whole social process,’ . . . and that of 
ideology, in any of its Marxist senses” (108). Said opens Orientalism (1978) by framing both his 
conception of his object of inquiry—Orientalism as hegemony1—and his own subject position in 
writing such a work (as a response to the imperative to attempt to compile an inventory of the 
“infinity of traces” that constitute the subject, as a precondition for critical refection) in 
Gramscian terms. Stuart Hall, a central figure in the establishment of cultural studies in his role 
as director of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, 
makes the familiar claim about the preponderance of a hegemonic mode of power—rule through 
consent rather than coercion—in the West in late twentieth century, but also argues for 
Gramsci’s relevance in the 1980s as a theorist for times of defeat, of a crisis of the left:  
The truth about the 1920s is that the ‘proletarian moment’ very nearly came off. 
Just before and after the First World War, it really was touch and go as to whether, 
under the leadership of such a class, the world might not have been transformed—
as Russia was in 1917 by the Soviet revolution. This was the moment of the 
proletarian perspective on history. What I have called Gramsci's question in the 
Notebooks emerges in the aftermath of that moment, with the recognition that 
                                                 
1 “[T]he form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony, an 
indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is 
hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the 
durability and strength that I have been speaking about so far” (7); “we can better understand the 
persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that 
their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were productive, not unilaterally inhibiting. 
It is this idea that Gramsci, certainly, and Foucault and Raymond Williams in their very different 
ways have been trying to illustrate” (14). 
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history was not going to go that way, especially in the advanced industrial 
capitalist societies of Western Europe. Gramsci had to confront the turning back, 
the failure, of that moment: the fact that such a moment, having passed, would 
never return in its old form . . . This looks like a moment of total crisis for the Left, 
when all the reference points, the predictions, have been shot to bits. The political 
universe, as you have come to inhabit it, collapses. (162) 
Hall defines Gramsci’s historical moment here within an argument for the relevance of his 
thought in the era of Thatcherism in the U.K., but the comparison could just as well be extended 
to the Latin American context of the corpus that I analyze in my first chapter.2 
Gramsci has also been a central reference for Latin American and Latin Americanist 
political thought, in part because of the flexibility of his theoretical legacy, as a communist who 
has been appropriated by a liberal to social democratic left, as well as from a radical democratic 
post-Marxist position. I discuss the most salient figures of the former schools in my first chapter; 
a major exponent of the latter, Ernesto Laclau, is conspicuously absent in this study, and so his 
important intervention in contemporary political theory merits some mention here. In 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (who has in her own right made a 
direct contribution to Gramscian scholarship through her own writing as well as with her edited 
collection, Gramsci and Marxist Theory [1979]) appropriate and self-consciously rework 
                                                 
2 The “cultural studies” Gramsci has elicited criticism from a number of Gramscian scholars and 
others who align themselves with a more general opposition to the “turn to theory”; see, for 
example, Brennan’s Wars of Position (2006), and others discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. Perry Anderson, whose 1976 essay “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” perhaps 
the foundational study of English-language Gramscian scholarship, is similarly critical of this 
“culturalism,” but attributes the fault to Gramsci himself, noting that Croce along with Lenin is a 
fundamental source of Gramsci’s concept of Hegemony (48). 
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Gramscian concepts in the service of a radical democratic socialist politics that insists on 
“deepening” rather than renouncing liberal-democratic ideology (176). “[I]t is clear,” they write, 
“how we may recover the basic concepts of Gramscian analysis, although it will be necessary to 
radicalize them in a direction that leads beyond Gramsci” (136). As much as the concept of 
“hegemony” itself, Laclau and Mouffe draw on the concept of the “historical bloc” as a coalition 
or “hegemonic articulation” of social groups, as the basis of a political logic not confined to the 
determination of class.  
A particular reading of this Gramscianism “beyond Gramsci” as a version of social 
contract theory has recently been spotlighted within Latin Americanist academic discourse with 
the notion of “posthegemony,” coined by Alberto Moreiras and developed at length by Jon 
Beasley-Murray in Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America. This ambitious proposal 
situates itself as post-Gramscian (although Gramsci is not cited directly, but always through 
Laclau’s reading),3 claiming that “the concept of civil society (for Gramsci, intimately linked to 
the notion of hegemony) no longer holds” (xi), to then advance an argument for a theory of 
posthegemony centered on the concepts of affect, habit, and multitude (citing Antonio Negri). 
What is most credible in Beasley Murray’s book, however, the claim that ideology and therefore 
hegemony does not work through “consent” understood as rational contract but through 
“affect,” “habit,” etc., is in fact consistent with any minimally responsible reading of Gramsci. 
The critique of rational consent is familiar enough not to warrant further discussion here; the 
                                                 
3 Beasley-Murray writes of the Requerimiento—the document read to the peoples that the 
Spanish conquistadores intended to conquer, establishing their legal right to do so derived from 
the king, the pope, and ultimately God himself—that it “appears to encapsulate Gramscian 
theory in a nutshell” (2) (as a petition for consent backed up by force), a statement that, rather 




more pertinent polemical stance is against a logic of populism, for which Laclau is taken as 
representative. Laclau, the most productive theorist in a broader effort to reconcile the politics of 
Peronism with a more radical left (I discuss an apology for Peronism that shares something with 
Laclau’s in the work of Juan Carlos Portantiero in my first chapter), has argued from this theory 
in defense of chavismo and by extension the politics of the “pink tide” more broadly; it is in his 
opposition to this kind of populism, in its crudest form a strategic espousal of a notion of a 
unified people-nation (Laclau’s theory of politics as hegemonic articulation into a popular 
subject is more sophisticated, but ultimately is mobilized to the same purpose) that this “post-
hegemonic” strain of Latin Americanist theory is relevant to my project. 
Two further general features of Gramsci’s thought that have contributed to its appeal and 
utility for Latin American intellectuals should be pointed out: his position as a theorist of the 
semiperiphery (of Italy, and specifically the South), and his concern with the state (or more 
broadly with the superstructural moment as extension of the state), which has been connected to 
the historical centrality of the state in Latin American politics.  
The former aspect is central to the subject of my second chapter, and in particular to the 
category of subalternity. While Gramsci’s concern with the effectivity of stuperstructural 
elements complicates the linear progression of the orthodox theory of historical materialism 
(Laclau and Mouffe, for example, write, “War of position presupposes the concept of hegemony 
which, as we shall see, is incompatible with the idea of a linear, predetermined development” 
[23]),4 the subaltern is, in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s terms, a supplement that introduces the 
                                                 
4 Marx himself explicitly refutes the reading of Capital that posits as universal such a “linear, 
predetermined development”; following four unsent and unpublished drafts of a reply to Vera 
Zasulich attempting to answer her question as to whether the Russian rural commune was 
necessarily fated to be destroyed and superseded by capitalist relations of production before a 
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incalculable. In Latin America, it is José Carlos Mariátegui, Gramsci’s contemporary, who first 
takes up this task of reworking Marxist theory to account for the (potentially revolutionary) 
historical action of collective subjects other than the bourgeoisie and then the proletariat, in this 
case the Indians (for Gramsci, and the South Asian subaltern studies scholars, the peasantry). 
Latin American intellectuals understood the social reality that constituted their object of 
reflection, then, to share this difference from the Western European context from which 
orthodox Marxist theory emerged in the trajectory of its historical development and the 
persisting plurality of “historical stages,” “modes of production,” or social groups (the various 
theoretical conceptions of which are discussed in Chapter 3), while at the same time sharing 
structures of modern political and civil society with Western Europe, if sometimes as second-
hand imports.  
The claim that Gramsci has appealed to Latin American intellectuals as a theorist of the 
state, and therefore as particularly relevant to a region with a historical tendency toward statism, 
must take into account that Gramsci’s “integral” concept of the state does not correspond to that 
normally assumed by the notion of “statism,” and has led him to be characterized at least as often 
as primarily a theorist of “civil society.” In the familiar Althusserian terms, the state in this 
“integral” sense (discussed at length in my third chapter) refers to one in which the “private” 
                                                                                                                                                             
communist society could emerge (in which, Spivak has observed, we see Marx grappling with the 
limits of his own thought), he finally answers tersely in the negative and directs her to an almost 
equally brief article in which he writes: “[My critic] feels himself obliged to metamorphose my 
historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic 
theory of the marche generale imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the historic 
circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it may ultimately arrive at the form of 
economy which will ensure, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of 
social labour, the most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. (He is both 
honouring and shaming me too much.)” 
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apparatuses of hegemony within civil society serve a function continuous with that of the state 
proper, ultimately backed up by the repressive apparatus. Althusser’s translation of Gramsci’s 
theory into an idiom of 1960s structuralism is correct but necessarily incomplete; while the 
conception of social totality and therefore of the fundamental unity of elements separated for 
analytical purposes into the categories of “structure” (or “base”) and “superstructure” is 
conveyed,5 Althusser’s dismissal of Gramsci’s “absolute historicism” or “humanism” (2009: 141) 
reintroduces a determinism that is untenable for Gramsci, and for the Latin American theorists 
who claim his legacy. The state—together with its organs within civil society—is conceived in this 
tradition as a historically productive entity, even an ethico-political subject (a tendency suggested 
by Gramsci’s personification of the state, or of the party as proto-state, following Machiavelli, in 
the “modern prince”), in a way that introduces a element of contingency, of politics as truly 
productive, and not merely reproductive. This is the tendency in Gramsci that enables the 
hypostasizing readings that I identify here, and that, I argue, can also be countered from a 
Gramscian position. 
My subtitle, “Reconstitutions of the State,” places the state in relation to the conceptual 
dyad of constituent and constituted power, which enters contemporary theoretical debates 
primarily through Antonio Negri’s 1992 Il potere constituente. My allusion to the concept here 
does not engage the problem of defining a subject of constituent power, or with the historical 
development of such a subject, theorized as the “multitude” in Negri and in his subsequent work 
co-authored with Michael Hardt (something further emphasized in the English translation of 
Negri’s title as Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State [1999], relegating the 
                                                 
5 Although the base remains always determinant “in the last instance.” 
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concept of constituent power to the subtitle; “insurgencies” suggests a more concrete 
revolutionary subject, or at least a more concrete historical process, than the more abstract 
concept of constituent power as an intrinsic element of all power). My use of the concept 
remains, instead, in a more negative mode, in reference to forms of intellectual practice rather 
than discrete political subjects.  
Negri conceives of constituent power in opposition to sovereign power (despite the 
tradition in democratic thought of ascribing sovereignty to the “people”), a distinction that is 
implicit in my critique of Álvaro García Linera’s political discourse in Chapter 3 (Negri 22). 
Andreas Kalyvas, while maintaining the notion of popular sovereignty,6 offers a useful discussion 
of constituent power as irreducible to any discrete entity or collective subject such as the term 
“people” connotes. The constituted power is unified, singular, and invites personification 
(Kalyvas 2013: 10).7 Constituted power commands, “emanating from the top” (Kalyvas 2013: 11), 
while “the notion of the constituent sovereign redirects attention to the underlying sources of the 
instituted reality located at the bottom” (Kalyvas 2013: 10); constituted power is power 0ver; 
constituent power is power to (Martin Loughlin, cited in Kalyvas 2013: 11). The constituent 
power, finally, is not reducible to or an attribute of any prior collective subject: “The subject of 
the constituent power is not prior or external to the act of constituting. Rather, it constitutes itself 
as it constitutes for itself. By framing the political forms of its collective existence, it also 
produces its own public identity” (Kalyvas 2013: 12). The movement between the constituent and 
                                                 
6 See, in particular, Kalyvas’s defense of the concept of sovereignty as the constituent power of the 
people rather than constituted power in “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent 
Power” (2005). 
7 And yet, in an earlier article (2000), Kalyvas equates Gramsci’s “prince” with Schmitt’s notion 
of sovereignty, as expressions of the concept of constituent power.  
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the constituted as conceived in this dissertation is, in keeping with this notion of irreducibility to 
a prior subject, not between the multitude, or the people, or any other analogous term, and the 
state, or the sovereign, etcetera, but between a concept of the constituent as continual self-
fashioning, and a thinking that takes for granted any form of constituted political subjectivity. 
 
My first chapter focuses on the Gramscian concept of the war of position in relation to 
the texts of politically engaged intellectuals of the transitions to democracy in the Southern 
Cone—Carlos Nelson Coutinho in Brazil, José María Aricó and Juan Carlos Portantiero in 
Argentina—and concludes with a discussion of the Bolivian Marxist theorist René Zavaleta 
Mercado, whose work I discuss at greater length in my final chapter. Paolo Capuzzo and Sandro 
Mezzadra suggest that Gramsci’s reception in Latin America helped to rehabilitate him back in 
Italy, where he had been appropriated, largely through Palmiro Togliatti's efforts, as the 
intellectual voice of the Italian Communist Party and accordingly rejected by the more radical 
left as a moderate “culturalist.”8 But the Latin American Gramsci—despite prompt translations 
into Spanish and Portuguese of the notebooks in their complete and unaltered form following 
Valentino Gerratana’s 1975 edition (the first three volumes of which have just recently been 
translated into English by Joseph A. Buttigieg [Columbia, 2007])—is not unmarked by Togliatti's 
reading, and this tendency was reinforced by the new alliances of liberal democratic and socialist 
interests imposed by the right-wing military dictatorships. Drawing on the work of several of the 
most influential intellectuals in Brazil and Argentina in the dissemination and interpretation of 
Gramsci's thought in Latin America of this period, I focus in this chapter on the changing 
                                                 
8 “Provincializing the Italian Reading of Gramsci” (2012). 
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conceptions of the relation between state and society that claim Gramsci as a legitimating source 
in the articulation of a new strategy.  
Against both the voluntarism of the model of the guerrilla foco expounded and later 
repudiated by Régis Debray and the (anti-politicist) structuralism of Althusser,9 the generation of 
the failed revolutionary programs of the 1960s turned to Gramsci to take stock of their defeat and 
regroup. Foquismo conceived the military conquest of state power as its tactical end, and as the 
strategic means through which revolutionary consciousness is forged. Gramsci was invoked to 
authorize a shift of focus from state power to civil society, from military force to hegemonic 
leadership through other forms of institutional organization. The war of position, as opposed to 
the war of maneuver, was the master metaphor of this new orientation. I read in this corpus an 
underlying affirmation, by way of a Gramscian reading and despite a supposed turn away from 
the state, of a pre-constituted popular democratic subject whose political expression is achieved 
through a proper articulation with the state. 
Chapter 2 traces the trajectories of the concepts of the subaltern and the national-popular 
from Gramsci through the work of Latin Americanist scholars affiliated with subaltern studies, 
with a focus on the interconnections with discursive production from the position of the state. I 
look at the work of the Latin American Subaltern Studies group but also Latin American 
intellectuals not connected to the North American academics, including Silvia Rivera 
Cusicanqui, who edited a translation of the work of the South Asian Subaltern Studies group with 
                                                 
9 Althusser warns in a letter to Debray (published in La critique des armes, 1974) criticizing his 
influential essay on the strategic urgency and tactical challenges of exporting the Cuban 
revolution to other Latin American countries (Revolution in the Revolution?, 1967) that “Above 
all, you must at all costs avoid the ideological disease of the Latin American political tradition, 
the mistake of seeing everything as purely and simply a matter of politics—the ‘infantile disorder’ 
which Latin America is far from having outgrown, which is that of politicism” (265). 
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Rosana Barragán. My discussion of this body of work is focused on its engagement with three 
moments in the relation between the subaltern/people and the nation/state in Bolivia: (1) 
Indigenous insurgency against the creole-oligarchic state; (2) new forms of subalternity within 
the National Revolutionary state of 1952, as one instance of the broader regional phenomenon of 
nationalist/populist regimes in the mid twentieth century; and (3) a return to the national-
populist mode of interpellation within the “pink tide,” specifically in Evo Morales’s Bolivia. I 
conclude this chapter by arguing that while in the second of these moments the subaltern is the 
remnant or excess that is invisibilized by a mestizo “fictive ethnicity,” in the third, the subaltern is 
re-visibilized in a way that instrumentalizes indigenous identity, now as the subject of the state, 
with effects that are ultimately continuous with previous modes of social containment. At the 
center of this chapter is a shift from a political and intellectual culture of the eighties and nineties 
that privileged non-state actors on both the right and the left—a discourse to which the concept 
of subalternity, conceived as the absolute outside of the state, seemed particularly well suited—to 
a paradoxical recycling of the concept from the position of the state. 
In Chapter 3 I look exclusively at this new statism of the pink tide, extending my analysis 
of the Bolivian case. One of the discursive tasks of Evo Morales’s MAS government has been to 
knit together, around a core trope of indigeneity, elements of a Marxist discourse that provide 
some continuity both with the non-indigenous national left and a broader regionally and globally 
articulated rhetoric of anti-capitalism. García Linera has been the primary agent charged with 
this task, as the non-indigenous, academic counterweight to Morales’ performative persona, and 
the principal figures through which García Linera establishes a linkage of political memory and a 
current interpellative state program, of elite and popular sectors, intellectual prestige and 
prevailing interests, are, on the national and international levels, respectively, Zavaleta and 
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Gramsci. This chapter will trace the steps through which certain concepts drawn from the work 
of both theorists—Zavaleta's sociedad abigarrada or “motley society,” and the Gramscian integral 
state—come together in the service of the ideologeme of the Plurinational State. I conclude by 
situating the study within the current political conjuncture, in which the moment of the rise of 
the pink tide that was my point of departure is superseded by a new regional and global right. 
 
I read the texts that make up my corpus, produced from different disciplinary, 
institutional, national, and historical positions (by public intellectuals with varying levels of ties 
to political parties and social movements, both Latin American and North American academics, 
and finally, directly from the propagadistic organs of the state apparatus) as primary texts. I do 
not conceive my argument as belonging to political theory, but rather as a study of modes of 
reading as a political act. While I return to the Gramscian source of the concepts under 
discussion in each chapter in plotting their itineraries, this dissertation is not conceived as a 
study of Gramsci’s thought in dialogue with Latin American and Latin Americanist readings and 
applications. While my analysis takes into account the relation between discourses in Latin 
America and their local historico-political conditions as well as shifts in a globalized academic 
culture, the object is not Latin America in its social or political reality as locus of production of 





Postdictatorship and the War of Position 
 
 The reconstitution of the left in Latin America at the level of the state since the close of 
the twentieth century demands—and has indeed provoked—a return to the discursive legacy of 
the preceding decades of struggle and defeat. The present chapter is intended as a contribution to 
this genealogical work of rereading. I focus here on a symptomatic component of that legacy, on 
the work of a number of influential intellectuals at the vanguard of what has been called the 
Gramscian turn, the defining mark of which is an effort to reconcile a socialist project with the 
institutional structures of liberal democracy. I read these texts from a position of cautious 
solidarity: I share their conviction of the need to retrieve a concept of democracy from the logic 
of liberalism, but am wary of the impulse to do this by locating a hypostatized subject of 
democracy within the existing order of social relations. 
 The problematization of emerging forms of democratic organization is no doubt a task of 
global dimensions, but it carries a particular weight—and entails particular difficulties—in the 
context of Latin American societies marked by decades of military dictatorship, where a strategic 
alliance between the socialist left and liberal-democratic center-left was arguably indispensable. It 
is within this field of shifting conceptual and practical alliances—which emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s and still conditions a contemporary discourse that nonetheless contends with a different 
set of tasks—that I examine here a series of inscriptions of Gramsci’s thought. I start with a 
critique of Carlos Nelson Coutinho, who translated Gramsci into Portuguese in the 1960s and 
has played an important part in the dissemination and critical discussion of Gramsci’s texts in 
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Brazil; I turn then to Juan Carlos Portantiero, who wrote the first and probably still the most 
significant major book-length study of Gramsci’s thought and its utility for Latin America (Los 
usos de Gramsci, 1971), and to José Aricó, who collaborated in the first Spanish translations of 
the prison notebooks and published the journal Pasado y Presente and eponymous book series, 
both with a strong Gramscian orientation. I conclude with an analysis of Bolivian sociologist and 
philosopher René Zavaleta Mercado’s critical reading of Gramscian categories in relation to his 
thinking of democracy in his later work. 
 I argue that in Coutinho, and in a more subtle way in Portantiero and Aricó, there is a 
tendency to deploy conceptual tools drawn from Gramsci’s texts to posit in different ways an 
existing collective popular democratic subject with emancipatory potential, rather than 
articulating the necessity of constructing new forms of subjecthood. In his reterritorialization of 
Gramscian categories, Coutinho substantially alters the concepts of society and the state and, as a 
result, that of revolutionary practice and objectives, which become synonymous with democratic 
pluralism; Aricó and Portantiero stress the superstructural determination of the base as the 
specific difference of Latin American social processes, and starting from this premise Portantiero 
ultimately seeks to redeem the political agency of the monolithic demos of populism. Zavaleta’s 
use of Gramsci is diagnostic rather than validating: he derives from Gramsci’s expansion of the 
state a concept of democracy as a powerful instrument of bourgeois dictatorship. 
 The background of dictatorship and transition to democracy must be understood within a 
longer history that has conditioned both the immediate political context and the intellectual 
inheritance of the texts in question. The first generation of Latin American Gramscians (most 
notably those associated with Pasado y Presente) came of age during the Cuban Revolution and 
the period of polarization in its aftermath that Régis Debray sums up with his observation that 
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“revolution revolutionizes the counter-revolution” (1967a: 21).10 This mechanism through which 
socialist revolutionary struggle strengthens the military and ideological backlash from the right 
supported by the United States necessitated a new political strategy, but also a new theoretical 
discourse, and the Gramscian “war of position” became a recurring trope in the intellectual 
production of the left; the succession of military coups beginning in the 1960s was diagnosed as 
the expression of a crisis of hegemony.11 A vocabulary and conceptual matrix derived from or 
associated with Gramsci’s texts became commonplace not only in the academy but in the public 
                                                 
10 The foremost theorist and advocate of armed struggle modeled on the Cuban guerrilla 
experience, even as he upholds Cuba’s status as the “vanguard detachment of the Latin American 
Revolution” (1967a: 13), Debray recognizes that it is a paradoxical vanguard: “From the Rio 
Grande to the Falkland Islands, the Cuban Revolution has, to a large extent, transformed the 
conditions of transformation of Latin America. ... Cuba condemned to failure any mechanical 
attempt to repeat the experience of the Sierra Maestra, with an equally rapid tempo of action, 
with the same alliances and the same tactics” (1967a: 21). 
11 José Nun, writing at the same time as Debray, advances this argument in “América Latina: la 
crisis hegemónica y el golpe militar” (1966), arguing that while there is a common-sense 
assumption of golpismo as an indicator of economic underdevelopment, it is correlated instead 
with an underdeveloped state-society relation. Norbert Lechner, taking as his premise this 
correlation between militarism and hegemonic crisis, extends the argument from successful 
coups to revolutionary armed struggle focused on the seizure of the state. This mode of struggle 
reflects that of the existing state, he argues, and a new regime established through armed struggle 
can only reproduce the same hierarchical power structures: “La experiencia del Estado como una 
fuerza de ocupación encuentra su simple inversión instrumental en la organización del partido 
como ejército de liberación. . . . La ruptura se reduce a un cambio de mando” [the experience of 
the state as an occupying force finds its simple instrumental inversion in the organization of the 
party as a liberation army. . . . The break is reduced to a change of command] (418). Debray 
diagnoses this putschist or blanquist reflex of the right and the left as the bane of the region, and 
defines “Fidelism” as its negation: “In semi-colonial countries, even more than in developed 
capitalist countries, the State poses the decisive political problem. . . . The usual way of resolving 
the problem in South America is the coup d’é tat, by means of which almost all transfers or 
overthrows of established power take place, even when they are carried out in the name of the 
popular classes and against the oligarchy. Fidelism defines itself first of all by its refusal of the 
coup d’é tat” (1965: 19). 
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discourse more broadly.12  
Within this wide range of interpretations and instrumentalizations, the dominant strain 
of reception in Latin America echoes Togliatti’s presentation of Gramsci’s writings and the PCI’s 
shift toward social democracy. Most of the texts considered here bear a relation to this trend. 
Each responds to and participates in a shift in the discourse of Latin American Marxist 
intellectuals—conditioned by an international crisis of the left and, at the national level, by the 
eclipsing of the traditional class antagonist by the fiercer, or at least more immediate, opponent 
of authoritarianism—toward a theoretical marriage of socialism and democracy that 
simultaneously borrows from and competes with the cultural and formal principles of liberalism, 
a signifier that has historically served both its exponents and critics to identify democracy with 
capitalism. Each of their authors, with the exception of Zavaleta, left or was expelled from the 
communist party of their respective countries: Coutinho, along with other leading intellectuals of 
the Brazilian left, joined the Workers’ Party (PT), which has held the presidency since 2003; 
Aricó and Portantiero founded the Club de Cultura Socialista, and were denounced by the 
orthodox communist left as “renegades, deserters, or traitors to their roots” for supporting social 
democrat Raúl Alfonsín as the first elected, civilian president following the years of military 
dictatorship (Burgos 2004: 385). Speaking from a position of defeat, they seek to found a new 
discourse that renegotiates old allegiances without renouncing them. The strategy of armed 
insurrection had failed, and was held to have led to the years of military repression by the 
reconstituted democratic opposition as well as by the military regimes themselves. A new strategy 
                                                 
12 Raúl Burgos (2002) provides an overview of the disparate uses of a Gramscian vocabulary in 
the discourse of political actors in Latin America, from Sandinista guerrilla leaders to the 
Communist Party of Argentina, to the PT in Brazil. 
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was in order, and Gramsci’s theoretical arsenal seemed apposite to the task. 
 
I. Gramsci’s military metaphors 
 
Arditismo and foquismo: From tactics to strategy 
 Gramsci first theorizes political struggle in terms of the military metaphor of the war of 
position in § 133 of notebook 1, titled “Military art and political art,”13 in a discussion of the 
arditi, storm troops of the Italian army in the First World War. Here the arditi are understood as 
a kind of tactical supplement to the regular forces that indicates a weakness: 
1) . . . gli arditi sono semplici formazioni tattiche … 
2) . . . non bisogna considerare l’arditismo come un segno della combattività 
generale della massa militare, ma viceversa, come un segno della sua passività e 
della sua relativa demoralizzazione. 
[1) . . . the arditi are simple tactical formations … 
2) . . . one must not regard arditismo as a sign of the general fighting spirit of the 
mass of soldiers but conversely, as a sign of their passivity and relative 
demoralization.]14  
                                                 
13 With the following disclaimer: “Ciò sia detto mantenendo implicito il criterio generale che i 
paragoni tra l’arte militare e la politica sono sempre da stabilire cum grano salis, cioè solo come 
stimoli al pensiero e come termini semplificativi ad absurdum” [One says this while silently 
adhering to the general principle that comparisons between military art and politics should 
always be made with a grain of salt, that is, as terms simplified ad absurdum].  
14 For all passages from Notebooks 1–8, I use Buttigieg’s translation. Since the Buttigieg 
translation includes only the first eight notebooks, translations of passages from subsequent 
notebooks, where no earlier version is indicated, are mine alone; where an earlier version of the 
note is identified, I have modified Buttigieg’s translation of the original version of the note in 
 
 18 
Arditismo, by extension, refers to a spontaneous, self-organized militancy that can act with 
greater flexibility than a national army, perhaps analogous to guerrilla tactics, and later in the 
same note is connected to the war of position: “Il vero arditismo, cioè l’arditismo moderno, è 
proprio della guerra di posizione, così come si è rivelata nel 14–18.” [True arditismo, that is, 
modern arditismo, is peculiar to the war of position, as became apparent in 1914–18]. In 
Notebook 1 § 134, however, Gramsci takes care to distinguish arditismo from “forms of partisan 
war,” citing as examples the Balkan Komitadji and the Irish guerrillas:  
I comitagi, gli irlandesi, e le altre forme di guerra da partigiani devono essere 
staccate dalla quistione dell’arditismo, sebbene paiano avere con esso punti di 
contatto. Queste forme di lotta sono proprie di minoranze deboli ma esasperate 
contro maggioranze bene organizzate: mentre l’arditismo moderno presuppone 
una grande riserva, immobilizzata per varie ragioni, ma potenzialmente efficiente, 
che lo sostiene e lo alimenta con apporti individuali. 
[The comitadjis, the Irish, and the other forms of partisan war must be separated 
from the question of arditismo, even though they seem to be related in some 
respects. These forms belong specifically to weak but exasperated minorities 
opposing well-organized majorities, whereas modern arditismo presupposes a 
large reserve force, immobilized for various reasons but potentially effective, 
which supports and sustains it with individual contributions.] 
Arditismo is now defined as a form of struggle proper not to a minority but to a latent majority. 
There is a dialectic of “voluntarism” and spontaneity, of a mass movement spurred on by 
                                                                                                                                                             
accordance with Gramsci’s revisions in the later notebook. All unattributed translations of other 
authors are mine. 
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organized cells, that resonates with the theory of foquismo that emerged out of the Cuban 
revolution, prior to Debray’s reassessment following the failed efforts of “exportation”15; Guevara 
writes, 
Es importante destacar que la lucha guerrillera es una lucha de masas, es una lucha 
de pueblo: la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del 
mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la población. . . . Por esto es preciso 
acudir a la guerra de guerra de guerrillas cuando se tiene junto a sí un núcleo 
mayoritario y para defenderse de la opresión un número infinitamente menor de 
armas. (14) 
[It is important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of 
the people. The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the 
people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves. . . . Guerilla 
warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a 
much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression.] (52) 
Here priority is given to the “spontaneous” will of the masses, and the “voluntarist” force of an 
armed vanguard serves as a mere tactical stimulus. Debray articulates this position in his defense 
of foquismo or “Fidelism,” contrary to the claims of its critics who would argue, based on the 
failed attempts to “export” the Cuban revolution, that foquismo is a tragically voluntarist strategy 
(but here specifically in the context of a discussion of the failed Brazilian Communist coup led by 
Luís Carlos Prestes in 1935): 
The most serious mistake would be to see in the foco a revival of Blanquism. 
                                                 
15 See Fonseca (pp. 76–77) for a discussion of arditismo in connection with Leninist hegemony as 
vanguardism as well as Latin American foquismo (qualified as Trotskyist).  
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Although it starts as a tiny group—from 10 to 30 individuals, professional 
revolutionaries entirely dedicated to the cause and aiming to win power—the foco 
does not by any means attempt to seize power on its own, by one audacious 
stroke. Nor even does it aim to conquer power by means of war or through a 
military defeat of the enemy: it only aspires to enable the masses themselves to 
overthrow the established power. It is a minority, certainly, but one which, unlike 
the Blanquist minority of activists, aims to win over the masses before and not 
after the seizure of power, and which makes this the essential condition of the final 
conquest of power. (1965: 27) 
Like Gramsci’s arditi, the guerrilla foco of the 1950s and 1960s represents an incipient or latent 
hegemonic (mass) force, but one that still must operate in a context of repression in which 
revolutionary struggle cannot be waged unarmed.  
The name arditi was later adopted by fascist paramilitary units, but also by antifascist 
militias called the Arditi del Popolo. In 1921, Gramsci opposes Socialist member of parliament 
and political leader of the Arditi del Popolo Giuseppe Mingrino’s position that its members 
should carry out only defensive actions in an article in L’Ordine Nuovo, contending that such a 
limitation would neutralize the power of the movement, confining it to trade union (that is, 
corporative) goals. Mingrino’s position, Gramsci argues, is premised on a naïve understanding of 
the fascist opponent. He writes,  
bisogna invece vedere il fascismo nella sua realtà obbiettiva . . . come uno 
spontaneo pullulare di energie reazionarie che si aggregano, si disgregano, si 
riassociano, seguendo i capi ufficiali solo quando le loro parole d'ordine 
corrispondono all'intima natura del movimento, che è quella che è, nonostante i 
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discorsi di Mussolini, i comunicati di Pasella, gli alalà di tutti gli idealisti di questo 
mondo? 
Iniziare un movimento di riscossa popolare, aderire a un movimento di 
riscossa popolare ponendo preventivamente un limite alla sua espansione, è il più 
grave errore di tattica che si possa commettere in questo momento.  
[Fascism must rather be understood in its objective reality . . . as a spontaneous 
swarm of reactionary energies that coalesce, dissolve and then reassemble, 
following the official leaders only when their orders correspond to the inner 
nature of the movement. This is what it is, regardless of the speeches of Mussolini, 
the statements of Pasella, and the war cries of all the idealists in the world. 
To launch, or join, a movement of popular resistance – while setting in 
advance limits to its expansion—is the gravest tactical error one could commit in 
this moment.] (Trans. Ben W., with my modifications) 
The people should be armed, Gramsci maintains, but also allowed autonomous political 
organization and action. The disciplined subsumption of the Arditi under more rigid political 
leadership would, moreover, he points out, instrumentalize its militants and put them at risk of 
being massacred if they are deployed from above as a mere armed vanguard. Although the 
L’Ordine Nuovo article predates the note in which arditismo is defined as merely tactical, there is 
here already an implied privileging of the diffuse, political (rather than merely corporative) 
nature of the Arditi del Popolo as a broader strategic conception of the struggle against fascism.  
 In § 18 of Notebook 14, “Machiavelli. Voluntarism and Garibaldism” (a revised version 
of § 244 of Notebook 8, “Machiavelli. Against ‘voluntarism’ or Garibaldism”), in which Gramsci 
criticizes an individualistic rhetoric of heroism, he uses the term arditi as a synonym for 
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vanguard, itself a military metaphor so central to discourses pertaining to culture that it has 
become catachrestic (in the sense of a metaphor without substitution elaborated by Derrida, 
following Pierre Fontanier16), its metaphoricity forgotten.17 Like vanguardism, hegemony, and 
indeed the very category of the intellectual as cultural and political function, arditismo has a 
necessarily double sense, as organic popular leadership or as an agent of domination and of the 
perpetuation of elite privilege.  
Le “avanguardie” senza esercito di rincalzo, gli “arditi” senza fanteria e artiglieria, 
sono anch’esse trasposizioni del linguaggio dell’eroismo retorico; non così le 
avanguardie e gli arditi come funzioni specializzate di organismi complessi e 
regolari. Così è della concezione delle élites di intellettuali senza massa, ma non 
degli intellettuali che si sentono legati organicamente a una massa nazionale-
popolare. In realtà si lotta contro queste degenerazioni di falsi eroismi e di pseudo-
aristocrazie stimolando la formazione di blocchi sociali omogenei e compatti che 
esprimono un gruppo di intellettuali, di arditi, un’avanguardia loro propria che 
reagiscono nel loro blocco per svilupparlo e non solo per perpetuare il loro 
dominio zingaresco. 
[“Vanguards” without an army behind them, commandos (arditi) without 
infantry and artillery, are transpositions of the rhetorical language of heroism; not 
                                                 
16 Derrida 1982: 255–257.  
17 Buttigeig translates arditi as commandos in Q 8 § 244, a choice that I maintain in my 
translation of the revised note here. It should nonetheless be noted that the term is not used in 
this general sense in Italian (the same word of Latin origin, commando, is used in Italian). Arditi 
as a military term retains its historical specificity originating in the First World War (as a 
common adjective it simply means daring, courageous, etc.). 
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so vanguards and commandos as specialized functions of complex and regular 
organisms. Such is the elite conception of intellectuals removed from the masses, 
but not of intellectuals that feel themselves to be organically linked to a national-
popular mass. In reality the struggle is against these false notions of heroism and 
pseudo-aristocracy and for the formation of homogeneous social blocs and 
alliances that produce a group of intellectuals, of commandos (arditi), a vanguard 
of their own that acts within their bloc to develop it and not only to perpetuate 
their Gypsy-like domination.] 
As the concept moves from the sphere of military to political and cultural activity (a rhetorical 
move with which Gramsci was never entirely satisfied, as noted in the passage cited in footnote 4, 
above, despite his continual return to various forms of these military metaphors), arditismo as a 
more improvised, clandestine, and prolonged form of militancy comes to signify the core of 
political struggle rather than its mere supplement, and the war of position becomes a figure for 
the shift to the terrain of hegemony, ideology, and culture.18  
                                                 
18 Marco Fonseca frames arditismo as a strategy within the war of position in Negrian terms 
(something perhaps suggested by Gramsci’s use of the word pullulare [translated here as 
“swarm”] in the L’Ordine Nuovo article): “In Gramsci’s sense, then, popular organizations 
committed to counter-hegemony are radically autonomous, rhizomatic, multiple, heterogeneous, 
and even prefigurative or utopian expressions of what can be called self-constitutive, self-
authorizing and self-legitimating practices of modern militant activism that, if we look at them in 
the context of today’s neoliberal capitalism, can also operate as a form of neo-arditismo, a kind of 
cultural guerilla warfare subversive of the process of hegemony and the passive revolution that 
operate invisibly at the heart of modern types of civil society. Counter-hegemonic popular 
organizations are, thus, radically collective and oppositional forces in the war of position, and 
Gramsci by no means suggests that civil society should be fought with civil society, or hegemony 
with hegemony, or the state with the state. In this regard, Gramsci transcends Lenin’s basic 
notion of hegemony as leadership and Lenin’s basic formula for a shift in the balance of forces 
towards the leadership of the proletariat and its party within an existing capitalist hegemonic 
regime or historical bloc. Gramsci here is decidedly post-Leninist” (Fonseca 119). 
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From military to political struggle: The war of position 
 The recurring trope of the “war of position,” defined in opposition to the war of 
movement, is connected to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony first as the predominant military 
strategy of Western industrialized states—that is, states in which hegemony predominates over 
sheer force—while the war of movement is relegated to a tactical role19 (“La guerra di posizione 
domanda enormi sacrifizi a masse sterminate di popolazione; perciò è necessaria una 
concentrazione inaudita dell’egemonia” [The war of position calls on enormous masses of people 
to make huge sacrifices; that is why an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is required] 
[Q 6 § 138]); it then comes to signify not only the form of warfare that accompanies, or follows, 
the construction of hegemony, but the conquest of hegemony itself as the political correlate of 
this form of military struggle (a transposition made, for example, in Notebook 8 § 52: “la guerra 
di posizione, in politica, è il concetto di egemonia, che può nascere solo dopo l’avvento di certe 
premesse e cioè: le grandi organizzazioni popolari di tipo moderno, che rappresentano come le 
“trincee” e le fortificazioni permanenti della guerra di posizione.” [in politics, the war of position 
is the concept of hegemony that can only come into existence after certain things are already in 
place, namely, the large popular organizations of the modern type that represent, as it were, the 
trenches and the permanent fortifications of the war of position]).  
                                                 
19 In Q 7 § 10, quoted at length below, Gramsci writes, “Con ciò non si vuol dire che la tattica 
d’assalto e di sfondamento e la guerra manovrata debbano essere considerate come ormai sparite 
dallo studio dell’arte militare: sarebbe un grosso errore. Ma esse, nelle guerre tra gli Stati più 
avanzati industrialmente e civilmente, devono considerarsi ridotte più a funzione tattica che a 
funzione strategica, così come era la guerra d’assedio nel periodo precedente della storia militare” 
[This does not mean that the tactics of assault and incursion and the war of maneuver should 
now be considered to be utterly erased from the study of military science; that would be a serious 
error. But in wars among the most industrially and socially advanced states, these methods of war 
must be seen to have a reduced tactical function rather than a strategic function; their place in 
military history is analogous to that of siege warfare in the previous period]. 
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Gramsci develops this metaphoric—but, again, not only metaphoric—relation between 
the military and political strategies of the war of position at length in note 10 of Notebook 7, 
titled “Structure and superstructure,” identifying the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the pivotal 
moment after which the war of movement became anachronistic.20 If 1917 represented a 
“revolution against Capital” because it proved that the bourgeois revolution and the entire 
historical stage it was to inaugurate could be skipped, that the proletariat could lead a socialist 
revolution without the period of training that subsumption under capital would provide,21 it also 
represented a victory that was irreproducible in industrialized Europe.  
                                                 
20 The note opens with Gramsci’s criticism of Rosa Luxemburg’s The Mass Strike, which he reads 
as overly economistic: “Ricordare il libretto della Rosa . . . erano trascurati gli elementi volontari 
e organizzativi . . . per pregiudizio “economistico,” li trascurava inconsciamente; questo libretto 
mi pare il più significativo della teoria della guerra manovrata applicata alla scienza storica e 
all’arte politica. L’elemento economico immediato (crisi ecc.) è considerato come l’artiglieria 
campale nella guerra . . . di creare fulmineamente la concentrazione dell’ideologia e dei fini da 
raggiungere. Era una forma di ferreo determinismo economistico, con l’aggravante che gli effetti 
ne erano concepiti come rapidissimi nel tempo e nello spazio” [Take note of Rosa’s little book . . . 
The “voluntary” and organizational elements are ignored . . . because of her “economistic” 
prejudice, she unconsciously ignored them. This little book, in my view, constitutes the most 
significant theory of the war of maneuver applied to the study of history and to the art of politics. 
The immediate economic factor (crises, etc.) is seen as the field artillery employed in war to open 
a breach in the enemy’s defenses . . . to produce, in a flash, a concentration of ideology and of the 
ends to be achieved. It was a rigid form of economic determinism, made worse by the notion that 
effects of the immediate economic factor would unfold at lightning speed in time and space] (cf. 
Q 13 § 24). Luxemburg, it should be noted, stresses the unity of political and economic struggle 
in the mass strike, and unequivocally denies such a notion of a victory at “lightning speed”: “It is 
absurd to think of the mass strike as one act, one isolated action. The mass strike is rather the 
indication, the rallying idea, of a whole period of the class struggle lasting for years, perhaps for 
decades” (141).  
21 “In Russia, Marx’s Capital was more a book of the bourgeoisie than of the proletariat. It was a 
critical demonstration of the necessity that events must take a certain course in Russia: a 
bourgeoisie had to develop, the capitalistic era had to get under way and civilization on the 
Western model be introduced, before the proletariat could even start thinking about its own 
revolt, its own demands, its own revolution. But events have overtaken ideology” (“The 
Revolution Against Capital” 39). 
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In this note Gramsci initially writes “trench warfare,” but then changes “trenches” to 
“positions,” a choice maintained in his transcription of the note in Notebook 13 § 24: “La guerra 
di trincee posizione non è infatti solo costituita dalle trincee vere e proprie, ma da tutto il sistema 
organizzativo e industriale del territorio che è alle spalle dell’esercito schierato” [A war of 
(trenches) position in fact does not consist solely of a set of actual trenches; it comprises the 
entire organizational and industrial structure of the territory that lies behind the arrayed forces]. 
This revision contributes to the flexibility of the concept to move with greater ease from a strictly 
military sense into the sphere of political struggle. Because the superstructural “trenches” of 
modern civil society offer greater resistance to the “immediate economic factor,” the notion of 
revolution as a heroic event is superseded by one of prolonged political struggle that requires an 
in-depth study of the elements of civil society, and their progressive occupation and 
transformation. In this way the war of position not only articulates a conceptual relation between 
two parallel spheres through analogy, but can designate a shift from military to cultural struggle. 
Finally, the war of position is connected in a number of passages in the notebooks to the 
notion of passive revolution (elsewhere called “revolution without revolution” [Q 1 § 44; Q 19 § 
24] or “revolution-restoration” [passim]), and situated within a broader periodization scheme 
according to which the war of movement gives way to the war of position as the general mode of 
historical development after the French Revolution. The first victorious “war of position,” 
according to this scheme, is that of liberalism in the nineteenth century, followed, in the 
twentieth century, by fascism. In Notebook 8, for example: 
Non sarebbe il fascismo precisamente la forma di “rivoluzione passiva” propria del 
secolo XX come il liberalismo lo è stato del secolo XIX? . . . Questa concezione 
potrebbe essere avvicinata a quella che in politica si può chiamare “guerra di 
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posizione” in opposizione alla guerra di movimento. Così nel ciclo storico 
precedente la Rivoluzione francese sarebbe stata “guerra di movimento” e l’epoca 
liberale del secolo XIX una lunga guerra di posizione. 
[If liberalism was the form of “passive revolution specific to the nineteenth 
century, wouldn’t fascism be, precisely, the form of “passive revolution” specific to 
the twentieth century? . . . This idea can be compared22 to the concept of what, in 
political terms, one might call “war of position,” as opposed to war of movement. 
Thus one might say that, in the previous historical cycle, the French Revolution 
was a “war of movement,” whereas the liberal epoch of the nineteenth century was 
a long war of position.] (Q 8 § 236) 
In Notebook 10 § 9, passive revolution is defined as the political equivalent of the war of position 
understood as proper to the economic sphere, and in Q 15 § 11, on the Risorgimento, Gramsci 
asks whether there is an “absolute identity” between the two concepts, or at least a coincidence of 
the two during a certain historical period. The war of position as political or broadly 
superstructural rather than armed struggle cannot therefore be equated with a given 
superstructural content; for example, of either liberal or radical socialist democracy, either of 
which might claim such an identity through their respective understandings of “civil society” as 
the field of politics.  
 
                                                 
22 I have changed only this word from Buttigieg’s translation; he translates avvicinata as 
“juxtaposed,” suggesting that the two concepts are contrasted rather than likened to one another, 
perhaps indicating a resistance to reading the war of position as potentially reactionary. 
Avvicinarsi, while closer to “juxtapose” in the most literal sense in that both refer to a spatial 
relation of contiguity, denotes similarity rather than contrast.  
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II. Civil society against the state 
 
 In 1979, midway between the beginning of the “opening” of the military regime in Brazil 
and de-escalation of repressive measures initiated in 1974 and the formal transition to civilian 
government in 1985, Coutinho published his most influential essay, “A democracia como valor 
universal.” Marco Aurélio Nogueira describes the impact of this text on the Brazilian left: 
O ensaio de Coutinho funcionou como um verdadeiro divisor de águas no 
marxismo brasileiro. Gerou polêmicas até então inimagináveis, polarizou a 
esquerda, fez com que viessem á superfície o doutrinarismo e a resistência à 
mudança dos militantes comunistas, impulsionou realinhamentos teóricos 
fundamentais e, sobretudo, ajudou a consolidar, entre muitos revolucionários, 
uma cultura política democrática e uma visão moderna do socialismo. Isso sem 
falar dos efeitos renovadores que teve sobre o próprio liberalismo brasileiro.  
[Coutinho’s essay marked a before and after in Brazilian Marxism. It generated 
polemics that had previously been unimaginable, polarized the left, brought the 
doctrinarism and resistance to change of the militant communists to light, 
prompted basic theoretical realignments, and, above all, helped to consolidate, 
among many revolutionaries, a democratic political culture and a modern 
conception of socialism. Not to mention its role in renewing Brazilian liberalism.] 
(137) 
While Noguiera frames this intervention in terms of a “polarization” of Brazilian Marxism, he 
also (and more pertinently) emphasizes its unifying function, the “consolidation . . . of a 
democratic political culture and a modern vision of socialism,” and signals, in its resonance not 
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only among socialist intellectuals but also within Brazilian liberalism, a recognition of common 
interests and values that unite the socialist left and the liberal-democratic center-left in their 
opposition to authoritarianism. Those who held fast to a militant position, a “golpismo de 
esquerda” [literally, coup-ism of the left] (37) that had already failed in practice, were now 
exposed as theoretically obsolete, unmodern. With “A democracia como valor universal,” 
Coutinho upholds a concept of democracy that is substantive rather than functionalist and is 
equated with socialism as an end in itself rather than subordinated to it as a strategic medium. He 
introduces in this text a deployment of Gramsci’s conceptual toolkit that he will take up in many 
of the texts that I examine in what follows, explicitly situating his reading within a lineage that 
comes through Togliatti (60). 
 Note 16 of notebook 7, on the war of maneuver and the war of position, is cited with 
astounding frequency in Latin Americanist scholarship on Gramsci, and Coutinho centers his 
argument for Gramsci’s utility for Brazilian socialist theory and practice around this fragment (as 
will Zavaleta, and Portantiero also cites it).23 The original passage reads:  
In Oriente lo Stato era tutto, la società civile era primordiale e gelatinosa; 
nell’Occidente tra Stato e società civile c’era un giusto rapporto e nel tremolio 
dello Stato si scorgeva subito una robusta struttura della società civile. Lo Stato era 
solo una trincea avanzata, dietro cui stava una robusta catena di fortezze e di 
casematte; più o meno, da Stato a Stato, si capisce, ma questo appunto domandava 
un’accurata ricognizione di carattere nazionale. 
[In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; 
                                                 
23 For a discussion of the frequent misuse and decontextualized readings of this passage, see 
Joseph A. Buttigieg’s “Gramsci on Civil Society” (Boundary 2, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 1–32). 
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in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when 
the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil society was immediately revealed. The 
State was just a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses 
and emplacements.] 
Coutinho offers different translations of this passage in different texts. In “As categorias de 
Gramsci e a realidade brasileira,” he renders “un giusto rapporto” literally as “uma justa relação”; 
on at least two other occasions, however, the same phrase is translated “uma relação equilibrada 
entre Estado e sociedade civil” (1985: 66; 2000: 88, 172), implying a balance, or, potentially, a 
tension, between two opposing forces, rather than an organic articulation. 
 In discussing Gramsci’s expansion of the concept of the state, Coutinho posits a dual 
nature of this “integral state,” and the relative autonomy of civil society within this binary 
structure. He outlines this theory taking as his point of departure Norberto Bobbio’s 
identification of Gramsci’s designation of civil society as superstructural (against Marx, for 
whom it constitutes the structural social relations of the economy) (1985: 60; 1989: 73), but 
distinguishes his reading from Bobbio’s by arguing that from this transformation or 
repositioning of the concept of civil society it does not follow, as Bobbio claims, that the 
superstructure becomes a determining element and no longer a mere expression of the structural 
base. This claim requires a complex edifice of argumentation, of equivalences and oppositions 
that can be summarized as follows: (1) the superstructure is of a binary nature and is identical to 
the integral state, that is, political society (or the state in the narrow sense, or dictatorship, or 
coercion) plus civil society (the field of hegemony, or consenso24); (2) The relative autonomy of 
                                                 
24 Consensus or consent. In Coutinho—as is conventional in Spanish and Portuguese translations 
of Gramsci’s concept—the Italian term is shifted toward the sense of consensus (Pt. consenso), 
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these two spheres is determined in two ways: first, through a rigorous distinction between 
coercion and hegemony,25 and second, through the existence of separate material structures 
corresponding to each sphere which come to occupy the position of the material base, namely, 
the institutions of government, the police, and the military, and those of civil society (roughly 
corresponding to Althusser’s repressive state apparatuses and ideological state apparatuses, 
though conceptualized differently). Coutinho privileges this “ontological,” “material 
independence” of the institutions of civil society in his explication of Gramsci’s theory of the 
state—“é essa indepêndencia material . . . que funda ontologicamente a sociedade civil como uma 
esfera própria, dotada de legalidade própria” [it is this material independence . . . that founds 
civil society ontologically as a separate sphere, with its own laws] (1989: 77). This perhaps allows 
Coutinho to claim fidelity to a certain materialist orthodoxy, but in doing so he rewrites the 
notions of base and superstructure, reducing this relation to a mere distinction between the 
material and immaterial in a quite literal sense. Base and superstructure are no longer categories 
of any theoretical value, since the real relation (or opposition) here is between civil society and 
the state, first claimed to jointly constitute the superstructure but then found to each contain its 
own base. The result is a concept of civil society that is neither determinant of the state (as in 
Marx) nor closely articulated with it (as in Gramsci), but has a dual structure—internally divided 
into material base and ideological superstructure—parallel to that of the state. 
 This idea of parallel structures emerges once more in an essay that traces the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                             
implying a more active form of agreement than mere consent. This is perhaps the most obvious 
translation, but it is worth noting that a word closer to the English consent—consentimento—is 
also available in Portuguese, while both concepts are covered by the Italian consenso. 
25 For a critique of this distinction, see Pereyra (5–19). 
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dual power from Marx, through Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky, and concludes by suggesting that 
this genealogy constitutes the historical roots of Gramsci’s concept of the war of position, refined 
by his Eurocommunist successors: Togliatti, Poulantzas, Vacca. Coutinho argues that the seeds of 
the transcendence of Marx’s “explosive revolution” are already present in Engels, in his 
introduction to the 1895 edition of The Class Struggles in France. Here Engels offers a revision of 
Marx’s definition of the state as the executive committee of the ruling class, proposing a new 
concept of a contractual state that includes a plurality of interests. The subsequent Leninist and 
Trotskyist theories of dual power as a transitional phase that must end in the destruction of one 
by the other are rejected, and a version of Engels’ theory of the “contractual” state reemerges in 
Gramsci and his heirs. Through this linear genealogical construction, Coutinho rejects the 
original content of the concept of dual power, and yet borrows the name to give new meaning to 
the Gramscian concept of the integral state (49). Both concepts are transformed in the process: 
dual power becomes a balance of forces rather than a parallel operation of two opposing powers, 
and the integral state assumes a binary (or pluralistic) structure in terms of interests or 
ideological content and not merely in terms of means (coercion and hegemony). The “integral” 
state, here and elsewhere in Coutinho, through a series of semantic associations, comes to 
connote the inclusion of a multiplicity of political subjects, rather than merely the integration of 
state and non-state organs, grafting Gramsci’s text onto a contemporary discourse of democratic 
pluralism and social inclusion.26 
 Returning to Coutinho’s application of these concepts to Brazil, and to the passage on 
Western versus Eastern states and the war of position as opposed to the war of maneuver: 
                                                 
26  I discuss a similar use of the concept in Álvaro García Linera in Chapter 3.  
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Coutinho argues in “As categorias de Gramsci e a realidade brasileira” (1989) that the Brazilian 
state, founded on the exploitation of slave labor, has historically been of the Eastern type, basing 
this argument on an evaluation of the relative strength or weakness of society vis-à-vis the state: 
“o que torna possível afirmar a predominância de pontos de semelhança com o modelo ‘oriental’ 
é o fato de que não só a sociedade civil era até pouco tempo ‘primitiva e gelatinosa,’ mas também 
de que o Estado—ao contrário das mencionadas sociedades liberais—foi sempre bastante forte” 
[what makes it possible to affirm the predominance of points of resemblance with the “Eastern” 
model is the fact that not only was civil society “primitive and gelatinous” until recently, but the 
state—unlike in the liberal societies he refers to—was always comparatively strong] (212). During 
the latter half of the twentieth century, however, Coutinho claims that Brazilian society 
embarked upon a process of Westernization through which civil society gained a certain degree 
of “autonomy”;27 Westernization here is equated with organized, grassroots struggle against the 
ruling class rather than the hegemonic integration of civil society into the social order defended 
and represented by the state. 
                                                 
27 This progression is placed in a relation of antagonism with respect to the military regime 
established with the coup of 1964, which is constructed above all as a reactionary attack on this 
growing autonomy, albeit one that ultimately fails: 
a tendência à “ocidentalização” da sociedade brasileira continuou a predominar, 
reforçando-se ainda mais no período 1955–1964. Essa tendência foi obviamente freada 
pelo golpe de Estado de 1964 que . . . buscou por todos os meios quebrar os organismos 
autônomos da sociedade civil. . . . Todavia, apesar de tudo, a sociedade civil—embora por 
vezes duramente reprimida—sempre conservou uma margem de autonomia real.  
[the tendency toward the “Westernization” of Brazilian society continued to 
predominate, becoming even more pronounced in the period between 1955 and 1964. 
This tendency was obviously halted by the coup of 1964 that . . . sought by all means 
possible to break the autonomous organisms of civil society. . . . Still, in spite of 
everything, civil society—if sometimes brutally repressed—always preserved some degree 
of real autonomy.] (123) 
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 There is in this reading a conflation of Gramsci’s East/West dichotomy and a state/society 
opposition that resonates with a global trend of anti-statism in processes of democratization,28 
but which has also been a central theme of Brazilian social thought at least since Gilberto Freyre’s 
notorious defense of “social democracy,” used interchangeably with “racial democracy,” as 
obviating the need for a “merely political democracy” (Freyre 18) at the level of the state. 
Gramsci’s (far from unequivocal) phrase “primordiale e gelatinosa,” an attribute that Coutinho 
applies to Brazilian society until the second half of the twentieth century, refers not to an absence 
and not even primarily to a weakness or deficiency (though certainly these are implied to some 
extent), but to a lack of structural organization, and of articulation with the institutions of the 
state. More to the point, in the first sentence of the passage he cites from the notebooks, 
Coutinho reads “Lo stato era tutto” as affirming a degree of presence, of strength, of power. 
Certainly the immediacy of state power often appears as heightened presence, and the association 
of Gramsci’s characterization of Tsarist Russia with colonial and early republican Brazil, in which 
a landed oligarchy ruled over a population of slaves and poor laborers with little mediation of 
bourgeois institutions of civil society, is not entirely unfounded. But a more precise 
interpretation of the first clause in this opposition—“lo Stato era tutto, la società civile era 
primordiale e gelatinosa”—would be not that the state is everything in that it is strong, expansive, 
omnipresent, occupying the space left empty by an unformed civil society, but that it is 
everything in the sense of being all there is: in that it cannot enlist the support of civil society and 
therefore does not occupy this space; it lacks the necessary connection to the organs of civil 
society to reinforce its power. 
                                                 




  This reversal with regard to Gramsci’s use of these categories serves to shift the terms of 
the discourse toward pluralism and grassroots democratic mobilization, rehabilitating a Marxist 
tradition (at least nominally) that had in recent decades been charged with obsolescence by 
integrating it into a broader discourse of the Latin American left, and specifically of the Brazilian 
PT, which, Coutinho notes, constitutes a coalition of appreciable ideological heterogeneity. This 
gesture is necessarily bidirectional: a Marxist identity is preserved in the inhospitable climate of 
globalized capitalism following the collapse of “real socialism,” and a discourse and practice 
compatible with (and perhaps indistinguishable from) that of the liberal democratic left is given 
radical overtones. 
 According to Coutinho’s reading, in the Eastern model the state permeates the social 
fabric, foreclosing the possibility of organized opposition, while in the Western model civil 
society enjoys a degree of autonomy that enables it to contest the dominant ideology of the state, 
limiting the reach of its institutions. What for Gramsci is merely the terrain on which the war of 
position is waged, for Coutinho is something like conquered territory from the outset. “Civil 
society” is equated here with “the masses” and with political agency “from below,” and thus is 
conceived as necessarily bearing a democratic content. A concept of civil society as a space, or 
structure, slips continually into the form of a subject,29 and the war of position—a war waged 
                                                 
29 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato propose a revision or development of Gramsci’s theory in a 
vein very similar to Coutinho’s reading, though without attributing their innovations to Gramsci 
himself, whom they consider to have been confined by a “functionalist reduction of civil society” 
(152). The idea of civil society, and more specifically that of liberal democratic political culture, 
as a good in itself, they note, emerged in the discourse of anti-authoritarian social and political 
actors in the transitions to democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and is a defining 
trait of post-Marxism, and possibly post-Gramscianism (71). Coutinho seems to exemplify what 
Cohen and Arato identify as a desirable transformation of Gramsci’s concepts, and yet he almost 
always chooses to present himself as a faithful apostle, arguing the case for Gramsci’s timeliness 
and appositeness to Brazilian social conditions, and seeks to distance himself from declared 
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within the structures of civil society for the radical transformation of the state conceived in its 
expanded form—is simplified into a war between society and the state. 
 
 
III. From civil society to pueblo 
 
  If Coutinho implicitly abandons the logic of base and superstructure while still claiming 
adherence to a materialist position, Aricó and Portantiero both take as their explicit point of 
departure in writing Gramsci into Latin American socialist theory the transcendence of this logic. 
Each stresses in different ways the effectivity of the superstructural moment, no longer a mere 
expression or reflection of the socio-economic structure; the productivity of the state as 
inseparable, in short, from the productivity of culture, of the intellectuals, of the ethico-political 
moment. 
 In Aricó’s Marx y América Latina, this anti-economistic perspective informs an argument 
against the conventional wisdom that attributes Marx’s inattention to Latin America simply to 
the Eurocentrism of the times. This view follows from an orthodox construction of the Marxist 
canon in which certain texts—those that question the universality of a historical process in which 
the development of capitalism is a necessary precondition for socialist revolution, and even 
propose an inversion of the model in which revolutionary mobilization spreads from the center 
to the periphery—are excluded as apocryphal, designated as “circumstantial” and devoid of 
                                                                                                                                                             
advocates of liberalism; Cohen and Arato, on the other hand, while uncommonly rigorous in 
their analysis, read Gramsci from a position that seeks to deliberately distinguish itself from 




theoretical significance (58; 76). If we cannot accept this reductive explanation, Aricó suggests, 
we must take a closer look at Marx’s marginalization of Latin America in order to deduce its 
cause. Aricó does this by examining a rare text in which Marx does indeed discuss Latin 
American politics, but does so in a way entirely inconsistent with his own theory and method 
(120). In a text on Simón Bolivar, Aricó claims, Marx fails to offer any materialist or structural 
basis or, for that matter, any theoretical basis at all, for his criticism of the figure that embodies 
the emergence of the independent Latin American nation states, and thus writes off the continent 
as untheorizable. Aricó concludes that this theoretical blind spot is the result of Marx’s 
overzealous reaction to Hegel’s philosophy of the state as subject of history, which prevents him 
from recognizing the capacity of the state to act upon or “produce” civil society, inverting the 
logic of social base and political superstructure (128). 
 The relative strength of this capacity constitutes for Aricó the singularity of Latin 
American societies, and leads him, by bringing to the fore Marx’s failure to address such cases, to 
propose a revision of classical Marxist theory that resonates with Gramsci’s thought. It is 
therefore not so much Gramsci who facilitates a reading of Latin America, but the other way 
around: Latin America demands a Gramscian rewriting of Marx. In La cola del diablo, Aricó 
describes the affinity of Gramsci’s historical context with his own in terms of 
el implícito reconocimiento por parte de Gramsci de dos rasgos que 
caracterizaron el proceso de constitución de nuestros estados nacionales: una 
autonomía considerable de la esfera ideológica y una evidente incapacidad de 
autoconstitución de la sociedad. Colocados en este plano de análisis, los grandes 
temas de la revolución pasiva, del bonapartismo y de la relación intelectuales-
masa, que constituyen lo propio de la indagación gramsciana, tienen para 
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nosotros una concreta resonancia empírica.  
[Gramsci’s implicit recognition of features that characterize the process of the 
constitution of our national states: a considerable degree of autonomy in the 
ideological sphere and an evident incapacity for the self-constitution of society. 
On this level of analysis, the major themes of passive revolution, Bonapartism, 
and the relation between the intellectuals and the masses, which constitute the 
core of Gramsci’s research project, have a concrete empirical resonance for us.] 
(1988: 96) 
Gramsci’s empirical situation, in this reading, allowed him to arrive at an understanding of the 
historical productivity of superstructural elements lacking in Marx, which in turn serves as a 
model of theoretical production from and on the basis of Latin American societies. 
 The Gramscian turn in Argentina, with a strong regionalist overtone, entailed a 
reconstruction of the origins of Latin American Marxism in its own image. Aricó characterizes 
one of the canonical founders of the Latin American Marxist tradition, José Carlos Mariátegui, as 
Gramscian not by influence (he was just three years younger than Gramsci and cannot have been 
familiar with much of his work, although he studied in Italy) but as a result of the commonalities 
in the social problems they confronted—those of a “peripheral” formation largely constituted by 
non-proletarian (peasant) masses. The concrete problems that Aricó identifies in the conflict that 
arose between Mariátegui and the European Marxist institutional authorities of the period—the 
early years of the Third International—also carried a strong resonance in the Southern Cone at 
the time. In his introduction to the anthology, Mariátegui y los orígenes del marxismo 
latinoamericano, Aricó writes, 
La condena del populismo encubría en realidad la negación de toda posibilidad 
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subversiva y revolucionaria de movimientos ideológicos y políticos de las masas 
populares que no fueran dirigidos directamente por los comunistas. . . . Al 
establecer una relación de discontinuidad entre el movimiento comunista y los 
movimientos sociales que precedieron la constitución de aquella formación 
política, contribuyeron a romper los lazos ideológicos, políticos y culturales que 
los vinculaban con las realidades nacionales y que les podían permitir convertirse 
en una expresión originaria de ellas, antes que ser la expresión de una doctrina 
“externa” y por tanto “impuesta” a las formaciones nacionales siempre 
históricamente concretas.  
[The denunciation of populism really concealed a denial of any subversive or 
revolutionary capacity of the ideological and political movements of the popular 
masses that were not directly led by the communists. . . . In establishing a relation 
of discontinuity between the communist movement and the social movements 
that preceded the constitution of that political formation, they helped to break the 
ideological, political, and cultural links that connected them to the national 
realities and that allowed them to become their original expression, rather than 
the expression of a doctrine “external” to and therefore “imposed” upon the 
always historically concrete national formations.] (xxxviii) 
Mariátegui comes to represent a precedent for the articulation of socialism and populism, 
understood as the predominant mode of mobilization of the Argentine masses, and at the same 
time serves as a justificatory example of a certain heterodoxy, a process of autonomization from 
the European tradition. This departure is validated by an alternative source within the same 
European tradition: a thought that is at once inside and outside the metropolitan origin and 
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center, and thus confers a certain legitimacy even as it authorizes a divergence from the 
institutions that claim the legacy of this origin. Gramsci here serves to lend a certain prestige to 
the figure of Mariátegui and by extension an entire Latin American tradition, and this 
equivalence in turn justifies Gramsci’s appropriation for the development of a new theoretical 
practice from Latin America after the bankruptcy of the traditional models. Aricó writes of the 
Comintern’s censure of Mariátegui, “En primer lugar, condujeron a excluir por principio toda 
búsqueda original basada en el estado social del país y no a partir de doctrinas sectarias” [In the 
first place, they led the exclusion in principle of any original inquiry based on the social 
condition of the country rather than on sectarian doctrines] (xxxix), and he emphasizes in 
Mariátegui “la acuciante necesidad de hacer emerger el socialismo de la propia realidad, de 
convertir al marxismo en la expresión propia y originaria de la acción teórica y práctica de las 
clases subalternas por conquistar su autonomía histórica” [the urgent need to make socialism 
emerge from reality itself, to turn Marxism into the the proper and originary expression of the 
the theoretical and practical action of the subaltern classes in their conquest of historical 
autonomy] (lii). The new guiding theoretical principle would be the subordination of theory to 
the local empirical reality, clearly a proposition of sufficient generality to allow its development 
in a number of directions. 
 Portantiero’s reading of Gramsci resonates strongly with Aricó’s account in the passage 
cited above from La cola del diablo, and he emphasizes in particular Gramsci’s interest in 
“Bonapartist,” or populist configurations. The Argentine left has, since the boom in academic 
Marxism in the 1960s, found itself in a double bind in relation to the most formative experience 
of the working class: that of Peronism. In 1970 Portantiero and Miguel Murmis published 
Estudios sobre los orígenes del peronismo, a volume that brings together two essays on the 
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conditions and early gestation of the Peronist hegemonic configuration, arguing against both 
those who attribute to the subaltern classes an absolute ingenuity and heteronomy (the majority 
within the academy) and those who uncritically extol the radical potential of the popular masses 
as emerging political subject. The previous literature on the subject, according to Murmis’ and 
Portantiero’s overview, is invariably premised on the claim that the Argentine working class at 
the time of the emergence of populism as a political option was internally divided into “old” and 
“new” sectors: the old workers, mostly with immigrant backgrounds, resemble the classic 
European model of a proletariat with a history of organization and consciousness of their 
structural position; the new workers, which in this reading represent the dominant element 
quantitatively and qualitatively in the populist movement, exhibit a state of ideological vacancy. 
For Peronism’s critics, this vacancy translates into a docility and manipulability, a predisposition 
to a purely emotive mode of interpellation by the state; for its apologists, it represents a kind of 
natural purity and potential for revolutionary innovation. Murmis and Portantiero argue that 
this premise is both theoretically and empirically flawed. They present evidence for a high degree 
of autonomous syndicalist organization on the European (“old”) model in the early stages of 
Peronism, and argue that the new hegemonic configuration is constituted through an alliance of 
classes rather than simply through the subordination and manipulation of the workers. This 
alliance may have been the best strategic option at the time, and resulted in an objective 
amelioration of the conditions of existence of the working class. And yet, it failed in the long 
term to transform the social relations of production. 
 This double critique constitutes a response to what I have called the double bind of the 
Peronist legacy: the challenge of articulating a constructive analysis of the dominant mode of 
popular political subjectification that neither posits a pre-given, self-cognizant mass subject nor 
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forecloses the possibility of autonomy. Portantiero takes up this task again in his work on 
Gramsci, proposing that his theorization of the construction of hegemony is particularly 
pertinent not, as Coutinho would have it, in the West proper, but in the peripheral West where 
one form or another of “populism” has been the dominant mode of articulation of the national 
and the popular, and of the people with the state. This subcategory of peripheral capitalist 
Western states, in which Gramsci classes Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Poland, seems apposite to his 
object of study, and allows him to think a mode of relation between the masses and the state 
outside of the model of an organized civil society, deemed proper to advanced or central Western 
states, and a mode of collective agency of subaltern classes that do not constitute an industrial 
proletariat (124). 
 The structures of mediation between society and the state that Portantiero identifies as 
proper to peripheral countries exemplified in the populist movements that emerged in the 1930s 
continued to organize the primary force of resistance against and constitutive enemy of the 
Argentine dictatorship. In Los usos de Gramsci, his main interlocutors are once again the critics 
of populism who adhere to the standard claim that in Peronism and analogous movements 
throughout the continent (varguismo, cardenismo) the “people” are passive and infantilized, 
deceived and manipulated by cunning elites.30 But in the texts written with Murmis, the 
refutation of this claim maintains one of its central premises—that only a class with a history of 
syndicalist organization can possess any degree of autonomy, that consciousness must be 
preceded by proletarianization on the classic, European model; they demonstrate that the 
                                                 
30 Cf. Q 13 § 18: “Alcuni aspetti teorici e pratici dell’ ‘economismo.’” Portantiero’s argument 
largely anticipates Ernesto Laclau’s. Portantiero, unlike Laclau, however, does not posit populism 
as constitutive of the political as such, but maintains its specificity to “peripheral” societies. 
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Peronist workers did in fact draw on such a history and that the unions maintained a high level 
of autonomous participation in the early stages of the regime. For Portantiero and Murmis, this 
syndicalism is what distinguishes Peronism from other instances of “populism,” and leads the 
authors to question the suitability of this designation. In Los usos de Gramsci, this emphasis on 
syndicalism is absent, and Portantiero’s reexamination of the category of “populism,” which he 
now unhesitatingly applies to the Argentine experience, is articulated as a critique of the 
assumption that political subjecthood is produced necessarily and exclusively by economic 
conditions, which in practice refers to those conditions that accompanied the development of 
class struggle in Europe, precluding the development of popular consciousness beyond the 
dominant capitalist countries.31	
 Portantiero maintains the Marxian schema of civil society as base and state as 
superstructure as the basis of his critique of a deterministic “socio-centrism” rather than the 
Gramscian model in which civil society is subsumed under the superstructure,32 so that the 
                                                 
31 “La historia de la emergencia de las clases populares no puede ser asimilada con el desarrollo 
de grupos económicos que gradualmente se van constituyendo socialmente hasta lograr coronar 
esa presencia en el campo de la política como fuerzas autónomas. Su constitución como sujeto 
social está moldeada por la ideología y por la política desde un comienzo: cuando aparecen en la 
escena lo hacen de la mano de grandes movimientos populares y su emergencia coincide con 
desequilibrios profundos en toda la sociedad, con crisis del estado.” [The history of the 
emergence of the popular classes cannot be likened to the development of economic groups that 
gradually constitute themselves socially until they achieve a presence as autonomous forces in the 
political sphere. Their constitution as social subjects is molded by ideology and politics from the 
outset: when they appear on the scene they do so together with great popular movements and 
their emergence coincides with profound social disequilibriums, with crises of the state] (128). 
32 “En realidad—y esto lo planteó claramente Gramsci—, la distinción entre sociedad civil y 
sociedad política (o entre ‘base’ como dato y ‘superestructura’ como reflejo) jamás fue orgánica, 
sino meramente analítica: la ideología y la práctica burguesas tendían a imaginar esa disociación, 
pero la penetración de lo político-estatal en lo económico-social siempre había existido, aunque 
en el estado liberal restringido ello resultaba menos visible empíricamente.” [In fact—and 
Gramsci clearly stated this—, the distinction between civil society and politcal society (between 
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critique of the base-superstructure model corresponds to a critique of the state/society 
opposition: 
Si la propuesta gramsciana puede significar un avance, lo es—sobre todo y en 
principio—por las impasses que el sustancialismo dualista de las esferas 
“separadas” y “preexistentes” plantea para el desarrollo de una teoría de la política, 
tal como el caso del marxismo estructuralista francés lo ha demostrado 
patéticamente, algo más de una década atrás.  
[If the Gramscian project represents a step forward, it is—above all and in 
principle—because of the impasses that the dualistic essentialism of “separate” and 
“preexisting” spheres creates for the development of a theory of politics, as the 
case of the Marxism of French structuralism forcefully demonstrated over a 
decade ago.] (1988: 108) 
In this way a more familiar polemical discourse, against the canonical Marx but also, and more 
immediately, against a certain reading of an Althusserian determinism, and one which 
Portantiero shares, for example, with Coutinho, is mobilized against a new dichotomy, and one 
which is ultimately reified in Coutinho. 
 Portantiero coincides with Aricó in locating Gramsci’s utility for the Latin American left 
in the notion of the historical productivity of superstructural elements, but while for Aricó the 
capacity for self-constitution of such a subject is limited in Latin America, Portantiero stresses 
the emergence of a popular collective political subject despite the predominance of the state in 
                                                                                                                                                             
“base” as a fact and “superstructure” as reflection) was never organic, but merely analytical: 
bourgeois ideology and practice tended to imagine this dissociation, but the penetration of the 
political and of the state in the socio-economic has always existed, although in the restricted 
liberal state it is less empirically visible.] (1988: 108) 
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the formulation of hegemonic national projects. Coutinho seeks to redeem through Gramsci a 
plurality of extra-state social actors loosely articulated in terms of interests or ideological 
orientation but unified through a concept of civil society that posits an intrinsic value in such a 
mobilization; the identification of socialism and democracy is thus achieved through the positing 
of a pluralistic popular subject with the power to resist and, to an extent, determine the operation 
of the state. In Aricó and Portantiero, the popular subject of democracy is constituted not against 
but through the superstructural moment of the state (or the vanguard organization as emergent 
state). What I am interested in highlighting here as a symptomatic commonality despite the 
important differences in the texts that make up this necessarily limited but representative corpus 
is the impulse to locate a stable democratic subject in the particular historical modes of 
organization proper to the region. It is a criticism meant to dismiss neither the value nor the 
singularity of its textual objects, but to signal a broader discursive tendency that perhaps 
obstructs the work of continuous reconstitution that democratic thinking requires. 
 
IV. The masses as epistemic object of democracy 
 
  Zavaleta credits Gramsci with a central concept in his later work, what he refers to as the 
“social optimum”—the degree of coordination between the state and civil society, “the relational 
quality of a society” (Lo nacional-popular 104)—which he derives from Gramsci’s military 
metaphor in which the state is but a “forward trench” of a superstructural field constituted by the 
institutions of civil society. My discussion of this concept in Zavaleta—that of the “optimum”—
follows two related considerations that recur in several of Zavaleta’s texts: the first is his critique 
or qualification of the dichotomy of Eastern and Western states that frames Gramsci’s 
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presentation of the state-society relation in notebook 7 §16; the second is what Zavaleta calls the 
epistemological (gnoseológico) function of this relation, which is the operation of liberal 
democracy. 
 In “El Estado en América Latina,” Zavaleta argues, against both instrumentalist and 
structuralist theories of the state, that the state must be understood as an autonomous, volitional 
subject: autonomous by definition, according to a usage of the term which properly designates a 
modern form, its precapitalist counterpart merely a fraction of “civil society” (which he does not 
restrict to any historical period, but here seems to use to designate the social in a broad sense) 
that has not yet constructed itself as a general class, separate from any particular social group; 
volitional in that as a synthesis (as Lenin claimed) of civil society, the state is not a mere product 
or reflection, but a selective and deliberate construction out of the elements of the larger 
superstructure, which is then projected back onto society as its true self. The superstructural 
social text (which is not ontologically separable from the economic structure, but merely 
distinguished from it as a methodological necessity for social-scientific analysis), on the other 
hand, necessarily lacks this unified or unifying volitional center, and gathers heterogeneous and 
conflicting elements, contingent products of a particular history. This imbrication of inherited 
and emerging forms approximates Raymond Williams’ model, but diverges from it in that a 
temporal heterogeneity is not organized into a predetermined, progressive sequence; elements 
extraneous to the capitalist order are not mere residues on their way out but integral and active 
components that combine with new historical forms to produce unforeseeable results. The 
articulation of the state and civil society—neither mechanistically determined nor directly 
governed by a seamless dominant superstructural organization—is therefore a complex and 
crucial factor in the analysis of a given social order and the elaboration of a strategy for its 
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transformation, and it is here that Zavaleta turns to Gramsci. In reference to the passage in 
notebook 7 § 16, he underscores the value of Gramsci’s theoretical construction of this relation, 
but questions the explicit spatial distribution and implicit temporal ordering of the types of state 
determined by it. 
 That the terms oriente and ocidente are inadequate labels for a generalizable taxonomy of 
state forms by the 1980s should go without saying, and here Zavaleta skips the deliberation as to 
where to place which Latin American states according to this schema that is almost ubiquitous in 
Latin Americanist discussions of Gramsci.33 Rather than problematizing the category of oriente, 
Zavaleta focusses on the descriptor gelatinosa, specifically in its connection to that of the 
primordial or the primitive (primordiale; primitiva, rather than primordial, in the Spanish 
translation that Zavaleta cites, as in Coutinho’s Portuguese), proposing, in addition to Gramsci’s 
sense of gelatinous in reference to a civil society that lacks the institutional organization 
applicable to precapitalist societies (and, therefore, prenational and prestatist societies, in the 
strictest sense in Zavaleta’s—and Gramsci’s—conception of the state), one that applies 
exclusively and necessarily to capitalist countries.34 The gelatinous, in this latter sense, is opposed 
                                                 
33 In Lo nacional-popular, he writes, “Se ha dicho que acá Gramsci utiliza el término Oriente en 
un sentido metafórico, lo cual, en todo caso, sería una metáfora con nombre y apellido. En 
realidad es un exceso culturalista suponer que el capitalismo ocurre en Europa porque es 
occidental” [It has been said that here Gramsci uses the term East in a metaphorical sense, 
although in any case it is a metaphor with a proper name. It is a culturalist exaggeration to 
suppose that capitalism exists in Europe because it is Western] (51). 
34 “[H]ay formas de lo gelatinoso. Gelatinosa, por ejemplo, es una sociedad incapaz de producir 
opinión pública, y lo es sin duda aquella en que no se dan las condiciones para producir formas 
racional-comprobables del poder. El capitalismo organizado produce sin excepción formas 
modernas de sociedad gelatinosa. En el caso de ciertos países como Perú y Bolivia, el verdadero 
problema no está en la gelatinosidad de lo social, sino en su osificación: la sociedad sigue 
sometida a la profundidad de su momento constitutivo.” [There are different forms of the 
gelatinous. A society incapable of producing public opinion, for example, is gelatinous, and 
 
 48 
not to the articulated, structured organs of “Western” civil society, but to the ossified effects of 
the constitutive moment of traditional societies that are territorially coterminous with peripheral, 
dependent capitalist states. 
 This is not a simple inversion of terms (nor would it constitute, even if it were, any kind 
of challenge to an Orientalist discourse, in which the representation of traditional societies as 
fixed, ossified, is perhaps even more familiar than that of a primordial or “primitive” disorder). 
Zavaleta’s qualification constitutes rather an extrication of Gramsci’s conceptual innovation from 
a linear world-historical teleology that happens to be Eurocentric. This move is consistent with 
the spirit of Gramsci’s own rigorous historicism and antidogmatism, a methodological principle 
that is inevitably applied imperfectly (an inevitability to which Zavaleta is no more immune). 
There is no more a necessary historical progression from fixity to fluidity and mobility than, as 
Gramsci’s language (that is, that which he has inherited and reproduces) implies, from 
primordial chaos to order, but rather a contingent incidence of historical conditions that may 
give rise to an intersubjectivity capable of self-organization. From the critique of the ordering of 
the categories that define this “optimum” a modification of the concept of the optimum itself 
necessarily follows, which can no longer be thought as something attained once and for all, or 
even progressively approximated, as the ultimate expression or destiny of capitalist development: 
“Es verdad que ésta, la del óptimo, es una metáfora, que la realidad no produce más que 
aproximaciones hacia ella. En cualquier forma, incluso si existe, no existe para siempre y es algo 
                                                                                                                                                             
surely so is one that lacks the necessary conditions for the production of rational-verifiable forms 
of power. Organized capitalism produces only modern forms of gelatinous society. In the case of 
certain countries like Peru and Bolivia, the real problem is not in the gelatinousness of the social, 
but in its ossification: society continues to be subject to the depth of its constitutive moment.] 
(“El Estado en América Latina” 348). 
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que se obtiene y se pierde” [What we are calling the optimum is of course a metaphor, and in 
reality it can only be approximated. In any case, even if it exists, it does not exist once and for all 
but is something that is gained and lost] (Lo nacional-popular 52). 
 In Lo nacional-popular, Zavaleta argues that precapitalist or “backward” (atrasada) 
societies should be considered more rather than less complex than capitalist ones.35 As with the 
category of the “gelatinous,” this move implies a redefinition of what is meant by complexity 
(namely, heterogeneity, even disarticulation rather than an articulation that produces a certain 
totalization and homogenization), but it also indicates that an opposition based on the notion of 
the complex organizational structure of capitalist societies tends to erroneously presuppose an 
undifferentiated, homogeneous social mass as the mere negation of organizational complexity 
that precedes the capitalist nation-state. 
 This qualification leads Zavaleta to theorize the bidirectional mechanism through which 
this relation (between the volitional unity of the state and the heterogeneity or mobility of the 
social base) is established in terms of legibility: 
Es claro con todo que, por lo mismo que el Estado debe adaptarse en el 
capitalismo a una base perpetuamente móvil, debe también actuar por medio de 
                                                 
35 “Se puede sin duda considerar como algo inmediatamente falso el que se piense en una 
sociedad capitalista como algo más complejo, de hecho, que una sociedad precapitalista. Es cierto 
que el capitalismo multiplica el tiempo social, pero no lo es menos que torna homogénea 
(estandarizada) a la sociedad. Al fin y al cabo, las clases nacionales, la propia nación, las grandes 
unidades sociales relativamente uniformes son propias del capitalismo y, en este sentido, 
cualquier sociedad atrasada es más abigarrada y compleja que una sociedad capitalista.” [We 
consider the premise that capitalist societies are more complex than precapitalist societies to be 
patently false. It’s true that capitalism multiplies social time, but it is no less true that it 
homogenizes, standardizes society. Ultimately, national classes, the nation itself, vast, relatively 
uniform social units, are proper to capitalism and, in this sense, any backward society is more 
heterogeneous and complex than a capitalist society.] (2009: 50) 
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métodos de lectura de la sociedad o métodos de conocimiento social como la 
democracia política considerada en esta acepción. El sistema de trincheras no es así 
sino el conjunto de mediaciones, estructuras y soportes mediante los cuales existe 
la sociedad civil ante el Estado y el Estado político ante la sociedad civil, o sea 
aquella fase intermedia sin la cual la voluntad consciente de la política o 
irresistibilidad (el Estado) y la sociedad (o sea el espacio de ofrecimiento de las 
circunstancias a la voluntad política o el de recibimiento de ella) no se pueden 
conocer una a la otra.  
[Of course, just as in capitalism the state must adapt to a perpetually moving base, 
it must also act through methods of reading or methods of social knowledge such 
as political democracy in this sense. The trench system is thus nothing but the set 
of mediations, structures, and supports through which civil society exists before 
the state and the political state before civil society, that is, the intermediate phase 
without which the conscious will of politics or power (the state) and society (the 
space of production of the conditions of a political will or of its reception) cannot 
know one another.] (Lo nacional-popular 49–50) 
Societies are legible insofar as they have been simplified by industrialization; this legibility in turn 
facilitates the hegemonic organization of civil society by the state. The instrument through which 
this mechanism operates is called representative democracy. Democracy in this sense is neither a 
concession obtained through passive revolution, as Coutinho would claim (1987: 106–107), nor a 
collective subjectivity constructed through the dialectical mutual constitution of the people and 
the state as construed in the populist tradition, but a barometer, a “method of reading” used to 
maintain an “optimum” state-society relation that maximizes the effectiveness of the state in the 
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broad sense. Zavaleta develops this epistemological concept of democracy in “Cuatro conceptos 
de la democracia,” where he argues that representative democracy performs the same function as 
the “quantitative techniques” of the social sciences, but with a far greater efficacy: 
 Las técnicas cuantitativas pueden revelar las modificaciones del modo de 
producción, pero sólo en el rango de la prognosis, como verosimilitudes medias o, 
en todo caso, como certeza ex post. La política, en cambio, o sea la democracia, 
que aquí tiene un significado idéntico en absoluto, retiene de inmediato las 
palpitaciones de los sitios de la sociedad; los mediadores convierten esas 
contracciones en materia estatal. Para decirlo de otra manera, la democracia oye el 
ruido del corpus social. 
  Está claro a dónde llegamos en este tercer sentido o índole de lo 
democrático o, al menos, a dónde queríamos llegar. Aquí la democracia se insinúa 
como un acto del Estado. Entonces la conciencia del Estado civil, en esta fase 
gnoseológica, es sólo el objeto de la democracia, pero el sujeto democrático (es un 
decir) es la clase dominante, o sea su personificación en el Estado racional, que es 
el burócrata. La democracia funciona por consiguiente como una astucia de la 
dictadura; es el momento no democrático de la democracia. 
[Cuantitative tecniques can reveal modifications in the mode of production, but 
only at the level of prognosis, as approximations or, in any case, as ex post 
certainties. Politics, on the other hand, that is, democracy, which here means 
exactly the same thing, immediately registers the palpitations of society’s different 
sites; the mediators convert these contractions into state substance. In other 
words, democracy hears the noise of the social body. 
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 It’s clear where this third sense or quality of the democratic leads us or, at 
least, where we want to arrive. Here democracy appears as an act of the state. The 
consciousness of the civil state, then, in this gnoseological phase, is only the object 
of democracy, but the democratic subject (so to speak) is the dominant class, that 
is, its embodiment in the rational state, which is the bureacratic state. Democracy 
therefore functions as a ruse of dictatorship; this is the non-democratic moment of 
democracy.] (2009: 132)	
 The concept of democracy opposed to this “gnoseological” function in the service of 
bourgeois dictatorship is, in the simplest terms, the self-determination of the masses; the 
problem that remains is what is meant by this and how it is to be achieved. It’s obvious that we 
cannot dispense with representative democracy, and Zavaleta says so explicitly (“Cuatro 
conceptos” 127). Our task is to combat the self-perfecting mechanisms of the capitalist state from 
within a liberal democratic society; I conclude this chapter by offering two different moments in 
Zavaleta’s thinking in which he grapples with this question. 
 The opening paragraph of “Cuatro conceptos” is repeated in the beginning of the second 
chapter of Lo nacional-popular, but its sense is altered by what follows. (“Cuatro conceptos” was 
probably written first, as Lo nacional-popular was unfinished at the time of Zavaleta’s death, but 
we can’t be sure of this.) Here are the two passages: 
En el desconcierto absoluto o malestar cósmico que produce la multiplicación de 
los objetos del mundo, los hombres están solos en medio de las cosas que se 
amplían sin cesar. ¿No es verdad acaso que esto es ya la soledad de la época, la 




 El conjunto de estos acontecimientos ontológicos desemboca en la 
cuestión de la democracia, que es la medida de la presencia del hombre, como una 
entidad activa frente a la vida, en una época cuya señal de esencia es su 
totalización.  
[In the absolute confusion or cosmic unease produced by the multiplication of 
objects in the world, men are alone in the midst of things, which are increasing 
endlessly. Is this not now the solitude of the age, the general fallacy of its identity 
and, in short, what we might call the second loss of the self? 
 These ontological events lead to the question of democracy, which is the 
measure of the presence of man, as an active entity in the face of life, in an era 
whose esential mark is its totalization.] (“Cuatro conceptos” 121) 
 En el desconcierto absoluto o malestar que produce la multiplicación de los 
objetos del mundo, los hombres están solos en medio de las cosas que se amplían 
sin cesar. ¿No es verdad acaso que esto es ya la soledad de la época, la falacia 
general de su identidad y, en fin, lo que podemos llamar la segunda pérdida del 
yo? 
 La época es cuantiosa y es como si huyera de nosotros, como si significara 
siempre algo distinto de sí misma, perdida en el número enorme de sus 
acontecimientos invisibles. No obstante, a pesar de estar abrumando a los 
hombres de continuo, tiene una suerte de flanco de fracaso en medio de esta 
suerte de asedio infinito y consiste en que puede ser conocida. 
[In the absolute confusion or unease produced by the multiplication of objects in 
the world, men are alone in the midst of things, which are increasing endlessly. Is 
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this not now the solitude of the age, the general fallacy of its identity and, in short, 
what we might call the second loss of the self? 
 The era is multitudinous and it is as if it were fleeing from us, as if it always 
signified something other than itself, lost in the enormous number of its invisible 
events. Nonetheless, despite continually overwhelming us, it has a weak flank 
amidst this sort of infinite siege and this consists in that it can be known.] (Lo 
nacional-popular 75) 
In “Cuatro conceptos,” there is a direct opposition between the existing order and the subject of 
democracy that asserts itself as an “active entity” before the ontological fact of totalization. 
Throughout the essay this opposition is maintained: democratic practice entails a challenge to 
the mode of knowledge that measures, quantifies, and affirms the real. The possibility of rupture 
lies in the ineradicable heterogeneity of the social ground and the contingency of historical 
events. In Lo nacional-popular, this mode of knowledge—and the corresponding order of 
existence that produces it—is a pharmakon: at once the condition of our subjection and of our 
subjectification. In this case, the intellectual labor of the “social sciences,” and of philosophical 
thought, which in Zavaleta’s own texts cannot be rigorously separated, is both complicit with the 
logic of totalization and necessary for its critique. The question as to whether another mode of 
knowledge is possible is left open to us. 
 
 My interest in this chapter has been in tracing the construction of the collective political 
subject—as democratic subject, in keeping with the equivalence that Zavaleta establishes here—
in the period of redemocratization following the collapse of the military dictatorships of the 
1960s to the 1980s. The general impulse that I have taken as the focus of my analysis is one 
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toward a closure of a constituted social subject thought in terms of “civil society”; the Gramscian 
“war of position” provides a conceptual frame through which a unified consciousness and agency 
of such a subject is posited. This critical reading of the invocation of an unquestioned democratic 
subject called civil society as antidote to a statist authoritarianism of the right, but also of the left, 
should be borne in mind in the following chapters, where I turn to the increasingly state-centered 
politics of the leftist regimes of the twenty-first century in Latin America, over more or less the 





Subalternity and the National-Popular  
 
The rise and decline of an electoral left in Latin America over the first decade and a half of 
the twenty-first century has provided an evolving frame for ongoing theoretical debates 
concerning the state, the subject, and, in the particular thread that I take up in this chapter, the 
categories of hegemony, subalternity, and the national-popular. My interest here is in the 
relation—most often one of opposition—that is constructed in Latin Americanist scholarship 
between these last two concepts, originally borrowed from Antonio Gramsci: that of the 
national-popular as modernist, developmentalist, homogenizing, and hegemonic, and that of 
subalternity, as heterogeneous, a-telic, and, finally a- or post- (rather than pre-) hegemonic. This 
opposition comes to structure much of the discourse of Latin American(ist) cultural studies in 
the late twentieth century, and has been reworked since the emergence of the so-called “pink 
tide” regimes of the twenty-first century that repeat—with a difference, of course—nationalist 
and populist modes of interpellation of an earlier era, now in a register that is, in varying degrees, 
explicitly anti-neoliberal, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist. Through a critical reading of the 
evolving forms of a debate around these concepts, in this chapter I am less interested in 
advancing an argument in favor of one side over the other than in drawing attention to the 
historical and political determinants of the various iterations of the propositions at play, from a 
non-determinist position, that is, with the understanding that this determination is never total.  
The “Founding Statement” of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, formed in 
1993 and inspired by the work of the South Asian collective that emerged a decade earlier, opens 
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by citing three historical conditions to which the group seeks to respond: “the end of 
communism and the consequent displacement of revolutionary projects, the processes of 
redemocratization, and the new dynamics created by the effects of the mass media and 
transnational economic arrangements” (110). Although expressed as simultaneous aspects of the 
text’s present, these three interconnected conditions refer to different—sequentially organized, 
although overlapping—moments in the history of the region in the second half of the twentieth 
century: the period of armed struggle that began with the Cuban Revolution and its 
reverberations, the series of military dictatorships authorized by U.S. counterinsurgency policy, 
and the neoliberal horizon of the societies that emerged from their collapse. 
“Redemocratization”—and this, the authors claim, is the most important aspect36—implies a 
return, but this is not a circular history, and the transitions to democracy, within the parameters 
of the Washington Consensus, in fact sealed the eclipse of the national-popular (or nationalist 
and populist) democratic paradigm that prevailed prior to the decades of authoritarian rule.  
The relation to this moment of the project of the Latin American Subaltern Studies 
Group—and Latin Americanist left intellectuals in general, within the broader context of the 
contested political significance of postmodernist or even poststructuralist thought—is fraught 
with the tension between an opposition to neoliberal globalization and an affiliation with a 
pluralistic democratic politics that rejects the model of the nationalist/populist state; an anti-
statism of the left oscillates between a self-conception as a necessary adaptation to the political 
conditions imposed by the market anti-statism of the right and a general, theoretically grounded 
resistance to constituted forms of power. This left anti-statism is expressed in an attention to 
                                                 
36 “It is above all the emerging consensus on the need for a democratic world order that sets the 
stage for our work” (117). 
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objects and actors whose marginalization in relation to the state and the hegemonic national 
culture is not conceived as a lack, and which are not placed within a narrative of active or 
potential (that is, desired) incorporation or emergence into the national scene. In a mode 
resonant with the original South Asian Subaltern Studies group’s focus on peasant insurgency, 
this work proceeds through the selection of social movements like that of the Zapatistas—as an 
insurgent collectivity that does not aspire to state power—as favored objects of study and sites of 
political solidarity;37 in the sphere of cultural production, there is a privileging of practices below 
the sanctioned cultural circuits and outside of the formal economy. Subalternity is sought as the 
locus of a disarticulation of the national and the popular and, ultimately, of the unified or 
unifying notion of the people itself. 
The political and cultural discourses that best—or at least first—exemplify the “national-
popular” as developmentalism for these authors emerge throughout Latin America in a series of 
analogous populist movements since the 1930s, including Cardenism in Mexico, Aprismo in 
Peru, Peronism in Argentina, Varguism in Brazil, and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement 
in Bolivia. These regimes establish a broadly inclusive notion of the “people” as subject of the 
nation in a way unprecedented in the region, through a route other than the traditional 
bourgeois production of liberal citizenship, but firmly within a teleology of capitalist 
modernization and industrialization. In their mode of popular interpellation, the revolutionary 
(or state-capitalist) regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua are largely consubstantial with the classical 
populist movements. The Latin American Subaltern Studies Group identified an affinity between 
                                                 
37 José Rabasa’s Without History (2010) offers a strong and representative performance of such a 
reading of the Zapatista movement against state-centric political theory, and specifically against 
what he identifies as a thoroughly vanguardist and developmentalist Gramscian conception of 
subaltern studies (46, 124, and passim).  
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this teleological articulation of the people-as-nation in the political sphere and, in the cultural 
sphere, the literature of the Latin American “Boom”—whose writers often aligned themselves 
with the revolutionary projects—and a series of ideologemes produced simultaneously or 
subsequently in the fields of literary and cultural criticism: mestizaje, transculturation, 
hybridity.38 Like the national-popular political formations, these forms of cultural and ideological 
production, the subalternist scholars argue, erase difference in its very incorporation.  
The first part of this chapter traces the trajectories of the concepts of subalternity and the 
national-popular from Gramsci through Latin American subaltern studies and its critical 
reformulations since the dissolution of the group. To examine the historical coordinates of this 
shifting theoretical terrain, as well as alternative articulations of the subaltern–national-popular 
relation before and after the twentieth century, I focus my discussion in the second part of the 
chapter on a selection of symptomatic readings of the history of the Andean region, from 
colonial Peru to contemporary Bolivia, via the Bolivian Nationalist Revolution of 1952. In 
looking at the intellectual response to the pink tide, I turn to the provocative intervention of John 
Beverley—a founding member of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group who subsequently 
proposed a partial abandonment of the category of subalternity, proposing in its place a 
“postsubalternism” when he adopted a more statist position,39 diverging sharply from the 
                                                 
38 The concept of transculturation is developed by Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz in his 
Contrapunteo cubano del tabáco y el azúcar (1940) and taken up again by the iconic Latin 
American literary critic Ángel Rama in Transculturación narrativa en América Latina (1982). 
The most widely disseminated theoretical articulation of the concept of hybridity in Latin 
America is that of Néstor García Canclini (Culturas híbridas: Estrategias para entrar y salir de la 
modernidad, 1990). 
39 Beverley’s position was in fact never post- or anti-statist; he initially expresses some affinity 
with the leftist version of the neoliberal assumption of the inadequacy of the nation-state, but 
distinguishes himself from other members of the group for whom this takes the form of an 
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“posthegemonic” turn led by a group of scholars including Alberto Moreiras and Jon Beasley-
Murray—as the best academic exponent of a symptomatic discursive shift that takes place within 
the conjuncture of the first decade of the twenty-first century. I read Beverley alongside an 
author that he takes as a source, from a sphere outside the university and within the immediate 
ideological organs of the state, to offer a critical exposition of the conception of the subaltern as 
national-popular in a text by Bolivian vice president Álvaro García Linera. The work of Bolivian 
sociologist and historian Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui from the 1980s to the present in particular 
guides my reading of the interaction between the histories of the theoretical concepts at work 
here and the historical narratives that constitute their object. 
 
I. A brief genealogy of the concepts 
 
In this section I offer a partial sketch of the Gramscian origin of the concepts of the 
subaltern and the national-popular from the point of view of a particular endpoint in their 
trajectories. My intention here is not only to advance new readings of the formulation of the 
concepts in Gramsci, but to intervene in the growing body of scholarship on their subsequent 
appropriation by proposing a conception of this legacy that is less focused on finding error, or 
even productive misreadings, and instead highlights tensions in the Gramscian sources that 
anticipate future reorientations and even reversals in Gramsci’s theoretical architecture.  
 
Subalternity 
                                                                                                                                                             
absolute and definitive obsolescence. I elaborate on this divergence below. 
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In tracing the history of the category of the subaltern, it should first be noted that the 
development of a specialized concept of subalternity probably owes much to the decision of 
Gramsci’s translators to use the English cognate for almost every occurrence of the term 
subalterno and its variants, which often might have been more naturally (which is not to say 
better) translated with another word—subordinate, oppressed, inferior, etc., depending on the 
context—since the term is in common colloquial use in Italian in a way that it is not in English.40  
In a passage like that in Notebook 4, § 1—“si suppone una scarsa capacità teoretica in Engels (per 
lo meno una sua posizione subalterna in confronto a Marx)” [Engels is supposed to have been 
lacking in theoretical skills (or at least occupies a subaltern position in relation to Marx)] – it 
means simply inferior, and the cognate does not convey anything that “inferior” would not. (I’m 
quoting from Joseph Buttigieg, but Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith also use the 
English “subaltern.”) In most other cases, however, for example where classi subalterne might 
                                                 
40 The Treccani dictionary, for example, gives the following definitions for subalterno: “Che è 
subordinato, in sottordine e in diretta dipendenza, rispetto ad altri di grado maggiore, o anche, 
riferito a istituzioni e sfere di attività, rispetto ad altre di livello superiore . . . sostantivato, con 
valore generico, chi è in un grado gerarchico inferiore o alle dipendenze di altri…” [That which is 
subordinated, inferior and in direct dependence with respect to others of a higher rank, or, in 
reference to institutions and spheres of activity, with respect to others of a higher level . . . as a 
generic noun, that which exists at a lower level hierarchical level or in the service of others]. Vico 
is cited as an example of term’s use in “the arts and sciences”: “la Metafisica è la scienza sublime, 
che ripartisce i certi loro subbietti a tutte le scienze che si dicono ῾subalterne’” [Metaphysics is 
the sublime science which distributes to all the so-called subaltern sciences their determinate 
subject matters], followed by the more quotidian and only recently outdated sense of an 
employee or assistant, and, in a usage that carried over into English in the seventeenth century, 
designating a lower rank in a public or military post. Finally, in “ethnology, sociology, and 
culture,” the Gramscian sense that has developed in the twentieth century is given: “la cultura di 
un popolo che è rimasto a lungo in posizione di dipendenza da una cultura dominante” [the 
culture of a people that has long remained in a position of dependence in relation to a dominant 
culture]. The Oxford English Dictionary, by contrast, gives only specialized or “rare” usages, 
among them that derived from Gramsci’s incorporation, in English translation, into the 
disciplinary lexicon of cultural studies: “Now chiefly in critical and cultural theory, esp. post-
colonial theory: of or relating to those who are marginalized or oppressed.”  
 
 62 
have read “lower classes,” or “oppressed classes,” or the position of the Catholic church could 
have been described as “subordinate” instead of subaltern, the production of a specific concept 
through this iteration may well be warranted.  
In its narrowest sense, the subaltern is one of inferior rank and therefore takes commands 
from a superior. This seems to me to be an apt concept-metaphor for the expanded sense, in 
which subalternity designates instrumentality, a lack of historical personhood and political 
autonomy, a greater degree of subjection to the laws of historical necessity (Notebook 25, § 4). 
This is continuous with some of the intermediate, narrower figurative uses of the military term, 
such as Gramsci’s description of the intellectuals as carrying out subaltern functions of the 
dominant class.41  
If there is a relatively unified concept of subalternity in Gramsci, it is elaborated in 
Notebook 25, in which prior notes, some of which do not yet contain the term, are compiled and 
revised under the title “On the Margins of History (The History of Subaltern Social Groups).” 
Much has been written on the subject, and so I will limit my remarks to some summary 
comments on two areas of debate that come up in this literature and that are pertinent to the 
subsequent uses of the concept in subaltern studies: 
1. Supplementing class. There is a tendency in Gramscian scholarship to point out a 
broadening and indeed an increasing vagueness in the concept as it travels through subaltern 
studies into a more general field of postcolonial theory and cultural studies. While this is 
obviously and inevitably the case if we are looking for a definition that fits all instances over an 
ever-proliferating corpus across not only different authors but different disciplines and 
                                                 
41 Buttigieg sees no significant relationship between these usages (2013: 35), and yet chose—
again, I think rightly—to maintain the cognate in these instances in his excellent translation.  
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theoretical orientations, given the flexibility of the concept in Gramsci noted above, I think that 
the tendency with each of its iterations within the smaller, more easily delimited corpora that 
constitute the major moments of this development (such as that of the early volumes of the 
Subaltern Studies series edited by Ranajit Guha, that of the Latin Americanist group, and an 
evolving definition in Spivak’s work) is rather toward a greater specificity or precision, which 
does not necessarily entail a narrowness of scope.42 Guido Liguori’s contention that the concept 
of subalternity enters cultural studies in a “mistaken . . . attempt to substitute a vision of society 
founded on class divisions with that of a society based solely on differences of culture” (130), for 
example, implies an understanding of “culture,” in its construction as the object of inquiry of the 
field of cultural studies, as that which does not lend itself to more rigorous analytical categories. 
Subalternity in the corpus referenced here is in fact more often conceived as a supplement, rather 
than a mere substitute, for class, or more precisely, a category in which class is necessarily 
supplemented and traversed by other social conditions.43 This supplementation of class is already 
present in Gramsci, if only implicitly theorized. 
A recurring theme of this debate in reference to Gramsci’s own texts has been the 
philological question of the significance of Gramsci’s original terminology in relation to the 
conventional Marxist analogs, alternately claimed as code words to elude the prison censors and 
                                                 
42 Buttigieg maintains that “it is futile to search for or attempt to formulate a precise definition of 
‘subaltern’ or ‘subaltern social groups/classes’ as conceived by Gramsci” (2013: 36), but he seems 
to be in the minority.  
43 Liguori’s position is representative of the critique of “culturalism” in relation to subaltern 
studies that has recently been relaunched as a topic of debate by Vivek Chibber’s controversial 
Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital (2013). For a generous yet critical assessment of 
this position, see Timothy Brennan’s review of Chibber’s book in the New Left Review 
(“Subaltern Stakes,” 2014).  
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as substantial theoretical innovations. Perhaps the most prominent of these is “philosophy of 
praxis,” in relation to Marxism; the most pertinent here is “subaltern” in relation to “proletariat,” 
and then subaltern “groups” in relation to “classes.” In a discussion of Gramsci’s revisions of § 90 
of Notebook 3, Marcus Green writes that “When Gramsci rewrote the note in Notebook 25 [§ 5], 
the special notebook on subaltern groups, he uses the terms ‘subaltern classes’ and ‘subaltern 
groups’ interchangeably. Therefore, although the terms are different, they do not represent a 
difference in meaning for Gramsci” (2002: 9). Peter Thomas, Buttigieg, and Green are among 
those who have argued against the assertion that “subaltern” is a mere code word for 
“proletariat.”44 Yet Buttigieg, having dismissed this claim, finds the censorship argument more 
persuasive as an explanation for the shift away from a strict adherence to the category of class 
(2013: 36).45 This hypothesis seems unfounded to me, as the lexical change is consistent with the 
implicit theorization of the category within the notebook. In revising prior notes in Notebook 25, 
Gramsci almost always changes “classes” to “groups,” and while “classes” is sometimes 
maintained, “groups” is never changed to “classes.” The two words are, therefore, not used 
interchangeably; in gathering his developing ideas into a more cohesive text organized around 
the theme of subalternity, it was clear to Gramsci that in most cases subalternity was not 
reducible to class.46  
                                                 
44 This position is attributed to Spivak; it should be noted, however, that when Spivak writes this, 
she follows it with the claim that “the word soon cleared a space, as words will, and took on the 
task of analysing what ‘proletarian,’ produced by capital logic, could not cover” (2000: 324; she 
has made the same qualification elsewhere). 
45 See also, for example, Christine Buci-Glucksmann (75).  
46 Green himself argues precisely this point—but without reference to the change in wording 
between Notebook 25 and prior notes—in “Race, Class, and Religion: Gramsci’s Conception of 
Subalternity” (2013).  
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This incommensurability with a differential social position defined strictly by class 
relations already implicit in Gramsci is thematized in subaltern studies both in terms of 
methodology (Marxism needs to be supplemented) and in terms of the social subject itself or 
object of study (subjects other than the proletariat come into view). In the unfinished essay that 
Gramsci was writing at the time of his incarceration in 1926, “Some Aspects of the Southern 
Question,” he begins to theorize the place of the peasantry of southern Italy in the communist 
movement. Although this text does not discuss the “subaltern” by name, it is perhaps the best 
expression of Gramsci’s early thinking about subaltern social groups in relation to a process of 
incorporation into a hegemonic bloc. His emphasis, because he was writing within a discourse 
that viewed the peasants as reactionary or underdeveloped in relation to the proletariat as an 
actually or potentially revolutionary class, is on the imperative of including the peasantry within 
a broader revolutionary alliance; he does not, however, question the necessary leadership of the 
proletariat in forging and directing this coalition. While the unification of the peasantry and the 
development of its political consciousness are crucial steps in the revolutionary project, they are 
not to be achieved autonomously. In the early work of the South Asian collective, closely 
following Gramsci’s own lines of inquiry, it is the peasantry, a subject outside of capital logic in a 
particular sense because it is the immediate precapitalist antecedent of the proletariat according 
to the stagist teleology, that occupies this position; it does so, however, in a way that puts this 
teleology into question.  
Already in the work of the South Asian collective, but more explicitly with the Latin 
Americanist group, this category is further complicated—articulated in its difference not only 
from the proletariat as the subject of class struggle but from the logic of struggle as the engine of 
a historical dialectic defined by class positionality—through the category of indigeneity. Guha’s 
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famous definition of the subaltern in the work of the group as “a name for the general attribute of 
subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, 
gender and office or in any other way” in his preface to Selected Subaltern Studies (35), while 
maintaining the breadth of the original concept (rather than reserving it for an elusive radical 
alterity or exteriority per the common allegation of critics of subaltern studies), coincides with 
the transition of the project into the disciplinary and discursive spheres of cultural studies and 
deconstruction, for which the compilation, co-edited with and introduced by Spivak and with a 
foreword by Edward Said, at the same time as providing a certain form of canonization of essays 
from the early volumes of the series, marks a kind of threshold. From this opening to subsume 
other forms of subordination, the concept does indeed, in certain contexts within this later 
corpus, including the work of some of the Latin Americanists, come not to substitute culture for 
class as a structuring principle but to mark a rejection of any kind of structural analysis that 
assumes a linear historical progression or social totality, stagist or not. 
2. The question of autonomy. A second (and related) major theme of the disputed 
appropriation of the concept of the subaltern within cultural theory is that of its relation to 
hegemony and the capacity for autonomous action from a position of subordination. In Gramsci, 
the extent to which subaltern groups can act autonomously is equivalent to the extent of their 
progress in overcoming their condition of subalternity, or “becoming state,” outlined in his 
famous (but tentative) six-point program of study laid out in Notebook 25, § 5 (the first draft of 
which appears in Notebook 3, § 90).47 The phases that Gramsci identifies are: 
                                                 
47 In a prior note of the same notebook (Q3 § 18; cf. Q 24 § 4), however, Gramsci refers to an 
autonomy of the current subaltern classes that precedes the development of the modern state, 
which, it is suggested in this note, reaches its most perfect form with the rise of fascism: “Lo Stato 
moderno abolisce molte autonomie delle classi subalterne, abolisce lo Stato federazione di classi, 
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(1) il formarsi obbiettivo dei gruppi sociali subalterni, per lo sviluppo e i 
rivolgimenti che si verificano nel mondo della produzione economica, la loro 
diffusione quantitativa e la loro origine da gruppi sociali preesistenti, di cui 
conservano per un certo tempo la mentalità, l’ideologia e i fini; (2) il loro aderire 
attivamente o passivamente alle formazioni politiche dominanti, i tentativi di 
influire sui programmi di questi formazioni per imporre rivendicazioni proprie e 
le conseguenze che tali tentativi hanno nel determinare processi di 
decomposizione e di rinnovamento o di neoformazione; 3) la nascita di partiti 
nuovi dei gruppi dominanti per mantenere il consenso e il controllo dei gruppi 
subalterni; (4) le formazioni proprie dei gruppi subalterni per rivendicazioni di 
carattere ristretto e parziale; (5) le nuove formazioni che affermano l’autonomia 
dei gruppi subalterni ma nei vecchi quadri; (6) le formazioni che affermano 
l’autonomia integrale ecc.  
[(1) the objective formation of the subaltern groups through the developments 
and changes that took place in the economic sphere; the extent of their diffusion; 
and their descent from other classes that preceded them, the mentality, ideology, 
and objectives of which they retain for a period of time; (2) their passive or active 
                                                                                                                                                             
ma certe forme di vita interna delle classi subalterne rinascono come partito, sindacato, 
associazione di cultura. La dittatura moderna abolisce anche queste forme di autonomia di classe 
e si sforza di incorporarle nell’attività statale: cioè l’accentramento di tutta la vita nazionale nelle 
mani della classe dominante diventa frenetico e assorbente” [The modern state abolishes many 
autonomies of the subaltern classes — it abolishes the state as a federation of classes—but certain 
forms of the internal life of the subaltern classes are reborn as parties, trade unions, cultural 
associations. The modern dictatorship abolishes these forms of class autonomy as well, and it 
tries hard to incorporate them into the activity of the state: in other words, the centralization of 
the whole life of the nation in the hands of the ruling class becomes frenetic and all-consuming]. 
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adherence to the dominant political formations; that is, their efforts to influence 
the programs of these formations with demands of their own and the 
consequences of these efforts in determining processes of decomposition and 
renewal or new formations; (3) the birth of new parties of the ruling class to 
maintain control of the subaltern classes; (4) the formations of the subaltern 
groups themselves that make demands of a limited and partial nature; (5) the 
formations that assert the autonomy of the subaltern classes, but within the old 
framework; (6) the formations that assert complete autonomy, etc.] 
Here, in addition to the substitution of “classes” in the original version from Notebook 3 in every 
instance where Gramsci writes “groups,” significant changes include the addition of the final 
clause of point 1, “di cui conservano per un certo tempo la mentalità, l’ideologia e i fini,” and, at 
the end of point 2, “e le conseguenze che tali tentativi hanno nel determinare processi di 
decomposizione e di rinnovamento o di neoformazione.” The first addition indicates the 
persistence of ideological structures, and indeed of an ethico-political regime (“objectives” or 
“ends”) across different historical moments in the development of the productive forces 
constitutive of the class/group, that is, across different modes of production. This is consistent 
with the departure from the category of class, as it suggests components of an evolving political 
subjectivity that exceed determination within the class structure. The expansion of point 2 
emphasizes the force of subaltern demands in shaping emergent formations; the progression that 
Gramsci is interested in tracking here is not merely a change in relative position, but a 
substantive alteration of the social formation from below. In both cases the element of continuity 
in the development of a collective social subject is reinforced in Gramsci’s more sustained 
elaboration of the theme.  
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In their work on peasant and worker mobilization, the South Asian Subaltern Studies 
group stressed the relative autonomy of these groups in their objectives and modes of struggle, 
sometimes falling into the developmentalist language that assumes a passage from political 
infancy into mature consciousness, but also modifying the notion of autonomy in the direction 
that Gramsci himself, as I have argued, suggests in his revisions in Notebook 25, emphasizing not 
just a quantitative measure of initiative but also a qualitative difference with regard to the desires, 
ethical principles, and episteme that inform subaltern political action in relation to those of the 
leadership of the nationalist movement. The principal divergence from Gramsci’s envisioned 
methodology lies in that while for Gramsci the study of subaltern groups is framed as 
fundamentally a study of the process of desubalternization, taking into account its substantive, 
ethico-political dimension, in the South Asian Subaltern Studies group’s revision of colonial and 
nationalist historiography the primary focus is on the elements that distinguish these processes 
from the narrative of political modernization assumed by both bourgeois historiography and 
classical Marxism.  
Guha’s claim that in India there was (or is) an autonomous politics of the subaltern 
groups—a position shared by other members of the collective—has sometimes been 
misconstrued as a conception of subalternity as a non-relational condition. Guha takes care to 
preempt such a reading:  
We recognize of course that subordination cannot be understood except as one of 
the constitutive terms of the binary relationship of which the other is dominance 
[not hegemony, which will take the place of “dominance” as subalternity’s 
opposite pole in some of the later subaltern studies work], for “subaltern groups 




The conception of autonomy in the work that Guha is introducing here retains an affinity with 
the Gramscian idea of a graduated process of autonomization, as well as with the methodological 
injunction that every trace of autonomous action should be studied by the “integral historian” 
(Notebook 25, § 2; Notebook 3, § 14), while marking a shift toward a privileging of action from 
below as a potential interruption of the logic of historical progression through capitalist 
modernity, a theoretical bearing that later scholars of subalternity, including the Latin 
Americanists, will take up and amplify.  
Massimo Modonesi—whose work is perhaps of particular interest here because his point 
of departure, the circumstance that he posits as the impetus for his study of the concept of 
subalternity, is the emergence of the pink tide and specifically the processes of desubalternization 
that brought Evo Morales to power in Bolivia and of resubalternization within the new regime 
(23)—articulates a position representative of the charge of an undue attribution of autonomy 
against both the South Asian and Latin Americanist subaltern studies scholars. Modonesi 
identifies in Guha (as representative of subaltern studies in general) “una esencialización 
contradictoria: el subalterno es, por definición, autónomo” [“a contradictory essentialization: the 
subaltern is, by definition, autonomous”] (46). This contradiction, for Modonesi, results from 
Guha’s positing of subaltern autonomy without the mediation of Gramsci’s six-phase process 
(45). The autonomy that Guha claims is indeed prior to and not the transcendence of 
domination or hegemonic control; his assumption of such an autonomous politics or 
“consciousness” does not amount to a Gramscian scheme in which the intermediate steps are 
                                                 
48 The unattributed (and often cited) sentence is from Notebook 3, § 14, transcribed in Notebook 
25, § 2. 
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simply skipped, but to a modified conception of the political “consciousness” or “unity” of 
subaltern groups. Modonesi recognizes this in his criticism of the “possible excesses . . . of 
postcolonialism,” citing Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and Rossana Barragán’s introduction to an 
anthology of essays from the Subaltern Studies series in Spanish translation, where a drift toward 
identity politics that will become a major axis of debate about and within subaltern studies begins 
to take place.  
 Along with the notion that subaltern studies exaggerates the capacity for autonomy on 
the part of subaltern groups there is, and for related reasons, although in reference to its later 
period, a more common, opposite contention that subaltern studies goes too far in denying 
subaltern agency. The link between the two tendencies lies in the separation of subalternity from 
the hegemonic order, first as a positive alterity, and then as an absolute exteriority silenced by its 
discursive incommensurability and therefore conceivable only in negative terms, the ubiquitous 
representative for this position being Spivak’s alleged claim that the subaltern cannot speak. Peter 
Thomas advances a case for a reading of subalternity as inseparable from Gramsci’s theory of the 
integral state, and therefore as a position that is by definition within modernity and within 
hegemony.49 His argument provides a counterpoint to some of the readings of subalternity under 
discussion here in a way that is less straightforward than one might assume at first glance, and 
that therefore merits some comment. In the first place, being cut off from access to the state 
(Spivak’s phrase is slightly different—“removed from all lines of social mobility” [2012: 430, and 
elsewhere]), or the hegemonic discursive field, is indeed a relation to the state, and a constitutive 
one, if the state must constitute itself through what it excludes; in the second place, that 
                                                 
49 “Cosa rimane dei subalterni alla luce dello ‘Stato integrale’?” (2015). 
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externality is not necessarily equivalent to absolute oppression, but can mean precisely the 
opposite, that is, a degree of autonomy, even if this autonomy does not translate into any kind of 
recognizable political agency within the hegemonic sphere of the state. Finally, Spivak insists that 
no one can claim to be subaltern, because subalternity precludes the ability to make claims 
intelligible within the dominant discourse; Thomas’s assertion that “we” are the subalterns (92) 
assumes a different conception of the term, and it is not the same statement that Spivak declares 
impossible, since here there is no trace of identity in the position claimed. In fact, in enlarging the 
scope of subalternity, Thomas is perhaps making a move that has something in common with 
Spivak’s rejection of any vindicatory appropriation of the concept from the site of a particular 
positive identity by means of its restriction. Likewise, Spivak uses the term in a sense entirely 
consistent with Thomas’s when she talks about the dismantling of the welfare state as a process of 
resubalternization.  
Subalternity in Gramsci is always, at least potentially, a moment of a historical process of 
collective subject formation that has a hegemonic articulation as its telos. In most of its 
subsequent iterations it remains a differential position and not a site of radical or absolute 
difference—as Spivak reminds us, a structural position without identity. But in Gramsci it is not 
yet, as it will become for the Latin American subaltern studies scholars, taking up and modifying 
Spivak’s frequently cited definition of the subaltern as “the absolute limit of the place where 
history is narrativized into logic” (1988: 16), a negativity that can be read as a positive force in its 
political and epistemological resistance to any hegemonic articulation. For a certain strain of 
subaltern studies it becomes the position from which to deconstruct the teleology of which in 
Gramsci it constitutes an initial moment, whatever its content, as itself produced by the 
hegemony of modernity, or modernity as hegemony, as totalization. 
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The “Founding Statement” of the Latin American Subaltern Studies group contains the 
different stages of this conceptual development: the history of Latin America is constructed as 
one of (only partially successful) processes of desubalternization, starting with the Mexican and 
then finally the Cuban and Sandinista revolutions, but in the subsequent moments of this history 
of struggle—with the emergence of testimonio in the cultural sphere, for example—the meaning 
and function of the category shifts to one of a vindication of subalternity as a position from 
which to deconstruct the collective—national-popular—projects of liberation. The “Statement” 
ends with a citation of the final lines from Rigoberta Menchú’s testimony edited by Elizabeth 
Burgos: “I’m still keeping secret what I think no one should know. Not even anthropologists or 
intellectuals, no matter how many books they have, can find out all our secrets” (121); the space 
of subalternity guards some positive content that loses its fetishistic power the moment it is 
exposed. Not only is the subaltern removed from the teleology of modernity whose embodiment 
is the state, but this immutable and constitutive removal becomes its positive content, and one 
with political, cultural, and commercial value.  
 
The national-popular 
Gramsci’s most substantial notes on the national-popular deal with the cultural sphere, 
and specifically with the absence of a national-popular literature in Italy. This is connected to the 
socio-historical development of the country, and of particular interest for Gramsci is its relation 
to the question of the lack of popular mobilization in the Risorgimento. In this section I discuss 
the significance of the term as articulated in relation to these two interconnected themes, 
followed by a consideration of other uses of the concept in the notebooks which, taken together, 
highlight the ambiguities already implicit in the cultural and historical notes: in reference to a 
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national-popular collective will as the essence of the modern prince and to the national-popular 
as integration into the capitalist market. 
Notebook 21, titled Problemi della cultura nazionale italiana: I. Letteratura popolare, 
collects revised versions of Gramsci’s key notes on the national-popular. Note 5, “Concetto di 
‘nazionale-popolare,’”50 thematizes the concept as one of theoretical import, formulating the 
problem of the disjunction between the national and the popular in Italy. The note takes as its 
point of departure an article in the periodical Critica Fascista decrying the serial publication in 
Italian newspapers of nineteenth-century French novels and calling for a more rigorous 
examination of the underlying social causes of the greater marketability of foreign literature, 
which, he insists, are not to be found in the judgment of the press, as the Critica piece suggests, or 
in the tastes of its readership, but in the absence of a national intellectual class capable of 
producing a popular literature: 
perché i giornali italiani del 1930, se vogliono diffondersi (o mantenersi) devono 
pubblicare i romanzi d’appendice di un secolo fa (o quelli moderni dello stesso 
tipo)? E perché non esiste in Italia una letteratura “nazionale” dello stesso genere, 
nonostante che essa debba essere redditizia? É da osservare il fatto che in molte 
lingue, “nazionale” e “popolare sono sinonimi o quasi . . . In Italia il termine 
“nazionale” ha un significato molto ristretto ideologicamente e in ogni caso non 
coincide con “popolare,” perché in Italia gli intellettuali sono lontani dal popolo, 
cioè dalla “nazione” e sono invece legati a una tradizione di casta . . . Il termine 
corrente “nazionale” è in Italia legato a questa tradizione intellettuale e libresca . . . 
                                                 
50 See also Notebook 3, § 63, “I nipoti di padre Bresciani.” 
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La letteratura “nazionale” così detta “artistica,” non è popolare in Italia. 
[Why must the Italian newspapers of 1930 publish serial novels from a century 
ago (or modern novels of a similar kind) if they want to increase (or maintain) 
their circulation? And why is there no “national” literature of this type in Italy, if 
there is a market for it? Note the fact that in many languages “national” and 
“popular” are almost synonymous . . . In Italy the term “national” has a very 
narrow ideological sense and in any case it does not coincide with “popular,” 
because in Italy the intellectuals are distant from the people, that is, from the 
“nation,” and they are bound instead to a caste tradition . . . the term “national” in 
common usage is connected to that bookish and intellectual tradition . . . So-called 
“artistic” national literature is not popular in Italy.] 
Here Gramsci identifies a double sense of the term national analogous to that of culture often 
referenced since the emergence of the disciplinary field of cultural studies, asserting that the 
“nation” in Italy was understood as proper to an elite segment of the country, the cultured 
stratum (since in its adjectival form cultured can only designate a distance or distinction from the 
popular or vulgar rather than a natural property of it).  
When Gramsci reiterates the question in the same note, he formulates his answer in 
terms of hegemony:  
Cosa significa il fatto che il popolo italiano legge di preferenza gli scrittori 
stranieri? Significa che esso subisce l’egemonia intellettuale e morale degli 
intellettuali stranieri, che esso si sente legato piú agli intellettuali stranieri che a 
quelli “paesani,” cioè che non esiste nel paese un blocco nazionale intellettuale e 
morale, né gerarchico e tanto meno egualitario. 
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[What is the significance of the fact that Italians prefer to read foreign authors? It 
means that they undergo the intellectual and moral hegemony of foreign 
intellectuals, that they feel more closely linked to foreign intellectuals than to 
national ones, that Italy does not have a moral and intellectual national bloc, 
whether hierarchical or, much less, egalitarian.] 
The national-popular bloc is constituted through a hegemonic relation, which can be more or 
less egalitarian, that is, more or less hierarchical. This relation, in its ideal form, is one of 
identification and education, which alternate in a dialectical process: “i sentimenti popolari non 
sono vissuti come propri dagli scrittori, né gli scrittori hanno una funzione ‘educatrice 
nazionale,’ cioè non si sono posti e non si pongono il problema di elaborare i sentimenti popolari 
dopo averli rivissuti e fatti propri” [popular sentiments are not experienced as those of the 
authors, nor do the authors have a “national educational” function, that is, they have not taken 
up and do not take up the task of developing popular sentiments after reliving them and making 
them their own]. Gramsci’s opposition between an elite and a popular conception of the nation 
does not imply a positive valorization of subaltern “sentiments,” culture, or knowledge as they 
exist, but rather of the will and capacity to develop these, in a sense, from within, into superior 
forms. 
In a note on Vincenzo Gioberti, an intellectual and political leader of the Risorgimento,51 
                                                 
51 Notebook 17, § 9, “Argomenti di cultura: Gioberti e il giacobinismo.” Gramsci cites a passage 
from Gioberti on the national-popular that resonates strongly with his own formulation, cited 
above, from Notebook 21: “Una letteratura non può essere nazionale se non è popolare; perché, 
se bene sia di pochi il crearla, universale dee esserne l’uso e il godimento. Oltre che, dovendo ella 
esprimere le idee e gli affetti comuni e trarre in luce quei sensi che giacciono occulti e confusi nel 
cuore delle moltitudini, i suoi cultori debbono non solo mirare al bene del popolo ma ritrarre del 
suo spirito; tanto che questo viene ad essere non solo il fine ma in un certo modo eziandio il 
principio delle lettere civili” [A literature cannot be national if it is not popular; because, if it is 
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the concept of the national-popular, understood as a hegemonic relation, is qualified as 
“Jacobin”: “Il Gioberti, sia pure vagamente, ha il concetto del ‘popolare-nazionale’ giacobino, 
dell’egemonia politica, cioè dell’alleanza tra borghesi-intellettuali e il popolo” [Gioberti, albeit 
vaguely, has a Jacobin concept of the “popular-national,” of political hegemony, that is, of the 
alliance between the bourgeoisie-intellectuals and the people].52 The national-popular (or 
“popular-national”) relation is again not an equivalence but an alliance, and an asymmetrical 
one. Note 21 of Notebook 8, on the projected work that Gramsci proposed to call The Modern 
Prince following his reading of Machiavelli as a theorist of hegemony, indicates that the book 
should have a chapter on Jacobinism. Here he diagnoses the “successive failures of the attempts 
to create a national-popular creative will” throughout the history of Italy as the result of the 
feudal and fragmented distribution of political power, “an internal situation that can be called 
‘economic-corporative,’” that is, without the ethico-political articulation that constitutes a 
collective historical subject capable of acting outside of a logic of simple self-interest or 
instrumentality. Gramsci writes, 
mancò sempre una forza “giacobina” efficiente, la forza appunto che crea la 
volontà collettiva nazionale popolare, fondamento di tutti gli Stati moderni. ... 
Realmente il moderno Principe dovrebbe limitarsi a questi due punti 
                                                                                                                                                             
the vocation of few to create it, its use and enjoyment ought to be universal. Moreover, since it 
should express common ideas and sentiments and bring to light those feelings that lie latent and 
confused in the heart of the multitudes, its cultivators must not only look to the benefit of the 
people but portray its spirit; indeed this is not only the end but also the beginning of a civil 
literature]. 
52 He then qualifies this: “giacobino teorico, s’intende, perché in pratica egli non ebbe modo di 




fondamentali: formazione di una volontà collettiva nazionale popolare di cui il 
moderno Principe è appunto espressione attiva e operante, e riforma intellettuale 
e morale.  
[there never was an effective “Jacobin” force—precisely the force that creates the 
national-popular collective will, the foundation of all modern states . . . The 
Modern Prince should focus entirely on these two basic points: the formation of a 
national-popular collective will, of which the modern Prince is the active and 
operative expression, and intellectual and moral reform.] 
When Gramsci criticizes the regional writers for their “touristic” and “paternalistic” gaze, he goes 
on to say that a more militant nationalism is preferable to this kind of sentimental and 
essentializing portrayal;53 in his discussion of the Risorgimento in the same note, he argues that 
one of the causes of the weakness of the national-popular element in the movement was precisely 
the myth of an Italian nation that has always existed since ancient Rome. The obstructive, 
conservative force of such a myth for the critical and creative work of national formation 
outweighs whatever strategic value it might have in the process of unification.  
 What each of these points shows is that the distance between the “national” intellectuals 
                                                 
53 “la letteratura regionale è stata essenzialmente folcloristica e pittoresca: il popolo “regionale” 
era visto “paternalisticamente,” dall’estero, con spirito disincantato, cosmopolitico, da turisti in 
cerca di sensazioni forti e originali per la loro crudezza . . . Da questo punto di vista sono stati piú 
simpatici Enrico Corrandini e il Pascoli, col loro nazionalismo confessato e militante, in quanto 
cercarono risolvere il dualismo letterario tradizionale tra popolo e nazione, sebbene siano caduti 
in altre forme di rettorica e di oratoria” [regional literature has been essentially folkloric and 
picturesque: the “regional” population has been seen “paternalistically,” from the outside, with a 
disenchanted, cosmopolitan, touristic spirit in search of strong feelings, authentic in their 
rawness. From this point of view Enrico Corrandini and Pascoli, with their overt and militant 
nationalism, are preferable insofar as they seek to resolve the traditional literary dualism between 
the people and the nation, even if they have fallen into other forms of rhetoric and oratory] 
(Notebook 21, § 1).  
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and the “people” is not a question of authenticity but of alliance, of ethico-political self-
positioning. Gramsci emphasizes this in his revision of Notebook 3, § 63 in Notebook 21, § 5; the 
clauses in italics below are added in the later note: 
Gli intellettuali non escono dal popolo, anche se accidentalmente qualcuno di essi è 
d’origine popolana, . . . sono qualcosa di staccato, di campato in aria, una casta, 
cioè, e non un’articolazione, con funzioni organiche, del popolo stesso. 
[The intellectuals do not come from the people, even if by chance one among them 
happens be of popular origins . . . They are something detached, cut off from 
reality—a caste, that is, and not an articulation, with organic functions, of the 
people itself.] 
Spivak has pointed out — and the passage above confirms—that the organicity of the “organic” 
intellectual has to do with organization rather than essence or identity; an organic intellectual—
whether of the dominant class or of the popular, or subaltern, strata—is connected to its class or 
group not by nature or origin but by function. The national-popular collective will is not pre-
given but must be produced. 
I’ll conclude my discussion of the concept of the national-popular developed in Gramsci’s 
notebooks by citing a passage that offers something of a counterpoint to the “Jacobin concept.” 
In a note on Fordism, a national-popular—as opposed to merely nationalist—economic policy is 
one that views the masses as national market rather than as mere “cattle”: 
in certi paesi di capitalismo arretrato e di composizione economica in cui si 
equilibrano la grande industria moderna, lartigianato, la piccola e media cultura 
agricola e il latifondismo, le masse operaie e contadine non sono considerate come 
un “mercato.” Il mercato per l’industria è pensato all’estero, e in paesi arretrati 
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dell’estero, dove sia piú possibile la penetrazione politica per la creazione di 
colonie e di zone d’influenza. . . . Paesi dove esiste nazionalismo, ma non una 
situazione “nazionale-popolare,” dove cioè le grandi masse popolari sono 
considerate come il bestiame. (Notebook 6, § 135) 
[in certain countries where capitalism is still backward and the economic 
structure consists of a mixture of modern big industry, artisan production, 
midsize and small-scale agriculture, and large land holdings, the masses of 
workers and peasants are not considered to be a “market.” Industry looks abroad 
for a market, it seeks to export its goods to backward countries where it is easier to 
penetrate politically through the establishment of colonies and spheres of 
influence. . . . There are countries that have nationalism but no national-popular 
situation—in other words, countries in which the great popular masses are treated 
like cattle.]  
In this passage a “national-popular situation” is, as in other contexts, connected to the idea of 
historical subjectification, perhaps of citizenship, figured as humanization through its opposition 
to bestiame. But the opposition is also, and more explicitly, between a population regarded by the 
state as cattle and one that is regarded as a market. The incorporation of the people as an active 
element of the social or national body is coextensive with the consolidation of an advanced 
capitalist economy. While the “Jacobin” concept is derived from a bourgeois historical process, 
the form of articulation, expressed in political rather than economic terms, is assumed to be 
transferable to a new—socialist—content or ethico-political horizon, and it is this possibility that 
Gramsci wants to highlight in his elaboration of the concept. The note on Fordism, without 
negating this transferability, makes clear that a “national-popular situation” is not necessarily a 
 
 81 
good thing in itself, and reminds us that its empirically knowable historical form is that of the 
bourgeois nation-state. 
We have seen that the category of the national-popular in Gramsci already contains the 
vanguardist and integrationist structure that will prompt the criticism of the Latin Americanist 
subaltern studies scholars from within an intellectual culture wary of these aspects, but it always 
represents a sphere of inclusion rather than exclusion of the subaltern. For Gramsci, the 
production of a national-popular collective will corresponds to a process of desubalternization of 
the popular masses, and even within “advanced” capitalism, a national-popular state is one in 
which the masses are no longer “treated like cattle.” In the appropriation of the terms by the 
Latin Americanists, following the South Asian group’s critique of Indian nationalism, the 
national-popular comes to name a mode of political organization that further subalternizes those 
who constitute the necessary outside of any totalizing hegemonic articulation, of which the 
nation is the paradigmatic form. Subalternity, then, can come to designate not a condition to be 
transcended but a position that in fact represents a certain epistemological privilege, while the 
national-popular, embodied in the historical nationalist and populist movements of the region, is 
the erasure of difference, for example, the erasure of indigeneity through the ideologeme of 
mestizaje. 
The development of the concept of the national-popular as something that masks and 
deepens rather than eradicating the condition of subalternity can perhaps be traced to the 
disjunction between the peasantry and the nation highlighted by the South Asianist scholars.54 
But while the absence or failure of hegemony in colonial India, as posited in Guha’s Dominance 
                                                 
54 Although in Notebook 6, § 135, cited above, Gramsci explicitly distinguishes between the 
national-popular and nationalism plain and simple. 
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without Hegemony (1997), was a central tenet of the original Subaltern Studies group, the 
hegemonic projects of Latin American internal colonialism—the various populist and nationalist 
movements in early to mid twentieth-century Latin America—if necessarily incomplete, had at 
their core the expansion of the nation to formally and symbolically include the majority of the 
people through the construction of mestizo national identities within the cultural and intellectual 
spheres. The exclusions that operated within these discourses and regimes could no longer be 
attributed to a lack of national-popular orientation of the dominant classes, but were inherent in 
the institutionalization of a unified nation-people itself.  
The reversal in the valorization of the concepts of the national-popular and the subaltern 
outlined here (or, more broadly, between hegemony – a term more often counterposed to 
subalternity with the same implications – and the subaltern) tends to reduce the Gramscian 
terms to stable and unequivocal positions within a normative politics: the national-popular 
names the hegemonic regime that is distinguished from pure domination in means only and not 
in substance, while the subaltern marks the incompletion of this regime, the fracture from which 
its undoing can be precipitated, or at least imagined. We can cull from Gramsci’s notebooks an 
equally normative political project onto which subalternity and the national-popular can be 
mapped as a starting point prior to the emergence into historical subjecthood and a step on the 
path to a popular hegemonic project respectively; this framework, however, as I hope my 
discussion here bears out, does not exhaust Gramsci’s theoretical formulation of the concepts. 
Subaltern groups, always and by definition occupying a position of subordination to be 
overcome, are not reducible to this position or incapable of an autonomous politics, but actively 
contribute through their own ideological formation to the construction of a new society; a 
national-popular articulation, as the incorporation of subaltern groups into the nation, on the 
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other hand, can represent an emergence from subalternity into hegemony, into the nation, 
through a bourgeois mode of citizenry-as-market that only fortifies the existing regime. Our 
reading of both concepts and the larger theoretical constellation in which they are embedded 
must take into account this equivocality, through which they might serve as figures for any 
element of a discourse that might be mobilized in the service of a disembodied or transhistorical 
politics.  
 
II. Histories of (de)subalternization 
 
The trajectory of the Gramscian concept of the subaltern as one of analytical value for the 
study of historical processes and structures of power, through the “history from below” or 
“grassroots history” spearheaded by Eric Hobsbawm, anticolonial scholarship, and finally the 
turn to poststructualism and cultural studies, has been conditioned not only by these disciplinary 
factors but also by the discourses proper to the societies and histories taken as their objects of 
inquiry and sites of enunciation. My discussion of the subaltern in this chapter situates the 
concept in relation to that of the national-popular as its most pertinent counterpoint in the Latin 
Americanist discourses that make up the object of this study. These discourses, in turn, are 
generated in response to the nationalist and populist political projects that have predominated in 
the history of the region in the twentieth century, but such discourses also take on a life of their 
own, persisting in their structuring function beyond the historical effectivity of the events to 
which they respond in their initial formulation. In this section I construct a necessarily somewhat 
arbitrary itinerary of both concepts in academic and political Latin Americanist discourses in 
connection to (yet often articulated at a significant temporal and geographic distance from) a 
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series of points in a local (Bolivian) historical narrative that has broader regional resonance; my 
interest is in the production and uses of these discourses, rather than in their correspondence to 
historical situations or historical causation.  
 
The creole state and its outside 
From the moment of its creation following the final victory of the War of Independence 
in 1825 until the early twentieth century, the Bolivian nation-state was organized around what 
have been loosely called feudal or precapitalist social relations that corresponded to the racialized 
colonial hierarchy; the most conspicuous mode of participation of the indigenous majority in the 
political sphere was that of direct militant action, that is, as challenge to the creole nation from 
without. This position of externality in relation to the state is eloquently expressed in the 
campaign of the Aymara military leader Pablo Zárate Willka and its aftermath.55 In 1899, a civil 
war broke out between the colonial capital of Chuquisaca and the rising elite of La Paz connected 
to the tin mining boom, represented by the Conservative and Liberal parties, respectively. José 
Manuel Pando, the leader of the Liberal faction, enjoyed the support of the Aymara communities 
of the La Paz department, and Zárate Willka mobilized an indigenous army that would have 
given the Liberals a decisive advantage in the war. The Aymara forces, however, had their own, 
autonomous line of command based on traditional structures of authority and developed their 
own substantive program as well. They formulated their own demands and waged battles in 
white towns to achieve their ends without regard for the Liberal/Conservative divide. In the end, 
the two creole parties decided they had no choice but to unite against the indigenous forces. 
                                                 
55 The classic account of the uprising is Ramiro Condarco Morales’s Zárate, el “temible” Willka: 
Historia de la rebelión indígena de 1899 (1965). 
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Zárate Willka was executed and the war ended in a kind of stalemate, with the question of the 
capital still unresolved today (Sucre—what was then Chuquisaca—remains the judicial capital, 
while the seat of the executive is in La Paz). René Zavaleta recounts this history in Lo nacional-
popular en Bolivia to argue that the oligarchic Bolivian nation-state is constituted through the 
unification of its elite factions against the Indians; the historical function of the indigenous 
peasantry in the process of national consolidation is that of an existential threat. For the 
indigenous insurgents, on the other hand, a relationship to the state that appeared to be one of 
simple subordination (or subalternity) is revealed as an alliance that is forged and broken at will. 
There is a failure of incorporation not only within a national-popular framework, but also as an 
instrumental faction, leaving open a certain disarticulated autonomy in potentia. 
If we go back another century in Andean history, to the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II in 
1780 in Peru, we see another failed approach between the Indians and the state, this time ending 
in a new state project or proto-state, that is, what for Gramsci would constitute a process of 
desubalternization, and what for Zavaleta constitutes the only true national-popular program of 
the region (216). José Gabriel Condorcanqui sought recognition from the colonial authorities of 
his title of Inca nobility, and only after this was denied does he take the name of the last Inca, 
Tupac Amaru, and lead his own independence campaign against the Spaniards—one that sought 
to found an independent state organized around an indigenous hegemonic articulation—thirty 
years prior to the outbreak of the creole-led wars that were ultimately successful.56  
                                                 
56 Alexander von Humboldt cites the incident in his Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain 
(1811) within an Enlightened liberal argument for the social development of the Indians through 
education and economic and political assimilation, that is, through juridical equality and 
incorporation into capitalist production: the Indians constituted a “status in statu” (69) and 
urgently had to be included as citizens, lest they wage their own, very different, barbaric war of 
independence. Although as a guest of the viceroy of New Spain Humboldt would have been 
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What these movements express is not quite a conflict involving a subaltern group 
understood—in a somewhat modified usage of Gramsci’s term within the various streams of 
subaltern studies—as one cut off from the channels of the state, since Condorcanqui was able to 
solicit his title and Zárate was able to enter into an alliance with Pando. Nor is it a conflict 
between dominant and subordinated groups, in a sense closer to Gramsci’s, that vie for 
hegemonic control of a single formation. Instead, there is a struggle on behalf of the state to 
externalize or suppress a more or less internal element that challenges its subordinate status, and 
an even more vigorous response to the threat posed by the emergence, from that externalized 
position, of an organized will to constitute a counter-state. Here Ranajit Guha’s thesis of the 
(always relative) autonomy of subaltern groups seems pertinent. Despite this relative externality, 
the defeated militant subaltern counter-state, as in Gramsci’s six-phase process but, of course, 
without a necessary progression toward increasing autonomy, provokes a reactionary adaptation 
of the dominant groups, unifying and strengthening the creole state. 
In a central text of the Latin American Subaltern Studies project, Subalternity and 
Representation (1999), Beverley cites two documents of the Tupac Amaru rebellion—
Condorcanqui’s Genealogía, written to prove his royal descent, and his brother Juan Bautista’s 
Memorias—as examples of texts that could be incorporated into the canon of Peruvian literature 
in a certain subalternist/multiculturalist revision of the curriculum. But this kind of inclusion, 
Beverley argues, would in fact run contrary to the task of subaltern studies:  
                                                                                                                                                             
unlikely to voice explicitly separatist views, his writings echoed and stimulated bourgeois Creole 
revolutionary discourse (Simón Bolívar called Humboldt the second discoverer of America). The 
Tupac Amaru revolt therefore serves a similar cautionary function to that of the Haitian 
Revolution across the Americas, both in prompting the most reactionary (in the Haitian case, 




To seek to canonize texts like the Genealogía or the Memorias . . . as pertaining to 
a now wider sense of “Peruvian” or Latin American literature not only obscures 
the fact of the cultural production of a national-popular imaginary by an 
indigenous peasantry and its organic intellectuals—a production which, while it 
may have involved elements of European literary, political, and scientific culture, 
did so in a way subordinate to its own struggle for meaning and hegemony; it also 
amounts to an act of appropriation that excludes that population as a subject 
conscious of its own history, incorporating it only as a contingent element of 
another history (of the modern nation-state, of the Enlightenment, of Peruvian 
literature), whose subject is also an other (creole or mestizo, Spanish-speaking, 
letrado, male, propertied). (55–56) 
Like Zavaleta, Beverley recognizes in the Túpac Amaru rebellion a national-popular, hegemonic 
articulation, albeit one that failed in an embryonic state, and here the interest in the subaltern, as 
in the early volumes of Subaltern Studies (and in Gramsci), is in tracking “every trace of 
autonomous initiative” (Notebook 25, § 2; Notebook 3, § 14). 
But within the larger argument of Subalternity and Representation, this failure seems to 
be more than an incidental element of the narrative. Beverley is writing from the position of the 
literary critic (although it remained an interdisciplinary enterprise, the Latin Americanist project 
coincides with the “linguistic” or “literary turn” of subaltern studies) and he is less interested in 
the historical subject of the rebellion than in the way in which the event is narrativized within the 
academy; he is more interested in the performative than the constative function. I am thinking 
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here of Spivak’s framing of the task of subaltern studies in terms of this distinction57—for Spivak, 
the constative mode is sometimes useful but insufficient; for Beverley (although he does not use 
the terms), the constative scholarship within Latin American subaltern studies is in fact 
performative in a counterproductive way in that it reifies the subaltern as representable object 
and as constitutive element of a national history that is necessarily given a closed and teleological 
form in its narrativization.58 The category of the national-popular/hegemonic in the Tupac 
Amaru rebellion retains a disruptive function because of its incompletion; when the category 
refers to a successful passage from subalternity to hegemony, for example, in the case of the 
victorious Sandinista revolution, it enters the phase of closure in which the heterogeneous 
multiplicity of subjects that have been articulated into the popular is flattened and sealed, 
producing new and more insidious forms of exclusion. The other mode in which the national-
popular emerges in Subalternity and Representation as a productive ideologeme for the politics of 
subaltern studies—besides that of an unrealized would-have-been—is that of futurity, of what 
might be read as the Derridean à venir (although, again, Beverley does not use the phrase). In 
contrast to the subalternist strain represented by, among others, Alberto Moreiras, who had 
already launched his appeal for a posthegemonist subaltern studies,59 Beverley does not entirely 
                                                 
57 “Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular, ” in An Aesthetic Education in the 
Era of Globalization (2014).  
58 This is his argument against Florencia Mallon’s Peasant and Nation (1995).  
59 Beverley cites a conference paper given by Moreiras at the annual conference of the Latin 
American Studies Association in 1997: “We need a concept of hegemony, but only in order to 
then go ahead and affirm that our work as translational subalternists is necessarily 
posthegemonic” (Beverley, 1999: 97); Moreiras elaborates this position in The Exhaustion of 
Difference, which would be published two years after Subalternity and Representation, in 2001. 
He lists among the “features constitutive of subalternist thinking” “the need to understand the 
operation of thinking beyond any attempt at reconstituting it as a form of philosophical 
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renounce the categories of hegemony, nation, state, or people, but calls for their radical 
reimagining, against all empirically discoverable models.  
 
The national-popular as resubalternization 
The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 
MNR), which came to power in Bolivia in 1952 with the election of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, sought 
to construct a mestizo national identity in opposition to the creole nation of the early republic, 
and therefore relied on a dichotomy between an oligarchy which, unlike the elite in the core 
capitalist countries, was allied with foreign rather than national interest, and the people-nation 
that was just beginning to emerge into the sphere of electoral politics. This dichotomy between 
the nation and (internal and external) “anti-nation” (in the words of Bolivian journalist and 
leading intellectual of the nationalist movement Carlos Montenegro60) constitutes the basic 
structure of the populist mode of articulation of which the Latin American state formations of 
the twentieth century have so often been taken as representative. In the most emblematic case, 
that of Peronism, the consolidation of the collective national subject is conceived in terms of 
class, as a transcendence of class antagonism through an affective identification with a national 
project; in the case of the Andean countries where the Indian provided the (negative) basis of a 
unified creole oligarchic national identity, the antagonism to be resolved is imagined primarily in 
terms of ethnicity.  
                                                                                                                                                             
reconceptualization at the service of hegemonic articulations” and “the production of a new 
philosophical subject, even as subjectless subject, whose ‘general intellect’ can sustain the 
enterprise of operational thinking, as posthegemonic thinking, in times of postmodernism” 
(Moreiras 2001: 113). 
60 Nacionalismo y coloniaje (1943). 
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Gareth Williams takes up Etienne Balibar’s concept of “fictive ethnicity”61 to think the 
various forms of national-popular articulations that emerge in this period, from the literary and 
political indigenismo of Peruvian Marxist theorist and activist José Carlos Mariátegui (48–51) 
and novelist José María Arguedas (39) to the “transcultural fusion” of Víctor Raúl Haya de la 
Torre, founder of the Peruvian nationalist/populist party Alianza Popular Revolucionario 
Americana (APRA), and the Bolivian MNR. While the indigenistas seek to found a national 
identity that privileges the Indian as the core of the nation (and in Mariátegui, the revolutionary 
subject as universal class in the Marxist sense), the discourses that Williams calls transculturalist 
seek instead to construct a unified national subject through a notion of mestizaje in which the 
indigenous and Hispanic identities are fused. In the ideology of the Revolutionary Nationalist 
Movement, and the analogous nationalist projects of the mid-twentieth century elsewhere in the 
region, the subaltern is symbolically incorporated into a universal national identity, producing a 
new set of exclusions (of that which cannot be effectively interpellated by the call to such an 
identification), new forms of subalternity, which lend themselves more readily to the theoretical 
                                                 
61 “I apply the term ‘fictive ethnicity’ to the community instituted by the nation-state. This is an 
intentionally complex expression in which the term fiction . . . should not be taken in the sense of 
a pure and simple illusion without historical effects, but must, on the contrary, be understood by 
analogy with the persona ficta of the Juridical tradition in the sense of an institutional effect, a 
‘fabrication.’ No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social ‘formations are 
nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by 
them are ethnicized—that is, represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural 
community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends 
individuals and social conditions. . . . It is fictive ethnicity which makes it possible for the 
expression of a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, and continually to measure the state 
against its ‘historic mission’ in the service of the nation and, as a consequence, to idealize politics. 
By constituting the people as a fictively ethnic unity against the background of a universalistic 
representation which attributes to each individual one—and only one—ethnic identity and which 
thus divides up the whole of humanity between different ethnic groups corresponding potentially 
to so many nations, national ideology does much more than justify the strategies employed by 
the state to control populations” (Balibar 96).  
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elaborations of the concept since the mid 1980s.  
Silvia Rivera traces the continuities between the colonial and oligarchic-republican forms 
of domination and this operation of the subsumption of the indigenous into the categories of the 
mestizo and the peasant. In her seminal Oprimidos pero no vencidos (Oppressed but not 
Defeated), published in 1984—that is, contemporarily with the first volumes of the Subaltern 
Studies series edited by Guha, although their work had not yet made its way to Latin America—
Rivera frames indigenous Andean history in terms of Fernand Braudel’s longue durée to posit a 
persistence of indigenous consciousness from late-colonial times to the present, not as a positive 
identity, not constituted through the survival of pre-colonial “conceptions of the world” or forms 
of social organization, but through struggle, through an unbroken history of oppression and 
resistance. The constitutive antagonist of this indigenous collectivity—the colonial Spanish elite, 
then the (internally colonial) republican creole caste, and finally a non-indigenous national elite 
that includes the mestizo (the identification of this continuity should recall the South Asian 
collective’s insistence on a continuity rather than an opposition between the colonial and 
indigenous nationalist elite)—possesses a remarkable capacity for adaptation and cooptation, and 
promptly took over the National Revolution of 1952 that in fact owed its victory to factions 
heterogeneous to this elite (although organized as “workers” rather than “Indians”62). This 
adaptation represents a passage from what Guha identified as dominance without hegemony into 
a hegemonic project of partial success that subalternizes at once through the renaming of the 
social subjects that it seeks to internalize and the invisibilization of those who cannot be 
designated by the new name. 
                                                 
62 It is important to keep in mind the overlap in the empirical content of these distinct analytical 
categories in a context like the Bolivian.  
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The National Revolutionary state presupposes and (to varying extents) produces a 
homogeneous mestizo people-nation, organized in its discourse into three groups that recognize 
traditional notions of class but not the category of indigeneity (despite the very real structural 
functionality of that category at the juridical and economic levels since the time of conquest): the 
petty bourgeoisie, the workers, and the peasants (campesinos). Through their inclusion as 
campesinos, the nationalist state once again excludes the indigenous as such. At the level of 
political discourse, the collective popular subjects that are integrated into the larger national-
popular subject are individuated and formally reinserted into the collectivity via a process of 
equivalence through citizenship; economically, this process corresponds to the continued assault 
on communal landholding. In practice, the liberal model of citizenship is not operative in the 
electoral sphere, and the coup continues to be the normal method of transfer of power, while 
legitimacy is established through charismatic leadership. At this conjuncture, then, the old 
(residual?) forms of subalternity overlap with emerging forms to produce a double erasure that 
reconfigures and neutralizes the identities of the subjects that it incorporates in the symbolic 
sphere. 
More than a decade after the publication of Oprimidos and four years after the founding 
of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group (but independently of this project), in 1997, 
Rivera co-edited an anthology of work by the South Asian collective in Spanish translation with 
Rossana Barragán. Their introduction to the volume emphasizes the value of South-South 
dialogue bypassing the mediation by the North represented by the group based in the U.S. 
academy and responding largely to metropolitan theoretical debates, calls attention to a certain 
affinity with historiographical and sociological work on and from Latin America that is 
underacknowledged by the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group (they name Zavaleta, and 
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Rivera’s own work would be an obvious example), and welcomes the methodological and 
theoretical contributions of the South Asian scholars as a potential source of enrichment for 
Latin American scholarship as well as an influence (via Spivak and the deconstructive turn, 
although this is unacknowledged) that has prompted them to revise some of their own 
conceptualizations. Their presentation of the concept of subalternity that they hope to introduce 
to a Latin American readership indeed differs from the one implicit in Oprimidos, in which a 
subaltern political identity is constructed through antagonism. In her study of Aymara and 
Quechua responses to colonial oppression in Oprimidos, Rivera proposes that the Katarist 
movement, in its invocation of a “long memory” of the colonial and precolonial past, activated by 
the protean mechanisms of exclusion operated by the state from the time of conquest to the 
present, works to produce an autonomous ethnic and political identity. In their introduction to 
the Subaltern Studies anthology, Rivera and Barragán write, 
La hegemonía colonial en la construcción institucional e imaginaria de la India 
es . . . cuestionada desde el punto de vista de una sociedad civil abigarrada—la 
sociedad subalterna—que siempre permanece heterogénea y elusiva a la política 
de los de “arriba.” La propia noción de subalternidad resulta forjada como algo 
distinto, ajeno y preexistente al mundo occidental—Razón como Historia –, 
aunque sin desconocer que es este mismo mundo el que le ha legado este concepto 
desde la vertiente gramsciana. 
[Colonial hegemony in the institutional and imaginary construction of India is . . . 
questioned from the point of view of a motley civil society—subaltern society—
that remains always heterogeneous and elusive to the politics of the elite. The very 
notion of subalternity is forged as something distinct, alien and prior to the 
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Western world—Reason as History—although keeping in mind that it is from this 
very world that it has received the concept, via Gramsci.] (11) 
The subaltern here is no longer the collective militant subject constituted through a history of 
struggle, but what exceeds or, in Alberto Moreiras’s terms, subceeds (2006) struggle and history. 
Yet while Moreiras understands this excess as precisely the negation of the subject, what is 
posited as alien to “Reason as History” here refers neither to another mode of existence (that is, 
as I understand Moreiras’s argument, as one which would have to apply to all lives prior to, 
underneath, or beyond the constitution of subjectivity) nor to a new theoretical perspective from 
which to study the power relations of subalternity (as in Spivak’s presentation of the Subaltern 
Studies project), but to the subaltern as subject, as identity, in that it refers to particular groups of 
people defined as heterogeneous to the Western world. The concept, and perhaps theory itself, is 
necessarily derived from the West, in this case via Gramsci, but can be instrumentalized to access 
a knowledge of the inhabitants of its outside. The subaltern-as-subject, which I take to be the 
necessary basis of the subaltern-as-state in the national-populist sense of the pink tide that I 
discuss in the following section—of which Rivera is now among the most forceful and astute 
critics—emerges precisely in the attempt to effect a detachment from a Western regime of 
subjectivity. 
 
The new national-popular state and postsubalternism 
Within the conjuncture of the pink tide—a moment now in crisis—the postmodern, 
postnational critique of the national-popular that developed within the context of the neoliberal 
“redemocratizing” state has had to contend with a new era of state-centered politics in Latin 
America. Beverley revises the subaltern/state dichotomy in response to the ascension of actors 
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from social movements previously excluded from the formal political sphere to state power—a 
new moment of desubalternization—citing the Gramscian notion of “becoming state” received 
via Ernesto Laclau; if his reading of the Amaru uprising as an indigenous proto-state collectivity 
served, in its mode of unrealized potentiality, as an apt example of subaltern agency, this 
successful conquest of the state by electoral means requires a theoretical reformulation. Beverley 
combines the terms of the subaltern/national-popular opposition to propose a substitution of the 
category of the subaltern by that of the “subaltern-popular,” constructing his argument by 
counterposing statements by Spivak and Bolivian vice president Álvaro García Linera. Spivak 
reaffirms the externality of the subaltern to all forms of political struggle:  
There is much talk these days of the emergence of subaltern counter-collectivity. I 
think that is bogus. If you nominate collectivities that are questioning the power 
of the United States or the power of the West or whatever as immediately a 
subaltern counter-collectivity, I don’t think you really know what it is like where 
this conflict can mean nothing. (qtd. in Beverley 2011: 122) 
García Linera, on the other hand, in an article published in the New Left Review and written 
during Evo Morales’s presidential campaign,63 stresses that in Bolivia the subject of political 
struggle oriented toward the transformation of the state, in contrast to the revolutionary periods 
of the early twentieth century, is itself indigenous and not only claiming to speak for the 
indigenous. Beverley concludes that, as Evo Morales and the movement he represents have 
proven, and basing his position in the quite justified judgment that the notion of the subaltern as 
radically other than the citizen or indeed the state is flawed, the subaltern not only can speak, but 
                                                 
63  “State Crisis and Popular Power” (2006). 
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can also govern. He calls for a combination of “skeptical realism” and hope, noting the populist 
aspects of pink tide governments like that of Chávez, for example, and points out the growing 
distance between García Linera himself and “intellectuals and activists more closely bound up 
with the demands of the indigenous movements” (123). But his argument in favor of a cautious 
support for the pink tide governments, and against the concept of subalternity embraced by the 
Subaltern Studies group in the previous decade, ultimately rests on an idea of the subaltern as 
subject rather than position, and in the Bolivian case that he proposes as exemplary, authorizes a 
repetition of the familiar populist claims to a totally transparent state-people relation. 
García Linera articulates these two moments—the first and second “national-revolutionary” 
regimes in Bolivia, in a short article entitled “El evismo: lo nacional-popular en acción.” Written 
in 2006 from a position of victory, the text considers the relation between the National 
Revolution of 1952 that (with all the qualifications made above) put a close to the creole 
oligarchic phase of Bolivian history and marked the entrance of organized workers and peasants 
into the political sphere and the 2005 election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president of 
the continent. The first obvious indication here of a populist mode of interpellation (and, 
incidentally, one that was absent in the MNR regime) is of course the proper name turned into 
an ism (evismo). The person of the leader is a signifier amorphous enough to contain, and 
reconcile, contradictory ideological positions and in this text García Linera affirms that while the 
core economic sector is small production, large foreign companies are also included; that while 
the core is indigenous, the white middle classes are also represented; that evismo contains 
multiple temporalities, multiple modes of production, and so forth.64 But what characterizes 
                                                 
64 This passage in García Linera’s text could have been from one of Perón’s speeches, in which he 
continually insisted upon the inclusion and harmonious alignment of the different elements of 
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evismo as national-popular for García Linera is that, unlike with the state of 1952, and unlike in 
Gramsci’s “Jacobin concept,” there is a hegemonic interpellation from the position of the 
subaltern. He writes, “el MAS representa el despertar de los sujetos subalternos hacia un nuevo 
nacionalismo revolucionario, pero eso no quiere decir que el movimiento de Evo Morales 
pretenda resucitar la vieja ideología del nacionalismo revolucionario. El evismo transita más bien 
la vertiente de lo nacional popular, cuyo filo es todavía más revolucionario” [MAS represents the 
awakening of subaltern subjects to a new revolutionary nationalism, but this does not mean that 
Evo Morales’s movement intends to revive the old ideology of revolutionary nationalism. Evismo 
proceeds, rather, by a national-popular route, which is even more revolutionary] (28). Since the 
subject of the revolution is indigenous, the subaltern social base is not represented but represents 
itself in an unmediated way:  
Anteriormente, las estrategias de los subalternos estaban construidas a la manera 
de una vanguardia política cohesionada que lograba construir movimientos que 
eran su base social. Ese fue el caso de muchos países de Centroamérica, de Chile y, 
en parte, de Brasil. . . . El evismo modifica este debate al plantearse la posibilidad 
de que el acceso a niveles de decisión del Estado lo puedan hacer los propios 
movimientos sociales. 
El evismo ya no hace una lectura de la representación de lo político a 
través de la delegación de poderes. Es una proyección que busca de manera casi 
absoluta la auto-representación de los propios movimientos sociales. 
                                                                                                                                                             
capitalist production, united through a shared telos and affect for the good of the nation (in 1944, 
for example, “Queremos que el capital y el trabajo, en estrecho abrazo, labren la grandeza de la 
patria” [We want capital and labor, united in a cordial embrace, to work towards the greatness of 
the patria] [246]). 
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[Previously, subaltern strategies were constructed through a unified political 
vanguard that was able to construct movements that in turn served as its social 
base. This was the case in Central America, Chile, and, in part, Brazil. . . . Evismo 
modifies this debate in opening up the possibility of access to the level of state 
decision making on the part of the social movements themselves.  
Evismo does not conceive of political representation through the 
delegation or power; it is a project that seeks almost absolute self-representation 
of the social movements.] (26) 
Here the subaltern has become a subject that maintains its identity as subaltern even when it 
comes to occupy the position of the state. The real institutional reforms that have expanded the 
political representation of subaltern groups within state apparatus—such as the increased 
inclusion of women and indigenous leaders in the Constituent Assembly of 2006, the 
constitutional recognition of indigenous-campesino and Afro-Bolivian autonomies, and the 
Derecho de Consulta Previa (“Right to Prior Consultation” of populations that would be affected 
by natural resource extraction or development projects)—are accompanied, and eroded, by a 
discourse that masks the constitutive gap of representation. If the theoretical elaboration of the 
concept of subalternity in Latin America has largely been constructed against the national-
popular as identitarian, hegemonizing, and homogenizing, here there is a paradoxical affirmation 
of difference and heterogeneity—the institutionalization of the concept of the Plurinational—
together with a total collapse of the people, or the subaltern, and the state through the person of 
the leader as well as an assumption of a similar transparency at regional levels. The claim of 
unmediated representation is authorized through the claim to a subaltern identity that persists 




III. From fictive to strategic ethnicity 
 
 The history of subaltern studies, a discourse that has indeed shown a particular 
inclination toward its own historicization in the context of the development of the political and 
intellectual landscape of the late twentieth century, is typically divided into two phases (alluded 
to above) with a “deconstructive turn” and a convergence with cultural studies and postcolonial 
theory marking a shift from the early work of the South Asian collective that sought primarily to 
challenge the premises of the existing historiography of colonial India.65 The Latin Americanist 
branch of this discourse emerges during the second of these phases, and articulates its own 
establishment as a response to the same scene of globalization that requires a reformulation of 
the original critique of nationalist ideology (although much of the work done under the banner 
of Latin American subaltern studies is influenced by the early essays on Indian peasant 
insurgency). The Latin Americanist group formally dissolved in 2001 following a theoretical 
divergence precisely on this question of deconstruction and historical subjectivity, the organizing 
antinomies of which have structured much of this chapter.66 My intervention here has sought to 
bring this debate into conversation, on the one hand, with the original Gramscian formulation of 
its theoretical terms, and on the other, with a particular historical sequence—one that is 
connected (although not reducible) to developments on a regional and global scale—and the 
ideological and theoretical production that responds to it.  
                                                 
65 See, for example, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s “A Small History of Subaltern Studies” (2002). 
66 Moreiras offers a thorough and highly personal discussion of this split in “The Fatality of (My) 
Subalternism: A Response to John Beverley” (2012). 
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 Returning to Gramsci does not simply provide a starting point for a theoretical genealogy 
or descriptive history of the discourse under discussion; the insistent return of the questions of 
vanguardism, autonomy, and historical subjectivity have shown that Gramsci remains relevant as 
an interlocutor at all stages of its development, and one whose position is complex and 
ambivalent. The historical narrative focused on Bolivia—but, again, in each of its moments 
representative to some extent of a broader Latin American situation—that I have plotted here can 
be summed up as follows:  
(1) In what has been called the creole-oligarchic state of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and in the colonial period leading up to its foundation, the subaltern 
indigenous majority is constituted through antagonism as a collective subject with relative 
autonomy, and demonstrates a capacity to launch a proto-state project, even if it is ultimately 
defeated. This first moment comes into view in the historiography of an anti-colonial scholarly 
discourse that emerges in the mid to late twentieth century through a lens that shares the general 
theoretical horizon of the South Asian Subaltern Studies group, although not yet directly in 
dialogue with that corpus. With the Latin Americanist group, this historical moment is revisited, 
and the fact of defeat is what enables the narratives of indigenous insurgency of the period to 
perform their role as enactments of subaltern agency. 
(2) With the National Revolutionary state founded in 1952, the national-popular 
ideological regime of mestizaje conceals subaltern difference, prompting another kind of retrieval 
than that of direct militancy and revisionist, vindicatory, or solidary historiography at multiple 
levels of political, cultural, and intellectual discourse and practice in the following decades. This 
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kind of erasure through a discourse of inclusion and universalization or totalization,67 through a 
resignifying and renaming, comes to characterize the object of Latin American subaltern studies, 
the remnant or excess of the fictive ethnicity of the national-populist state, in the subsequent 
historical period that has been called postnational.  
(3) The return of what has been called a national-popular state ideology with the pink tide 
regimes, with the passage of actors from the social movements, that is, non-state formations from 
the neoliberal or postnational phase, to state power, coincides with a sense of the political 
exhaustion of the deconstructive moment of the disciplinary development of cultural theory and 
a return to the subject, a tendency that in this corpus is best exemplified by Beverley’s 
postsublaternism. This turn occurs simultaneously and in dialogue with an opposing theoretical 
project, an extension of the subalternist position centered around the concepts of posthegemony 
and infrapolitics, designating a radical questioning not only of prior conceptions of collectivity 
and social articulation but of the political subject as such, which seems to have achieved a greater 
contemporaneity with the current crisis of the left at the level of the state.68  
Silvia Rivera, whose participation in each of the first two moments outlined above has 
been central to my discussion, offers a different position from which to criticize the discursive 
and political practice of the (pluri)national-populism of the MAS regime: she calls the 
appropriation of a subaltern subject-identity from the position of the state a mobilization of 
“strategic ethnicity,” a term that I find useful here because of its resonance, in a critical mode, 
                                                 
67 This is comparable to the postracial ideology of the U.S. that has finally come into crisis within 
the mainstream public discourse, within a very different (liberal rather than national-populist) 
model of integration.  
68 I discuss this at greater length in my conclusion. 
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with both Spivak’s continually invoked attribution to the South Asian collective of a “strategic 
use of essentialism” (which she has long since retracted, insisting that the formula is unhelpful 
and in any case the group needed no such apology)69 and with the “fictive ethnicity” of Gareth 
Williams via Balibar as the mechanism of subalternization within a regime of national-popular 
inclusion. Rivera’s “strategic ethnicity” is connected to what she has called the “permitted” 
Indian or the “World Bank Indian”70—the minoritized Indian as symbol of a folkloric national 
                                                 
69 Spivak writes in “Deconstructing Historiography,” her introduction to Selected Subaltern 
Studies, “Although the group does not wittingly engage with the post-structuralist understanding 
of ‘consciousness,’ our own reading of them is enhanced if we see them as strategically adhering 
to the essentialist notion of consciousness, that would fall prey to an anti-humanist critique, 
within a historiographic practice that draws many of its strengths from that very critique” (1988: 
15); in “The New Subaltern,” she writes, “In ‘Deconstructing Historiography’ I had suggested 
that the Subaltern Studies collective assumed a subaltern consciousness, however ‘negative,’ but a 
‘strategic use of essentialism.’ Subaltern Studies had no need of such apologetics. But the 
theoretically inclined metropolitan identitarians did. In the name of their own groups, they 
argued identity, claimed strategy, and sometimes gave me credit. No one particularly noticed 
what I have already mentioned, that Subaltern Studies never presupposed a consciousness for 
‘their own group,’ but rather for their object of investigation, and for the sake of the 
investigation. . . . ‘Consciousness’ here does not engage subject-theory, deconstructive, 
psychoanalytic, or otherwise. . . . We are here on the level of social agency—institutionally 
validated action.” (2000: 332–333; another version of this text appears in Subaltern Studies vol. 
11) 
70 “La idea del ‘indio del Banco Mundial’ (como la llamé entonces) surgió de una página de una 
revista de viajes que encontré en un avión, donde había un dibujo a color de un indio de los 
Andes, con Uuch’u y poncho, atendiendo un negocio ‘moderno’ de agua embotellada de los 
glaciares de la Cordillera . . . la ilustración no era sino una propaganda de la empresa Hewlett-
Packard, que mostraba su programa de donaciones de computadoras a iniciativas empresariales 
como la del indio descrito en el dibujo. Las reformas multiculturales de los años noventa, 
emprendidas bajo el impulso del Banco Mundial, se ven metaforizadas en este aviso publicitario. 
Se buscaba ‘incorporar’ a los indígenas al mercado como comercializadores de su propio 
patrimonio cultural, incluso de sus propias deidades tutelares. Esto se tradujo en un fomento de 
la actividad turística, en un modelo eco-etnoturístico que convertía en mercancía a los paisajes 
sagrados de las comunidades, a sus prácticas rituales y a las propias personas de la comunidad, 
que debían exhibir su alteridad conforme a las expectativas y estereotipos del turista, con su 
búsqueda del ‘buen salvaje,’ exótico y protector de la naturaleza.” [The idea of the “World Bank 
Indian” (as I called it then) arose from a page in a travel magazine that I found on a plane, where 
there was a drawing of an Andean Indian, with his lluch’u and poncho, tending a “modern” 
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identity rather than a subject of rights—of the neoliberal/multicultural period prior to the rise of 
the pink tide and MAS, and designates the performance of an indigenous identity on the part of 
the state to mask “the (neo)colonial continuities with the past under the label of the ‘process of 
change’” as well as “more prosaic facts, like the covert alliances between the cocalero project and 
mafia capitalism” (87). What Rivera has identified is a persistence of Gramsci’s “touristic” 
conception of the subaltern/popular that has nothing to do with inauthenticity, since the subjects 
in question are in fact indigenous (recall that Gramsci notes in his revisions in Notebook 21 that 
the detached, “caste” intellectual may well be of popular origin), and one that authorizes itself 
through a discourse of subaltern-becoming-state (as we see in García Linera’s language) at least 
in part bequeathed from Gramsci.  
Among the primary, or at least the original, contributions of the South Asian Subaltern 
Studies group was their analysis of the existing historiography as the organic intellectual 
production of the colonial-bourgeois-nationalist elite, that is, of the state in the integral sense, 
highlighting the colonial-nationalist continuity in this formation. The resonance between the 
discourse produced from the position of the state and in the successive Bolivian and Latin 
American political cycles delineated here and that of an intellectual and academic left reveals at 
once a translatability of the elements of any counter-hegemonic project to a function of 
                                                                                                                                                             
business that produced bottled water from the glaciers of the Cordillera . . . The image was an 
advertisement for Hewlett-Packard, publicizing a program that donated computers to 
entrepreneurial initiatives like that of the Indian in the drawing. The multicultural reforms of the 
nineties, undertaken under the auspices of the World Bank, are symbolized in this ad. The idea 
was to ‘incorporate’ indigenous people into the market as merchants of their own cultural 
heritage, even of their own tutelary deities. This translated into a promotion of tourism, into an 
eco-ethno-tourism model that presented the sacred landscapes of the communities, their ritual 
practices, and the people themselves, who had to display their otherness in accordance with the 
expectations and stereotypes of the tourist, with their pursuit of the “noble savage,” as exotic and 
in harmony with nature] (Rivera 2014). 
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containment and control and a capacity of the state for a continual adaptation to and 
neutralization of not only certain demands of recognition, but the ideological forms of their 
articulation, first through the national-popular as unifying identity and then through the 





Plurinationalism and the Integral State 
 
In his review of Peter Thomas’s 2009 book on Gramsci’s political philosophy and its most 
influential misreadings (The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism) Bruno 
Bosteels questions the value of philological reconstruction and correction as a mode of 
engagement with the texts for which we claim theoretical and practical efficacy in the present. He 
cites first Gramsci’s legacy in Latin America in general as not only one of particular robustness 
but also one that happens to focus precisely on what Bosteels reads as the key concept in 
(Thomas’s) Gramsci for a correct, non-dichotomizing reading of the familiar binaries of civil 
society / state, domination/hegemony, etc., namely the integral state, and then specifically 
Bolivian vice president Álvaro García Linera’s appropriation of this concept in his inaugural 
address following Evo Morales’s reelection in 2009, as productive misreadings that demonstrate 
the insufficiency of a scholarly ethos of fidelity. Forewarned of this risk of overallegiance to the 
texts with which I have been most closely engaged (in my case René Zavaleta, whom I have 
recently translated, as much as Gramsci), I want to advance here an argument that I hope will not 
be charged with the same merely corrective intent: while I explain García Linera’s concept of the 
integral/plurinational state as a misappropriation of Gramsci and Zavaleta, I am, like Bosteels, 
more interested in its performative function than in the legitimacy of its purported filiation. 
Unlike Bosteels (who makes a case for the radicality of García Linera’s project in The Actuality of 
Communism [2011]), I read this function as one that is profoundly conservative in that it seeks to 
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immunize the constituted power of the state from destabilization or transformation by the 
constitutive power of its social base. 
The steps of the process of resignification that interests me here can be summed up as 
follows: Zavaleta’s concept of abigarramiento or sociedad abigarrada (usually translated as motley 
society) has a history of misappropriation in which García Linera participates by articulating it 
with the related concept of the estado aparente to claim that the merely “apparent” state which 
does not effectively represent the heterogeneous social reality of a country like Bolivia is 
abolished with the official establishment of the Plurinational State in 2006. This ideologeme of 
the Plurinational State as one that faithfully represents Bolivia’s abigarramiento is equated with 
the Gramscian stato integrale, which in Gramsci refers to the state proper plus civil society in 
cases where these are thoroughly integrated to function as an organic whole (the “Western” or 
modern capitalist nation-state). Beyond merely misusing the borrowed terms of this discursive 
operation (most patently in the case of the integral state, which comes to mean transparent 
representation more than organic articulation, but in a more subtle way also the apparent state 
and motley society), García Linera gives a prescriptive value to concepts developed for an 
analytical purpose in what effectively constitutes an absolute and uncritical validation of the 
existing regime. 
This claim seems to conflict directly with García Linera’s own explicit position, which he 
has been expounding since the 1980s and defending as the authentic Marxian one, on the 
primacy of “civil society” as opposed to the superstructural moment of the state, against a 
Hegelian statism that he ascribes, for example, to the Argentine Gramscian José Aricó. The first 
part of this chapter, then, will consider García Linera’s intellectual trajectory with a focus on his 
theoretical treatment of the state/society binary, followed by a discussion of the elaboration of 
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this relation in Gramsci. I say my claim regarding García Linera’s ultimate defense of 
constituted power seems to contradict the arguments developed in his writings because the 
performative fortification of the state that I read in his use of Zavaleta and Gramsci is not exactly 
a reversal of the “societarian” position; García Linera will continue to affirm that the state 
merely reflects society and cannot produce revolutionary social effects, but he will ultimately 
imply that the perfect operation of this reflection, achieved with Morales’s Plurinational State, 
cancels the distance between state and society, and he holds this correspondence to be an end in 
itself, from which it could be concluded that the current regime effectively represents the 
completion of all political struggle. I turn then in the second part of the chapter to Zavaleta’s 
elaboration of the concepts of the apparent state and motley society, the history of the reception 
of the latter, and finally the plurinationalist project with which it has been articulated. I conclude 
with a brief discussion of García Linera’s official discourse as a representative of the state as the 
most direct expression of this appropriative gesture. 
 
I. Theories of the state in García Linera and Gramsci 
 
Un hombre que sabe 
The strategic electoral use of García Linera’s public persona as the learned, non- 
indigenous counterweight to Evo Morales, a powerful symbol of the occupation of the state by 
those it had most strictly excluded, is well known. García Linera comes from an urban, middle 
class family and, like most of Bolivia’s political class, was educated abroad. Formally trained as a 
mathematician at the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM), he is routinely 
accorded the title of self-taught sociologist. His credentials in leftist and Inidanist militancy are 
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equally solid: he wrote what he regards as his most polished theoretical work (Forma valor y 
forma comunidad) while imprisoned for his militancy in the Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari 
(EGTK), and signed all his texts from his guerrilla period with the Aymara pen name 
Qhananchiri, “the one who clarifies things.” His 2005 campaign posters are inscribed with a 
version of this epithet designed to relieve any lingering anxieties on the part of the more 
progressive sectors of the urban middle-class electorate about the competency of a government 
led by an Indian peasant with little formal education: Un hombre que sabe.71 
In the introduction to his anthology of selections of García Linera’s texts, Pablo Stefanoni 
describes his role as that of a translator mediating between the traditional and emergent political 
classes,72 a function that has been expanded to include a kind of ambassadorship in relation to 
the international academic left, and such prominent intellectuals as Antonio Negri and Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak have accepted his invitations to speak in La Paz. While the text to which 
                                                 
71 “A man who knows”; the gendered character of the phrase is of course not insignificant, 
although it comes across more strongly in English translation. 
72 Stefanoni writes, “En un contexto de nuevas formas de lucha, pero sobre todo, de nuevos 
actores (sobre todo campesinos e indígenas) poco comprendidos en las ciudades, se va 
consolidando el papel de García Linera como sociólogo-intérprete, lo que se refleja en su 
presencia creciente en los medios de comunicación bajo la figura de moda del ‘analista’ . . . 
sus formas y posiciones políticas aparecían moderadas por sofisticados análisis, capaces de 
‘traducir’ a las clases medias urbanas la “racionalidad” (cosmovisión, dirían los indianistas) de 
la Bolivia profunda y tradicionalmente despreciada, completamente opaca para los 
intelectuales hegemónicos” [In a context of new forms of struggle, but especially of new actors 
(above all peasant and indigenous groups) not well understood in the cities, García Linera’s role 
has been established as that of the sociologist-interpreter, which is reflected in his growing 
presence in the media under the title of “analyst” . . . his political concepts and positions appear 
to be moderated by sophisticated analyses, capable of “translating” for the urban middle classes 
the “rationality” (worldview, the Indianists would say) of rural Bolivia, traditionally scorned and 
totally opaque for the hegemonic intellectuals] (16). The collection has been translated into 
English by Historical Materialism’s book series (Plebeian Power: Collective Action and 
Indigenous, Working-Class and Popular Identities in Bolivia, 2014), reinforcing its presentation 
of the figure of García Linera as the dominant one internationally. 
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Bosteels refers in his review of Thomas’s The Gramscian Moment and which belongs 
unequivocally to a genre of explicit state propaganda, circulated by a state publishing organ73 
after its delivery as an official speech, García Linera also uses Gramscian terms to analyze the 
Bolivian situation leading up to the 2005 electoral victory in a more academic register in a text 
translated into English for the New Left Review (“State Crisis and Popular Power” [2006], 
discussed in Chpater 2). The attribution of the concepts deployed in his political speeches and 
academic essays to figures such as Gramsci and Zavaleta, then, is not immaterial to their 
performative content: while Gramsci conveys an international prestige with a broad, amorphous 
ideological range, Zavaleta (whom García Linera has been citing more than any other Bolivian 
author since well before his affiliation with a party aspiring to state power, perhaps on par with 
Bourdieu and Marx himself) is widely considered the most important Bolivian social theorist, 
and his work has been situated at the threshold between nationalist, Marixst, and Indianist 
discourses in a way that resembles García Linera’s own mediating position. 
 
From abolition to conquest of the state 
 I will consider García Linera’s theoretical treatment of the state from two different angles, 
which could be designated (for the sake of convenience, without implying a hard distinction 
here) as prescriptive and descriptive, or political and philosophical. First, the concept of the state 
constructed from the perspective of a political program: García Linera’s professed position 
conforms to the communist notion of the ultimate (but presently deferred) abolition of the state 
                                                 
73 Which, incidentally, has recently published a collection of Bosteels’ texts in Spanish 
translation, including the chapter on García Linera from The Actuality of Communism (El 




(and one that Bosteels [2011] rightly distinguishes from the traditional stagism of the Latin 
American communist parties that sought the full development of the capitalist state and 
corresponding institutions of bourgeois civil society in the medium term, although with the same 
utopian telos). The introduction to Forma valor y forma comunidad, co-authored with Raquel 
Gutiérrez, privileges the antisystemic, autonomist organization of society toward a “semi-state 
configuration” and finally “against the state in any form”;74 this text also contains an explicit 
warning against the “vulgar” conquest of state power as a revolutionary objective: “Hay que 
abandonar . . . de una buena vez, la idea vulgarizada de la ‘conquista del poder’ que se ha 
traducido en la ocupación del poder ajeno” [We must abandon once and for all the vulgar idea of 
the ‘conquest of power’ that has been translated into the occupation of a power that is not one’s 
own] (17).75 This passage offers perhaps the most convenient ironic foil for critics who claim that 
the MAS government has achieved just this, as evidence of García Linera’s hypocrisy or 
                                                 
74 “No puede haber una nueva naturaleza del poder político sin una nueva correlación de 
fuerzas sociales en los ámbitos múltiples de las relaciones de poder, esto es, si no se ha 
construido desde todos los territorios de despliegue de la vida social, en todos los vasos 
capilares del cuerpo del poder social-nacional, un flujo de energía de pasiones, de 
imaginación, de autonomía, de capacidad transformativa, de resistencia y emancipación 
individual-colectiva frente al poder del valor mercantil, lo suficientemente denso como para 
traducirse en una configuración semiestatal (porque es la sociedad misma en proceso de 
autodeterminación, lo que inevitablemente también supone a la larga el camino a la 
emancipación contra el Estado en cualquiera de sus formas) de nuevo contenido que las 
sintetice y luego las refuerce y expanda” [There can be no new nature of political power 
without a new correlation of social forces in the multiple spheres of power relations, that is, if a 
flow of energy, of affect, of imagination, of autonomy, of transformative capacity, of resistance 
and individual and collective emancipation from the power of market-value, dense enough to 
be translated into a semistate configuration (because it is society itself in a process of self-
determination, which necessarily also ultimately presupposes a path towards emancipation 
from the state in any form) of new content that synthesizes and then reinforces and expands 
them, has not been constructed from all the sites of unfolding of social life, all the capillaries of 
the social-national body] (27). 
75 See Bosteels 2011, p. 267. 
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transformism (a position that I take up in my conclusion). This narrative of betrayal, however, is 
too simplistic. (It should be noted that Gutiérrez, García Linera’s then partner and fellow EGTK 
member with whom he was imprisoned at the time, has remained critical of the cooptation of 
Indigenous and other social movements by the state and of the centralist and verticalist 
tendencies that have accompanied the assumption of state power by actors originating in such 
movements in Bolivia and elsewhere in the region.) In other texts from this period prior to 
MAS’s electoral victory, there is already a tension in García Linera’s conception of popular 
insurgency in relation to the state that anticipates those of his discourse from the position of the 
vice presidency, which consists in a failure to conceive of the state—or the collective subaltern 
subject constructed as its outside or antagonist (plebe, etc.)—beyond the logic of the sovereign 
subject. 
García Linera proposes a schematic periodization of different forms of inclusion within 
the state in an essay titled “Ciudadanía y democracia” (1999), structured as a history of the 
changing modes of citizenship since the beginning of the Bolivian republic (a scheme that largely 
overlaps with the one introduced in the previous chapter). The first period spans from the 
constitution of 1825 to the National Revolution of 1952. During this phase the operative concept 
of citizenship is identified as one of caste, that is, a hereditary system in which political and civil 
rights come with property and literacy requirements, and the Indian is the constitutive other of 
the citizen (“los indios son la nada del Estado, su externalidad más fundamental” [the Indians are 
the nothing of the state, its most fundamental outside] [136]). The second period, inaugurated 
with the Revolution of 52, formally extends citizenship to all (although the caste system 
continues to operate to a considerable extent, its boundaries policed by custom rather than law, 
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through racial, cultural, and linguistic hierarchies), but after the initial irruption of democratic 
political subjectivity that overthrew the oligarchic state, a new order of mediations is quickly 
consolidated, co-opting the emergent political actors, and the mode of inclusion of the formerly 
excluded is corporative. The emergence of autonomous political agency gives way to a 
contractual relation through which organized labor is entitled to certain negotiated concessions. 
By 1985, the state mode of 1952 has been fully replaced by a neoliberal state that no longer 
recognized collective political demands; García Linera calls this new form of individual 
citizenship reduced to the election of representatives ciudadanía irresponsable. 
On this phase, he writes, 
La delegación de la voluntad política presupone . . . un tipo específico de sujeto, el 
sujeto delegante que no es responsable de sus actos porque es impotente frente a 
sus circunstancias, y queda compelido a desprenderse del manejo de sus 
intereses . . . requiere pues, de la construcción disuasiva o forzada de una cierta 
“moralidad de esclavos” que permite arrebatar a los sujetos libres su impulso 
genérico y esencial de seguir siendo libres.  
[The delegation of political will presupposes . . . a specific kind of subject, a 
delegating subject that is not responsible for his actions because he is impotent 
before the circumstances that confront him and is compelled to relinquish control 
of his own interests . . . there is therefore a deterrent or forced construction of a 
certain “slave morality” that deprives free subjects of their general and essential 
impulse to persist in their freedom.] (147) 
This critique of representative democracy within the neoliberal context in which the citizen is 
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presented as a “slave” in fact resonates with his critique in a later text of the merely corporative 
citizenship of the National Revolutionary state, where the popular political subject, rather than 
delegating all power, is a reduced to a supplicant. The Bolivian proletariat of this period, he 
argues, while famously combative and organized, has failed again and again over the course of its 
history (prior to the mobilizations that culminated in MAS’s electoral victory in 2005) to 
constitute itself as a sovereign subject rather than a subordinate endowed with certain rights, 
where the sovereign is imagined as the occupant of the position of the state. In El retorno de la 
Bolivia plebeya (2000), García Linera writes of the marcha por la vida (1986), as the swan song of 
the proletariat that emerged in 1952, 
Ciertamente, es una apetencia política muy intensa la que se pone en marcha, y de 
hecho no es exagerado afirmar que los obreros, y en particular los mineros en toda 
esta época que va de 1952 a 1990, han interiorizado como componente indisoluble 
de su identidad de clase la cercanía al Estado, la ambición de integración en el 
Estado. 
Pero a la vez, no se trata de una presencia en el Estado como objetivación 
de un yo colectivo de clase; es decir, el minero no se ambiciona en el Estado como 
titularidad gubernativa. Al contrario, se ambiciona poderosamente en el Estado 
como súbdito, como seguidor, arrogante y belicoso, pero tributario de adhesión y 
consentimiento negociados. El obrero no se ha visto jamás, a no ser en momentos 
extremos y evanescentes, como soberano; pues el soberano no pide sino ejerce, no 
reclama sino sentencia.  
[Certainly, an intense political desire is produced, and it is indeed no exaggeration 
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to say that the workers, and in particular the miners, over the course of this period 
from 1952 to 1990, have internalized as an indissoluble component of their class 
identity a close relation to the state, a desire for integration within the state. 
But at the same time, it is not a matter of a presence of the state as the 
objectification of a collective class identity; that is, the miner does not aspire to a 
government post. On the contrary, he has a powerful aspiration to be a subject of 
the state, as follower, arrogant and bellicose, but offering his negotiated support 
and consent. The worker has never seen himself, except in extreme and ephemeral 
moments, as sovereign; for the sovereign does not ask but executes, does not 
appeal but decrees.] (2008: 174) 
This notion, in which a structural relation is expressed through psychologizing personifications, 
first applied specifically to the proletariat incorporated through union structures (and echoing 
his assessment of neoliberal citizenship in “Ciudadanía y democracia”) is later generalized, 
referring broadly to “un hábito mendigo de las clases populares” [a habit of supplication of the 
popular classes] (175). 
García Linera’s assessment of the relation of the Bolivian subaltern classes to the state, 
despite his attempt to organize his text around a series of more precise historical configurations, 
is structured in all its phases by an absolute opposition between the aspiration to state power and 
all other forms of political intervention. A supplicant or slave subjectivity is constructed as the 
inverse of seigniorial rule, the sovereignty of the colonial lord, governed by the same principle; 
the only alternative to the position of the slave within this logic is that of the master. The concept 
of popular power that corresponds to this binary construction of supplicant and sovereign does 
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not seem to admit any form of non-servile political subjectivity beyond the occupation of the 
state apparatus. García Linera articulates a discourse that is predominantly, at least on the 
surface, conceived from a radical antistatist, autonomist perspective, yet in fact cannot imagine a 
politics beyond the state. 
 
The apparent state: from reflection to illusion 
The second aspect of García Linera’s discourse on the state that I want to consider is the 
ontological or causal relation between society and the state. Since his writings on Marx and the 
agrarian community, García Linera has maintained that the state is produced by, and cannot 
produce, society. In De demonios escondidos, he affirms that the state can produce revolutionary 
effects only when the first cause is society itself, which expresses its will through the medium of 
the state: 
No hay pues revolucionarización social posible y la consiguiente construcción 
nacional desde el viejo Estado. Esta tarea solo puede venir como movimiento de la 
sociedad para auto-organizarse, como impulso creativo y vital de la sociedad civil 
para organizarse como nación. Esto no quita el papel que en esta tarea pueda 
desempeñar el Estado, como lo señala Marx en el caso de la monarquía absoluta 
en Europa, o las mismas elites criollas de México, pero siempre como 
condensadoras de los impulsos de la sociedad.  
[No social revolutionization and consequent national construction is possible 
from the old state. This task can only come as a movement of the new society to 
organize itself, as a creative and vital impulse of civil society to organize itself as a 
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nation. This does not negate the role that the state can play in the execution of this 
task, as Marx points out in the case of absolute monarchy in Europe, or even as 
with the creole elite in Mexico, but always as a synthesis of the impulses of 
society.] (50) 
The state for this early García Linera is not altogether impotent, but is ultimately productive only 
to the extent that it operates as an organic appendage of the social body. 
In De demonios escondidos, García Linera rejects Aricó’s argument in Marx y América 
Latina (discussed in my first chapter) that Marx is unable to engage productively with the figure 
of Simón Bolívar and by extension Latin America because, blinded by a too vehement, reactive 
anti-Hegelianism (and at the same time by a residual, unwitting Hegelianism in the implicit, 
Eurocentric positing of peoples without history), he denies the state any historical agency; García 
Linera attributes Marx’s inattention to Latin America rather to a relative absence of popular 
insurgency during the period and an even greater absence of sources on what mobilization from 
below there was.76 In his defense of Marx’s dismissal of Bolívar, who is for him (in keeping with 
Aricó’s reading) a symbol of Latin American nationalization from above, García Linera speaks 
already of apparent states, using the same term that he will later claim as a citation of Zavaleta 
(although he does not cite him here): 
En otras palabras, la concepción de Marx sobre los estados latinoamericanos 
como formaciones aparentes, formales, sustentadas más por el arbitrio autoritario 
centralizado que por la condensación de iniciativa social general y por tanto, el 
carácter inacabado o mejor a realizarse, de la construcción nacional estatal como 
                                                 
76 For Bosteels on this, see Marx and Freud in Latin America, pp. 6–9.  
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tarea del futuro, no es un desliz hegelizante de un momento (que no quita la 
incorporación de razonamientos de Hegel), sino un conjunto de valoraciones 
orgánicas al cuerpo teórico del marxismo que dan cuenta de la realidad nacional.  
[In other words, Marx’s conception of the Latin American states as apparent 
formations, merely formal, sustained more through a centralized authoritarian 
will than by the condensation of a general social initiative and therefore of the 
unfinished, or rather, still-to-be-realized nature of the construction of the nation-
state, as a task for the future, is not a momentary Hegelian slip (which is not to 
deny the incorporation of Hegel’s thought), but a set of judgments that are 
organically connected to the theoretical body of Marxism and that account for the 
national reality.] (254) 
The equivalence here between top-down nationalization from the moment of the state and the 
merely apparent or formal draws on the conception of the superstructural in general as mere 
reflection or expression; but in referring specifically to the Latin American republics as artificial 
national formations, García Linera introduces an implicit distinction between these as false 
representations and the Western European capitalist nation-states in which the state is a true 
expression of a process of nationalization from below. The concept of appearance here therefore 
functions on two different levels, one that applies to the state in general and serves to establish a 
causal primacy of the social base, and one that serves to distinguish the original Western nation- 
states in which this relation of (here not merely economic but “civilizational”) social structure 
and political superstructure is effectively produced and those in which the state projects a false or 
fictive image of the nation: “muy a pesar de los intentos desde arriba, la construcción de la nación 
y la reforma social no ha sido más que una ficción señorial, oligárquica y terrateniente” [In spite 
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of efforts from above, the construction of the nation and social reform have been no more than a 
seigniorial, oligarchic, landholder fiction] (255). In this passage from the general category of the 
state as phenomenon to the deviant case of non-correspondence, the “apparent” nature of all 
states is eclipsed and a new category of the “real” state, still unnamed, is implied. 
Bosteels cites the following passage from an interview with Stefanoni on the state’s 
limited power to produce a communist society—it can only empower or potentialize (potenciar)77 
structures that emerge from below—to preface an apology for García Linera’s “well-nigh 
complete turnaround in the interpretation of the relation between communism and the State” 
(presumably against critics of his proposition of “Andean capitalism” as the only realistic option 
for the present): 
Cuando entro al gobierno lo que hago es validar y comenzar a operar estatalmente 
en función de esa lectura del momento actual. Entonces, ¿dónde queda el 
comunismo? ¿Qué puede hacerse desde el Estado en función de ese horizonte 
comunista? Apoyar lo más que se pueda el despliegue de las capacidades 
organizativas autónomas de la sociedad. Hasta ahí llega la posibilidad de lo que 
puede hacer un Estado de izquierda, un Estado revolucionario. Ampliar la base 
obrera, y la autonomía del mundo obrero, potenciar formas de economía 
comunitaria allá donde haya redes, articulaciones y proyectos más comunitaristas.  
[When I enter the government what I do is validate and begin to operate at the 
level of the state in accordance with that reading of the present moment. So where 
does that leave communism? What can the state do in relation to that communist 
                                                 
77 Bosteels offers these two possible translations.  
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horizon? Support the development of the autonomous organizational capacities of 
society as much as possible. That is the extent of what a leftist state, a 
revolutionary state, can do. Expand the working-class base, the autonomy of the 
workers, empower communitarian economic forms where communitarianist 
networks, articulations, and projects exist.] (Actuality of Communism 247; Las 
vías de la emancipación 75) 
But this passage, far from representing any kind of turnaround, is in fact entirely consistent with 
García Linera’s earlier writings on the state (for example, with the passage from De demonios 
escondidos cited above). The impotence of the old state that does not represent the impulse of 
society has been exchanged for a potentially revolutionary state that cannot fulfill its function 
without correspondingly revolutionary forms of social organization, but can only stimulate these 
forms where it finds them as they emerge. 
The paradox of García Linera’s state theory consists in that while the state as such is 
devoid of agency, it is only through direct occupancy of the state apparatus that popular 
agency—conceived as sovereignty—can be imagined. The state then becomes the unmediated 
expression of a popular subjectivity when occupied by members of formerly excluded groups, so 
that Evo Morales as an Aymara cocalero organizer comes to embody the country’s social 
movements and indigenous population as a whole. Precisely because the state has no 
autonomous existence, where it is not an impotent shadow it becomes the embodiment of a 





Gramsci’s general concept of the state 
The concept of the integral state in Gramsci and in its subsequent iterations can operate 
in an empirical, analytical, or normative mode: it designates a historically determinate kind of 
state, a theory of the state as such, and a stage of development en route from subalternity to the 
full realization of political autonomy in a stateless, “regulated” society. This latter mode is of 
course the one that seems least adequate or thorniest today, and the first chapter of this 
dissertation is largely a refutation of such a normative reading of Gramsci, emphasizing the 
empirical or descriptive sense—the integral state as the terrain rather than the end of political 
struggle in advanced capitalism—as the one most pertinent to the context under discussion and 
the passages from the notebooks cited in the literature of Latin American Gramscianism of the 
seventies and eighties. Here I want to focus on the analytical function, the concept as a 
contribution to state theory (the claim that “in reality, the distinction [between the state proper 
and civil society] is purely methodological and not organic; in concrete historical life, political 
society and civil society are a single entity” [Q 4, § 38]), while taking stock of its ethical content—
a term that must be distinguished from the normative—however untenable the concept of 
“regulated society” and the progressivist conception of history that it entails.  
Thomas, who likewise cautions against a normative interpretation, points out that the 
notion of the integral state attributed to Gramsci owes much to Christine Buci-Glucksmann’s 
presentation of the concept as one of an “expanded state,” a phrase that does not appear in 
Gramsci’s writings (Thomas 2009: 139). More pertinently perhaps (and Thomas does not note 
this), the phrase “integral state” does not appear either, with the exception of one instance with 
quotation marks around “state,” in Notebook 6, § 10, in reference to the emergence of the 
modern state with the French Revolution: 
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. . . il raggruppamento sociale che dopo il Mille fu la forza motrice economica 
dell’Europa, poté presentarsi come “Stato” integrale, con tutte le forze intellettuali 
e morali necessarie e sufficienti per organizzare una società completa e perfetta. 
[. . . the social grouping that had become the economic driving force in Europe 
after the year 1000 was able to present itself as an integral “state” with all the 
intellectual and moral forces that were necessary and adequate to the task of 
organizing a complete and perfect society.] 
Gramsci suggests here, by placing it in quotation marks, that he is using the term “state” in a 
figurative sense, to mean something other than the state proper, and it is this figurative 
“expansion” or metaphorical displacement of the concept of “state” that comes to structure 
Gramsci’s political theory; the state becomes a pharmakological figure for the political, as ethico-
political transcendence of corporativist self-interest and as subjectification within a totalized 
bourgeois society.  
In two subsequent notes in Notebook 6 Gramsci refers to the “general notion of the state” 
and “the state in the integral sense” (translated as “full sense” by Buttigieg) (that is, again, the 
distinction has to do with the concept and not its object), followed by variations of the famous 
formula state = political society + civil society: in § 155, on the analogy of political and military 
struggle (the war of position and the war of maneuver), “Nella politica l’errore avviene per una 
inesatta comprensione di ciò che è lo Stato (nel significato integrale: dittatura + egemonia)” [In 
politics, the error stems from an inaccurate understanding of the nature of the state (in the full 
sense: dictatorship + hegemony)], and in § 88, on the “gendarme or night-watchman state,” 
Siamo sempre nel terreno della identificazione di Stato e Governo, identificazione 
che appunto è un ripresentarsi della forma corporativa-economica, cioè della 
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confusione tra società civile e società politica, poiché è da notare che nella nozione 
generale di Stato entrano elementi che sono da riportare alla nozione di società 
civile (nel senso, si potrebbe dire, che Stato = società politica + società civile, cioè 
egemonia corazzata di coercizione) 
[We are still on the terrain of the identification of state and government, an 
identification that is precisely a representation of the economic-corporative 
form—in other words, of the confusion between civil society and political society, 
for it should be noted that certain elements that fall under the general notion of 
the state must be restored to the notion of civil society (in the sense, one might 
say, that state = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the 
armor of coercion).] 
Here the “general” notion of the state, as opposed to “government,” synechdochized by the police 
in the narrow sense (and perhaps also in Rancière’s general sense of this concept, which I take up 
below) subsumes elements of civil society, no longer to be conceived as its dialectical other. The 
state understood in this general and not merely “technical” sense, as more than a mere 
instrument, does indeed have an ethical dimension, in that it designates an ethico-political 
articulation, the collective participation in the construction of a new “conception of the world.” 
In Notebook 17, § 51, on Machiavelli, Gramsci describes the process of becoming state in the 
integral sense (via the “party,” another term that Gramsci uses beyond its narrow or literal sense): 
Nel mondo moderno, un partito è tale, integralmente e non, come avviene, 
frazione di un partito piú grande, quando esso è concepito, organizzato e diretto 
in modi e forme tali da svilupparsi integralmente in uno Stato (integrale, e non in 
un governo tecnicamente inteso) e in una concezione del mondo. Lo sviluppo del 
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partito in Stato reagisce sul partito e ne domanda una continua riorganizzazione e 
sviluppo, cosí come lo sviluppo del partito e dello Stato in concezione del mondo, 
cioè in trasformazione totale e molecolare (individuale) dei modi di pensare e 
operare, reagisce sullo Stato e sul partito, costringendoli a riorganizzarsi 
continuamente e ponendo loro dei problemi nuovi e originali da risolvere. 
[In the modern world, a party is such, integrally and not, as it happens, a fraction 
of a larger party, when it is conceived, organized, and directed in such a way as to 
develop integrally into a state (integral, and not into a government in the technical 
sense) and into a conception of the world. The development of the party into a 
state in turn acts upon the party and demands its continuous reorganization and 
development, just as the development of the party and of the state into a 
conception of the world, that is, the total and molecular (individual) 
transformation of the ways of thinking and acting, acts upon the state and the 
party, requiring them to continually reorganize themselves and posing new and 
original problems for them to solve.] 
The modern state is the concrete historical realization of the concept of the state in its integral or 
full sense, as an organically articulated ethico-political collectivity; the integral state in Gramsci 
is, as highlighted in my first chapter, the terrain of political struggle in advanced capitalism, and, 
as I discuss in my second chapter, the condition of collective political and social agency. In this 
sense it is at once a condition of autonomy and a set of constraints, as a common ideological 
horizon.  
This double aspect, as condition and limitation of social action and thought, might take 
us into the field opened up by Althusser’s reading of Gramsci, in which the element of constraint, 
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the internalization of the “night-watchman” or police within the subject, is emphasized. 
Although my argument necessarily gestures in this direction, I will stay closer to Gramsci’s own 
terms here in insisting that the ethical unity of the state is not the end of political struggle.78 The 
ethical is not necessarily the good, although it is a precondition for a just society; it is also a 
precondition for all forms of totalitarianism, as well as for capitalist individualism. The 
autonomy, or sovereignty, of a collective social subject that succeeds in constituting itself as state 
can be as oppressive, both internally and externally, as any despotic regime. Gramsci is entirely 
aware of this non-normative value of the ethical integrity of the state, but he does not, as later 
theorists will, theorize heterogeneity, difference, or disagreement, as a productive democratic 
supplement to the collective political subject so constituted. In the next part of this chapter, via 
Zavaleta, I take up a particular strain of this thinking of social difference.  
 
II. The motley and the multi 
 
Zavaleta as local theory 
Zavaleta has been claimed within and beyond Bolivia as a local thinker. Or, more 
precisely, his thought has been read as the enactment of an incomplete passage from the 
metropolitan toward the local; in Walter Mignolo’s terms, of a process of epistemic 
decolonization. This intermediate position perhaps lends this localist/proto-decolonial Zavaleta 
even more symbolic force than if he were read as thoroughly decolonized from the outset because 
it can be recited in the form of a narrative, and this is indeed what has occurred. Here is 
                                                 
78 For a discussion of the ethical state as police state, see Williams 2011, pp. 91–92. 
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Mignolo’s account (taking Fanon and Rivera Cusicanqui as representative of fully decolonial 
thinking): 
Zavaleta died young, in the early 1980s, and he was also formed as a Marxist. 
Both, dying in the early 1980s and being Marxist of the 1960s, prevented him from 
pushing further into the colonial wound and the profound historical experience of 
the damnés that shaped the ‘mass accumulation’ of meaning. This aspect was 
developed with force and insight by perhaps the most brilliant follower of his 
work, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. In the work of Silvia Rivera, the colonial wound, 
the consciousness and the accumulation of the damnés (although she doesn’t use 
this word), is loud and clear. (“On Subalterns and Other Agencies” 403) 
Here—in a text published the year of Morales’s election—Zavaleta is at once a foundational and a 
transitional thinker of the “colonial matrix of power.” 
Another passage in Mignolo that tells this story emphasizes the empiricism of local 
theory (seeing what is “before [one’s] very eyes”), and places Gramsci, whom Zavaleta himself 
uses as a model of historicist attention to the local (see Lo nacional-popular 228, for example, on 
the blocco storico as a supplement to mode of production as analytical category), which is not 
the same thing, on the side of detached, abstract, metropolitan theory:  
Although the colonial matrix of power was introduced after Zavaleta Mercado 
died (and of course, Zavaleta’s contribution fueled that conceptualisation) its 
origins are helpful to know. Knowing them enables one to understand the 
tensions juggled in a conceptual apparatus inherited from Karl Marx and 
Antonio Gramsci, but growing out of Bolivian society—a society quite different 
from the three industrial countries of Western Europe (England, Germany and 
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France) that the German and Italian intellectuals were trying to understand. 
Zavaleta’s heritage in those frames of mind created out of the Indian and 
African experience in South America and the Caribbean is clear. But so too is 
his Marxism and it is this that then prevented him from taking Fanon’s 
conceptualisation of the damnés seriously, despite the fact that daily, in Bolivia, 
Zavaleta could see the damnés before his very eyes (397). 
Already in 1991, Antezana writes that Zavaleta’s concepts are left suspended between the 
general and the concrete, a universalist Marxist ideal and a heterogeneous social reality. The task 
of the new generation, he proposes, is to continue the unfinished work of the formulation of 
alternative concepts applicable to the local Andean reality. In his monograph on Zavaleta, La 
producción del conocimiento local, originally written as his doctoral thesis in 1997 and published 
in book form in 2002, Luis Tapia likewise proposes supplementing Zavaleta’s Marxist analysis 
with Rivera Cusicanqui’s historiography and the project of the Taller de Historia Oral Andina 
(THOA), which he describes as a counterpoint to Zavaleta’s more “systematic” analysis by 
supplying a “consciousness of subaltern diversity” (421).79 
The theoretical contribution most commonly associated with Zavaleta and cited to situate 
him within this narrative of a progressive approximation of the local is that of abigarramiento. 
Recalling a tradition of exoticizing commodification of Latin American culture, in La producción 
                                                 
79 Mignolo does not cite Zavaleta directly but relies on explications of his terminology in the 
works of Luis Tapia and Luis H. Antezana (and indeed the term “local theory,” which Mignolo 
attributes to Zavaleta, is used by Tapia and Antezana, but not by Zavaleta himself); this narrative, 
with Rivera representing the terminus that Zavaleta gestures toward but does not reach, is 
already present in his secondary sources (see below, on Tapia). Rivera points out that Zavaleta in 
fact draws on her work in his consideration of indigenous struggle, complicating the linearity of 
this sequence in which she is his “follower” (2014). 
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del conocimiento local Tapia connects abigarramiento with Alejo Carpentier’s concept of the 
baroque (which is of course in turn connected to Carpentier’s “real maravilloso,” the original 
formulation of magical realism): “el barroco es un tipo de producción cultural que se hace sobre 
las condiciones del abigarramiento social. Mi intención es utilizar estas ideas sobre lo barroco 
para caracterizar el tipo de trabajo y de pensamiento elaborado por Zavaleta, que también es un 
tipo de producción cultural” (320). There is an affinity here with a certain strain of subalternist 
discourse that would coalesce into the “decolonial” turn led by Mignolo upon the dissolution of 
the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, articulated in strikingly similar terms, as a 
vindication of alterity that is continuous with a broader Orientalizing tendency but rarely so 
plainly expressed, in the Bolivianist critic Javier Sanjinés (who takes Mignolo as his principal 
theoretical source):  
Indeed, in Latin America’s project of development and modernization, cultural 
and economic forms of different temporal origins coexist, forming layers rather 
than stages. This simultaneity of time and cultural forms, best captured by artists 
and writers through the mythic mode of magical realism, indicates that Latin 
America is unique and quite different from the instrumental rationality of the 
West. (154) 
There is clearly an appropriation here of a prior notion of economic disarticulation, uneven 
development, etcetera, which is incorporated into a certain form of Latin Americanist cultural 
studies that works through the continuous production of the specificity of its object of study; 
Tapia likewise appropriates, from the position of the social scientist and specialist in Bolivian 
political theory, claims originating in the discipline of literary criticism to advance an argument 
for the value of non-metropolitan thought.  
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Tapia’s reduction of Zavaleta’s “cultural production” to the function of re-presenting its 
object of inquiry, which is also its origin, or locus of enunciation, is precisely what occurs 
perhaps in a more subtle way in localist readings like Mignolo’s, and is complicit in the 
identitarianism that authorizes the populist, (pluri)nationalist state. He continues, 
Considero que Zavaleta es el barroco en la ciencia social en Bolivia, o sea, la 
descripción, que aquí es un decir, adecuada o correspondiente al mundo que 
piensa y pretende explicar. En general, el pensamiento social en Bolivia ha sido 
siempre más simple que el tipo de realidad que se pensaba. En el plano de la teoría 
y la ciencia social, esto muestra un grado de mayor retraso o no correspondencia 
en relación a las otras expresiones culturales, como las artes.  
[I consider Zavaleta to be the baroque author of Bolivian social science, that is, the 
description, so to speak, that is adequate to or corresponds to the world that he 
thinks and wants to explain. In general, social thought in Bolivia has always been 
simpler than the reality that it thinks. In the sphere of theory and social science, 
this represents a greater degree of underdevelopment or non-correspondence with 
respect to other cultural expressions, such as the arts.] (322) 
Here Tapia’s conception of the question of representation within the sphere of intellectual 
production, whether cultural or social-scientific, is analogous to García Linera’s discourse on 
political representation as faithful rendering or reflection of society in the state.  
 
From motley society to Plurinational State 
The concept of abigarramiento in Zavaleta first designates a synchronous 
superimposition of historical stages, that is, of modes of production, within a territory. 
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Comparable to other conceptual formulations of Latin American heterogeneity in the work of his 
contemporaries—and indeed to the identification of a persistence of precapitalist relations 
elsewhere in the postcolonial world, for example, in the work of the South Asian Subaltern 
Studies group—it is thus initially inscribed within an at least implicitly stagist analytical frame; 
rather than challenging the logic of the modes-of-production sequence it attempts to account for 
aberrant cases within the terms of that logic, and marks the specific difference of non-European 
societies. When Zavaleta emphasizes the insufficiency of a purely economistic social taxonomy 
and turns to the Gramscian conception of the historical bloc, the motley is not so much redefined 
as reoriented toward ways of imagining the social beyond the totalized, rational subject of 
bourgeois liberal democracy.  
In all its iterations it refers to “peripheral” societies not (or not yet) leveled by the process 
of homogenization that comes with the capitalist mode of intersubjectivity produced by the 
abstraction of labor, but always as a condition (of possibility or impossibility) whose theoretical 
value is bound to its political consequences, and never as an identity—or even a form of 
organization of a plurality of identities—to be defended. The motley is thus conceived primarily 
as a negative category, as an obstacle to the epistemological and political operation of the 
superstructures of capitalism, which are by no means wholly or unequivocally undesirable: 
motley societies are “unknowable” through the quantitative or empirical methods of the social 
sciences, necessitating a historicist method of inquiry, and the motley quality of a society 
obstructs the legitimacy of representative democracy.80 
Rivera Cusicanqui’s Oprimidos pero no vencidos offers an example contemporary with 
                                                 
80 See p. 57 of this dissertation. 
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Zavaleta’s late work (published before the posthumous and unfinished Lo nacional-popular en 
Bolivia [1986], the source most often cited by Tapia and García Linera) of a more vindicatory use 
of the term abigarramiento. In the context of a critique of the homogenizing ideology of 
mestizaje that governed the interpellative discourse of the Revolutionary Nationalist state, she 
calls for  
un nuevo pensamiento político y . . . un nuevo discurso histórico capaz de 
reconocer en el abigarramiento del país no ya una verdad angustiante sino la 
manifestación positiva y enriquecedora de un milenario proceso humano de 
domesticación del espacio, jalonado por múltiples y complejos procesos de 
ruptura, resistencia y creatividad colectiva.  
[a new political thought and . . . a new historical discourse capable of seeing in the 
motley composition of the country no longer a disconcerting truth but the 
positive and enriching manifestation of a millenarian process of the human 
domestication of space, marked by multiple and complex processes of rupture, 
resistance, and collective creativity.] (217) 
Lo abigarrado here occupies a position analogous to that of subalternity, and the two terms are in 
fact equated in Rivera’s and Barragán’s introduction to their collection of Subaltern Studies texts 
in Spanish translation (in a passage cited in the previous chapter): “La hegemonía colonial en la 
construcción institucional e imaginaria de la India es . . . cuestionada desde el punto de vista de 
una sociedad civil abigarrada—la sociedad subalterna—que siempre permanece heterogénea y 
elusiva a la política de los de ‘arriba’” [Colonial hegemony in the institutional and imaginary 
construction of India is . . . questioned from the point of view of a motley civil society—subaltern 
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society—that remains always heterogeneous and elusive to the politics of the elite] (Rivera and 
Barragán 11). Like subalternity in its presentation here, lo abigarrado is read in Oprimidos as a 
“positive and enriching manifestation” of alterity, as that which eludes domination, or politics 
from above.  
This alterity as a positive outside of the hegemonic order, as a force of resistance or 
repository of alternative possibilities, is always at risk of appropriation by a conception of alterity 
as multiculturalism, as the neutralization of difference through a discourse of inclusion and 
equation. The 1994 constitution—produced in the neoliberal phase whose crisis brought the 
current regime to power—already declared Bolivia a “multicultural state”; one of the major 
ideological tasks of the “Plurinational State,” declared in the 2009 constitution, then, is to 
distinguish itself from this earlier discourse. One such attempt is made in a text by Tapia 
frequently cited by García Linera, La condición multisocietal (2002), in which abigarramiento—
which I have argued is inherently neither good nor bad in Zavaleta, but can be understood to 
have both politically advantageous or obstructive effects—is defined as a condition of colonial 
domination:81  
                                                 
81 Bosteels questions the Zavaletian origin of the concept in Álvaro García Linera: 
The multiple references to the “plebes” (la plebe armada, la plebe facciosa, las plebes 
insurrectas, and so on) in García Linera’s recent collection of writings [Stefanoni’s La 
potencia plebeya], on the one hand, entail a sustained attempt to bypass the classical figure 
of the proletariat modeled on the large factory worker, in favor of a wider and much more 
flexible composition of the revolutionary subject. García Linera calls this composition 
“motley,” or abigarrada in Spanish, supposedly borrowing a term from the famous 
Bolivian sociologist René Zavaleta Mercado. In actual fact, though, this concept and its 
name already appear in the Spanish translation of Lenin’s well-known pamphlet on left-
wing communism: “. . . motley intermediate types between the proletarian and the semi-
proletarian . . . between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant …” This is how García 
Linera . . . describes the new class composition of that motley social formation of the 
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La idea de lo multisocietal viene de la idea de lo abigarrado que elaboró René 
Zavaleta . . . El abigarramiento social es una condición de sobreposición de 
diversos tipos de sociedad que coexisten de manera desarticulada, estableciendo 
relaciones de dominación y distorsión de una sobre otras. El abigarramiento en 
general es producto del colonialismo. Se podría decir que mientras persiste en 
algún margen de abigarramiento la condición colonial no ha desaparecido de ese 
ámbito de relaciones sociales y políticas. . . . Lo abigarrado es la heterogeneidad 
mal compuesta por la dominación.  
[The idea of the multisocietal comes from the idea of the motley elaborated by 
René Zavaleta . . . The motley quality of society is a condition of superimposition 
of different kinds of society that coexist in a disjointed way, establishing relations 
of domination and distortion of some in relation to others. The motley is 
generally a product of colonialism. It could be said that as long as this motley 
quality persists to some degree . . . the colonial condition has not been eradicated 
                                                                                                                                                             
“plebs” in which the socio-economical and cultural-symbolic aspects must be constantly 
thought together. 
More general speaking, the plebeian reference is consistent with a leftist and populist 
appeal to various names for the formless or as yet unformed masses: from Hegel’s 
“rabble” to Deleuze’s “hordes” and “packs” to Laclau’s retrieval of Marx’s “lumpen.” 
(2011, 232–233) 
Lenin is certainly a source for Zavaleta and there is no reason to believe García Linera is not also 
drawing directly on the same texts, but the citation of Zavaleta is not meaningless. As discussed 
below, there is a sense of superimposed and disarticulated formations in Zavaleta’s concept of 
abigarramiento as used in García Linera that exceeds the one offered in Lenin. Still, I don’t want 
to fetishize the term as constructed in Zavaleta and to which his work has so often been unjustly 
reduced (as also occurs with a set of terms in Gramsci). My interest here is much less in the 
concept itself or its original source than in the mechanisms and effects of its appropriation. 
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from this sphere of political and social relations. . . . The motley is heterogeneity 
disfigured by domination.] (10) 
While the term is taken here to denote a condition of domination (no specific source for this 
claim is provided; the concept is normally used in reference to contexts where it is an effect of 
colonial domination, but this is not necessarily inherent to its structure, and it might just as well 
be understood as the effect of the failure of colonial domination, or, in Ranajit Guha’s terms, of 
domination without hegemony), a positively valued heterogeneity actually precedes this 
condition of abigarramiento as disjointedness, which is its “disfigured,” corrupt, or falsified 
appearance. In addition to positing this prior condition of heterogeneity as authentic and 
originary, Tapia’s reading of abigarramiento leads him to formulate his own concept—lo 
multisocietal— as an anticipated, future condition that resembles the identitarian reading of the 
term that I have been disputing. Tapia continues, 
La idea de lo multisocietal deviene de la idea de lo abigarrado, la he imaginado 
desde esa fuente para pensar algo más general, por un lado, y así, varias 
posibilidades histórico-políticas de reconstrucción del país, por el otro lado 
complementario. Lo multisocietal contiene el primer rasgo de lo abigarrado: la 
coexistencia y sobreposición de diferentes sociedades o matrices de relaciones 
sociales de diversa cualidad y tiempos históricos, pero no necesariamente lo 
segundo y definitorio de lo abigarrado, que es el carácter desarticulado y de 
dominación más o menos colonial de la sobreposición.  
[The idea of the multisocietal comes from the idea of the motley, I have derived it 
from this source to think something more general, on the one hand, and thus, on 
the other hand, multiple possibilities of historical-political reconstruction of the 
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country. The multisocietal contains the first feature of the motley: the coexistence 
and superimposition of different societies or matrixes of social relations of 
different qualities and historical temporalities, but not necessarily the second and 
defining feature of the motley, which is the disjointed quality and the more or less 
colonial form of domination in this superimposition.] (10) 
This is a somewhat different operation from the one in which the concept is “expanded” from a 
discourse governed by the logic of mode of production to one of ethnicity, and takes as its point 
of departure a different reading of the term, but the resulting argument and its philosophical and 
political premises are similar: there is a recuperative impulse that claims a hidden truth and 
destiny. While Tapia is careful to explicitly endorse an anti-essentialist concept of ethnicity, in 
attempting to differentiate his position from a (neo)liberal multiculturalism he relies on a 
culture/civilization distinction (17) in which the Enlightenment hierarchy that privileges 
culture82 is flipped, and “civilization” means something deeper than the cosmetic diversity of 
multicultural liberal democracy. 
García Linera makes a similar argument in 2004 (La descentralización que se viene), 
referring to a sociedad multicivilizatoria (230), composed of different “civilizational regimes” 
(regimenes civilizatorios) in which “civilization” is likewise a culturalist expansion of mode of 
production: “Un régimen civilizatorio es mucho más que un modo de producción, pues integra 
la matriz cognitiva y los procedimientos de autoridad que regulan la vida colectiva . . . En Bolivia, 
se puede afirmar que existen cuatro grandes regimenes civilizatorios” [A civilizational regime is 
                                                 
82 Kant writes, for example, in “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” 
“While the idea of morality is indeed present in culture, an application of this idea which only 
extends to the semblances of morality, as in love of honor and outward propriety, amounts 
merely to civilization” (1991: 49). 
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much more than a mode of production, for it integrates the cognitive matrix and the procedures 
of authority that regulate collective life] (231).83 These are: (1) capitalist modernity, (2) the small-
holder and artisan sectors with a “corporative rationality” (233), (3) the Amazonian, and finally, 
(4) the communal, which includes Quechua and Aymara communities. The latter is “no solo . . . 
la más antigua en el territorio boliviano, sino que, por sobre todo, . . . la que más 
sistemáticamente ha creado una arquitectura de creencias, de discursos políticos centrados en el 
autogobierno, de proyectos y de fuerza de movilización en torno a esas demandas” [not only . . . 
the most ancient in the Bolivian territory, but above all, that which has most systematically 
created an architecture of beliefs, of political discourses centered around self-government, of 
projects and mobilizing force around these demands] (228). There can be no doubt that here an 
essentialist notion of civilization—despite García Linera’s attempts to safeguard himself from 
such a charge by citing sources like Benedict Anderson on the constructedness of collective 
identities—serves to propose the centrality and ascendency of a particular ethnic group—held to 
be at once the most ancient and the most advanced—as the basis of the nation. Both Tapia and 
                                                 
83 García Linera connects this to abigarramiento, and presents the slippage from mode of 
production or historical stage to “civilization” in terms of operationalizability: “El otro eje de 
desarticulación social sustancial es lo que Zavaleta llamó ‘lo abigarrado,’ que puede ser 
resumido como la coexistencia sobrepuesta de varios modos de producción, de varios tiempos 
históricos y sistemas políticos. En términos más operacionalizables, se puede decir que Bolivia 
es un país donde coexisten desarticuladamente varias civilizaciones, pero donde la estructura 
estatal recoge la lógica organizativa de una sola de estas civilizaciones, la moderna mercantil 
capitalista” [The other axis of substantial social disjointedness is what Zavaleta called “lo 
abigarrado,” which can be summed up as the superimposed coexistence of several modes of 
production, of various historical temporalities and political systems. In more workable terms, we 
could say that Bolivia is a country where multiple civilizations exist disjointedly, but where the 
state structure reflects the organizational logic of only one of these civilizations, that of modern 




García Linera, in their conception of the social reality of Bolivia and in their prescriptive political 
theses, assume an irreducible “civilization” that corresponds to a particular form of political 
organization; there is no room in this reasoning for politics as the collective transformation of the 
real, but only as its faithful or authentic expression. 
The notion that abigarramiento necessarily entails a form of colonial domination 
elaborated in Tapia’s La condición multisocietal, which García Linera also suggests in the passage 
cited above, a presumed equivalence between disarticulation or discord and domination, is 
predicated upon an understanding of democratic politics as consensus or totalization. 
Abigarramiento, Tapia writes, involves “formas cambiantes e inestables” [changing and unstable 
forms], and “implica la coexistencia conflictiva de varios principios de organización social que no 
pueden componer orgánicamente la totalidad social . . . el abigarramiento es la multiculturalidad 
conflictiva sin solución compuesta” [implies the conflictive coexistence of various principles of 
social organization that cannot organically constitute a social totality . . . abigarramiento is a 
conflictive multiculturalism without resolution] (58). This reading of conflict as domination and 
“social totality” as the political good to be sought anticipates García Linera’s presentation of 
Gramsci’s stato integrale as the resolution of centuries of struggle. 
 In the passage from mestizo nationalism to plurinationalism understood in the sense of 
Tapia’s multisocietal or García Linera’s multicivilizational as either a translation or 
transcendence of Zavaleta’s abigarramiento, and despite or even partially as a result of the 
express intent to differentiate this project from liberal multiculturalism as just another form of 
equalization or totalization, the positing of stable identities as the basis of political 
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organization is retained.84 If we read Zavaleta’s pharmacological use of the motley (as medicine 
and poison) as (de)constituent obstruction to the total, transparent representation of the social 
in the state, it does not so much constitute a positive alternative to nationalist thinking as an 
antidote to any ideological apparatus that might be erected in its place in the service of the 
closure of politics as struggle. 
 
The apparent and the real 
In the first part of this chapter I highlight a slippage between notions of superstructure as 
                                                 
84 A notable point of contrast: In a more recent text (Ch’ixinakax utxiwa, 2010), Silvia Rivera 
modifies her earlier usage of the concept to claim Zavaleta as precisely a thinker of agonistic 
plurality rather than totalization:  
La noción de “hibridez” propuesta por García Canclini es una metáfora genética, que 
connota esterilidad. La mula es una especie híbrida y no puede reproducirse. La hibridez 
asume la posibilidad de que de la mezcla de dos diferentes, pueda salir un tercero 
completamente nuevo, una tercera raza o grupo social capaz de fusionar los rasgos de sus 
ancestros en una mezcla armónica y ante todo inédita. La noción de ch’ixi, por el 
contrario, equivale a la de “sociedad abigarrada” de Zavaleta, y plantea la coexistencia en 
paralelo de múltiples diferencias culturales que no se funden, sino que antagonizan o se 
complementan. Cada una se reproduce a sí misma desde la profundidad del pasado y se 
relaciona con las otras de forma contenciosa.  
[The notion of “hybridity” that García Canclini proposes is a genetic metaphor that 
connotes sterility. The mule is a kind of hybrid and cannot reproduce. Hybridity assumes 
the possibility that the mixture of two different elements can produce a third, totally new 
entity, a third race or social group capable of fusing the traits of its ancestors in a 
harmonious and above all unprecedented combination. The notion of ch’ixi, on the other 
hand, is equivalent to Zavaleta’s “motley society,” and posits the parallel coexistence of 
multiple cultural differences that are not fused, but complement and antagonize one 
another. Each reproduces itself from the depth of the past and relates to the other in a 
contentious manner.] (70) 
While there is surely still an element of recuperative identitarianism here (although the 
connection drawn between Zavaleta and the Aymara concept of ch’ixi is one of affinity rather 




expression and as reflection, illusion, or fiction as it operates in García Linera’s texts (although 
the problem of course does not originate with García Linera). Here I expand on this in relation to 
the appropriation of Zavaleta’s concept of the apparent state, which will in turn serve as the 
constitutive opposite of the integral state as the real. Zavaleta’s reflection on the question of 
phenomenon or appearance in social theory begins with Marx and passes through Gramsci. In 
“Las formaciones aparentes en Marx” (1978), Zavaleta uses the term in the sense closest to that of 
illusion or falsity, that of “mystification,” the fundamental substitution of which is that of surplus 
value by profit (106–107). In “Problemas de la determinación dependiente y la forma primordial” 
(1982), peripheral capitalist development serves to illuminate the fallacy of an economistic 
conception of the correspondence between base and superstructure, between the constitution of 
an internal market and nationalization; he cites the Argentine case as one of “false” or “apparent 
nationalization” because the “national” market remains disconnected from the state (346).  
The “apparent state” in Zavaleta, conversely, refers to those which emerged on the 
periphery of the capitalist world and failed to import the political and ideological structures 
proper to the liberal-democratic state. Without these mediating structures, the state is 
disconnected from the nation, effectively absent in much of the territory that it claims to govern. 
In Lo nacional-popular, the apparent state is introduced in order to relativize Gramsci’s 
characterization of the modern Western state as an integrated system in which the state proper is 
only a “forward trench” backed by a “succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements” of civil 
society—the integral state—as opposed to the Eastern state that lacks this trench system, where 
society is an (untheorized) “primordial and gelatinous” mass (Gramsci Notebook 7 § 16): “En 
esta metáfora maestra acerca del Estado moderno se da, sin embargo, más de un aspecto 
controvertible. Habría que distinguir, por ejemplo, entre los Estados de larga duración y las 
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situaciones de fluidez estatal, como las que son propias del Estado aparente” [In this master 
metaphor of the modern state there is, however, more than one arguable point. We would have 
to distinguish, for example, between states of long duration and situations of state fluidity, such 
as those proper to the apparent state] (Lo nacional-popular 50). The apparent state escapes 
Gramsci’s conception of the integral (or “Western”) state in which there is a “proper relation” 
between civil society and political society, without quite conforming to its “Eastern” counterpart. 
The apparent state is distinguished from the Gramscian integral state within Zavaleta’s 
conceptual framework not necessarily as its opposite (it is not equivalent to the “Eastern” 
despotic state, which for Gramsci assumes a homogeneous and passive social base), but as an 
exception; a state in which a strong repressive apparatus predominates over the system of 
ideological apparatuses, in Althusserian terms, does not necessarily constitute an apparent state 
since its authority is nonetheless effective, if precarious. Heterogeneity, or abigarramiento, is a 
condition of the apparent state just as totalization through the abstraction of labor is a condition 
of the integral state. 
García Linera’s rewriting of these concepts in his 2009 inaugural speech offers a different 
interpretation of Zavaleta’s apparent state, and holds it to designate quite simply the one prior to 
Evo Morales’s 2005 election.  
Para Zavaleta, un Estado aparente es aquel que no logra incorporar los hábitos, la 
cultura y las formas de organización política de la sociedad, articula sólo a ciertos 
hábitos políticos y deja al margen a otros sectores sociales, regiones, territorios y 
prácticas políticas. Un Estado aparente, en el sentido zavaletiano, es lo que fue 
Bolivia hasta 2005.  
[For Zavaleta, an apparent state is one that does not incorporate the habits, the 
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culture, and the forms of political organization of the society, but articulates only 
certain political habits and excludes other social sectors, regions, territories, and 
political practices. The Bolivian state up until 2005 had been an apparent state in 
the Zavaletian sense.] (7) 
There is a reversal here through which a state that (as conceived in Zavaleta) fails to enforce its 
authority or establish its legitimacy in its official territory—fails to occupy society—becomes one 
that has not been occupied by society or has failed to incorporate local political structures. In 
Zavaleta the disconnection of the oligarchic state from society is not a form of active exclusion or 
domination but a weakness on the part of the dominant bloc, which, limited to its repressive 
apparatus and a small and socially isolated political class, is vulnerable to sudden and total 
displacement. 
The integral state, then, (in the Gramscian sense of the terrain of the war of position as 
the appropriate revolutionary strategy for “the West” as opposed to the war of maneuver that was 
effective in “the East”—the ethico-political struggle within civil society rather than the military 
struggle to take over the state) is conceived as the opposite of the apparent state as defined in the 
passage cited above, that is, as one in which society is incorporated from the bottom up: 
¿Qué Estado queremos construir? . . . Decía Gramsci que el Estado integral es 
aquel en el que hay una correspondencia entre la sociedad civil, los ciudadanos, 
las regiones, los trabajadores, las clases sociales y su representación política estatal. 
Es aquel aparato político gubernamental que une y sintetiza externamente a todos 
los sectores y clases sociales, a los grupos nacionales, a las regiones y a las 
colectividades. Estado integral o pleno es aquel en el que hay un liderazgo social, 
político, moral e intelectualmente activo, que permite crear el sentido de 
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pertenencia y representación de todos en la estructura administrativa del Estado. 
El Estado integral gramsciano es todo lo contrario del Estado aparente que 
tuvimos durante 180 años y es, precisamente, la construcción de un Estado 
articulador de la diversidad nacionalitaria, geográfica, cultural y clasista, lo que los 
bolivianos nos hemos planteado edificar desde abajo, en base a los pilares del 
gobierno de los movimientos sociales, la plurinacionalidad, la autonomía 
democrática y la soberanía económica.  
[What kind of state do we want to build? Gramsci said that the integral state is 
that in which there is a correspondence between civil society, citizens, the 
different regions, the workers, the social classes, and their political representation 
in the state. It is the political apparatus of a government that externally unifies and 
synthesizes all the sectors and social classes, all the national groups, all the regions 
and collectivities. The integral or full state is one in which there is a socially, 
politically, morally, and intellectually active leadership, which creates a sense of 
belonging and representation of all in the administrative structure of the state. 
The Gramscian integral state is the complete opposite of the apparent state that we 
had for 180 years and is, precisely, the construction of a state that articulates 
national, geographic, cultural, and class diversity, what Bolivians have been trying 
to build from the bottom up, from the pillars of a government that emerged from 
the social movements, plurinationality, democratic autonomy, and economic 
sovereignty.] (11) 
What is at stake in this redefinition and insertion within a conceptual field whose main 
coordinates are the apparent state in its inverted form (as exclusion by the state rather than a 
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failure of the state to exercise hegemonic control) and the plurinational as identitarian 
reconceptualization of the motley? In the first place the Gramscian integral or expanded concept 
of the state is read as a normative model. While in Zavaleta Gramsci’s bourgeois, integral state is 
also contrasted with the Bolivian “apparent” state, this opposition is set up for the purpose of 
determining appropriate methods of knowing and acting. The apparent state and corresponding 
heterogeneous society constitute the conditions of political and theoretical practice in Bolivia, 
which therefore cannot borrow the methods proper to the totalized capitalist nation-state. The 
other semantic shift consists in that the idea of integration, which in Gramsci means an 
integration of the state in the narrow sense and the organs of civil society, coercion and consent, 
comes to mean here horizontal integration or inclusion of the heterogeneous or motley elements 
of the social body, directly reflected in the state apparatus. The state in the narrow sense is now 
imagined to include or re-present the whole of the nation. 
In a 2010 televised interview (like the 2009 speech, subsequently printed by the vice-
presidential office), García Linera counterposes another term to the apparent state, perhaps more 
telling in its simplicity—the real state:  
El Estado aparente, que es una categoría de René Zavaleta Mercado, un sociólogo 
boliviano importante, es una estructura de gobierno y de poder que no representa 
a todos, sino sólo a un segmento reducido de la sociedad. . . . [E]n Bolivia, hasta el 
año 2005, no tuvimos un Estado orgánico, real, sino, para darle un nombre, un 
Estado de camarilla, de fracción, que sólo representaba a un diminuto sector de la 
sociedad, donde unos pocos sectores dominantes construyeron el poder político y 
no les importó representar al resto, dejando al margen a indígenas, jóvenes, 
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trabajadores y mujeres. Era un Estado ilusorio porque no hizo el esfuerzo de 
unificar a todos … 
Lo que se viene haciendo, desde 2005 y con mucha más fuerza a partir de 
la promulgación de la nueva Constitución en 2009, es construir un Estado real que 
totalice, unifique y represente a la sociedad, como de alguna manera ha sido 
nuestra Asamblea Constituyente y, ahora, nuestra Asamblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional, donde estamos incluidos todos . . .  
[The apparent state, a concept developed by René Zavaleta Mercado, an important 
Bolivian sociologist, is a governmental and power structure that does not 
represent everyone, but only a limited sector of society. . . . [I]n Bolivia, up until 
the year 2005, we did not have an organic state, a real state, but what we could call 
a factional state that represented only a minute fraction of society, where a few 
dominant sectors exercised political power and had no interest in representing the 
rest, excluding the indigenous peoples, young people, workers, and women. It was 
an illusory state because it made no effort to unify everyone . . .  
What we have been doing, since 2005, and much more forcefully since the 
enactment of the new Constitution in 2009, is building a real state that totalizes, 
unifies, and represents society, something that has been realized in a way in our 
Constituent Assembly, and now, in our Plurinational Legislative Assembly, where 
we are all included . . . ] (8) 
The “real” state, to my knowledge, does not appear in Zavaleta. The source of the real/apparent 
binary in which the motley is effectively representable by the (real) state seems to have its roots 
less in Zavaleta’s sources (Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci, all of whom he qualifies in substantial 
 
 144 
ways) than in Hegel’s real/existent opposition. In all of its iterations in Zavaleta, lo abigarrado 
remains in a negative mode, even when it is a productive negativity. 
 
III. Passive revolution and police regime 
 
Again, I do not propose to correct García Linera’s (mis)readings, since I read his as 
primary texts.85 I have tried rather to uncover the performative function of a series of discursive 
moves that knit together ideas received from Gramsci, and Zavaleta, as a local lens and 
supplement, to reinforce what is really the familiar populist logic of total identification between 
the people and the state, in which the distinction between representation as proxy and as portrait 
(Spivak) is dissolved. This is achieved through rather than against a language of pluralism, 
mulitnationality, and even abigarramiento, and with a rhetoric that maintains the primacy of 
civil society over the state as the subject of politics.  
The identification of centralist populism in the pink tide regimes whose explicit ideology 
is pluralistic and even radically participatory, and particularly Evo Morales’s Bolivia, has been 
framed in terms of another set of Gramscian concepts in the work of Tapia and Jeffery Webber: 
those of transformism and passive revolution. Gramsci defines transformismo as “l’assorbimento 
graduale, ma continuo e ottenuto con metodi diversi nella loro efficacia, degli elementi attivi sorti 
dai gruppi alleati e anche da quelli avversari e che parevano irreconciliabilmente nemici” [The 
gradual but continuous absorption, through means of varying efficacy, of active elements of 
                                                 
85 I am thinking of Spivak’s critique of Vivek Chibber for “correcting” Ranajit Guha (and, more 
broadly, the project of the Subaltern Studies group), “merrily mistaking a primary text for a 
secondary text” (2014: 180).  
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allied groups and even of opposing groups that seemed to be irreconcilable enemies] (Q 19 § 24; 
cf. Q 1 § 44). Tapia writes in El Estado de derecho como tiranía,  
el núcleo dirigente del MAS y del actual gobierno ha entrado en una fase de 
transformismo cada vez más acentuada. De ser intelectuales orgánicos de sectores 
campesinos, indígenas y populares se han convertido en los intelectuales 
orgánicos de un proyecto de reconstitución del estado-nación en Bolivia en torno 
a un núcleo capitalista, que está reacoplando las estructuras de poder y 
dominación patrimonialistas con una nueva dirigencia de origen popular, que a su 
vez está organizando un régimen de tiranía sobre el mismo pueblo del cual ha 
salido.  
[MAS’s and the current government’s core leadership has entered an increasingly 
pronounced phase of transformism. Once organic intellectuals of the peasant, 
indigenous, and popular sectors, they have become the organic intellectuals of a 
project of reconstitution of the nation-state in Bolivia around a capitalist nucleus, 
which is rearticulating the patrimonialist structures of power and domination 
with a new leadership of popular origin, which is in turn organizing a regime of 
tyranny over the very people from which it emerged.] (125) 
Tapia goes on to note that it is not a matter of a cooptation of the current leadership by the old 
elite, but rather that they have formed a new ruling class, connected to a new capitalist project, 
incorporating the old dominant bloc now in a subordinate position. This analysis is a valuable 
supplement to that of Rivera, discussed in Chapter 2, on the continuing coloniality of the 
Bolivian state, which in turn resonates with Zavaleta’s reading of the continual reconstitution of 
the dominant bloc in response to subaltern demands and insurrection over the course of the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and particularly with the National Revolutionary state of 
1952.86 What I find questionable in Tapia’s presentation of this assessment—a detail that is 
perhaps incidental but prominent enough to merit consideration as one of symptomatic value—
is the accentuation of the notion of tyranny (in the title of the book, El Estado de derecho como 
tiranía, as well as in the passage quoted above), which implies an aberrant abuse of power, in 
contrast with the Gramscian argument that he in fact advances of a historically conditioned 
political process.  
Jeffery Webber builds on Tapia’s argument, as well as that developed by Massimo 
Modonesi, which he finds to be mostly correct but qualifies as “overly ‘politicist’” (1862) 
(something perhaps indicated in the use of the concept of tyranny in Tapia), and proposes to 
offer a more class-based analysis, through the lens of the concept of passive revolution. Webber 
focuses on García Linera’s use of phrases like “creative tensions” and “plural economy,” which 
form part of the same conceptual constellation that I have highlighted here privileging the 
“plurinational” as its pivot, to argue that these terms obscure the operation of a process in which 
                                                 
86 Tapia in fact makes a similar argument to Rivera’s, discussed in Chapter 2, summed up in her 
notion of “strategic ethnicity,” in which subaltern groups are resubalternized precisely through 
the symbolic, instrumental, and identitarian form of their inclusion: “La noción [that of 
transformism] sirve para pensar cómo una parte de la lucha política consiste en la 
transformación de intelectuales orgánicos de un bloque obrero popular en intelectuales orgánicos 
del bloque dominante. Esta transformación debilita a los subalternos que difícilmente producen 
sus intelectuales orgánicos, capacidades de organización y dirección, y potencia al bloque 
dominante en tanto no sólo resta a los subalternos sino que les suma capacidades; ya que a veces 
operan también como una representación simbólica de la inclusión de los subalternos” [The 
notion (of transformism) enables us to think how part of the political struggle consists in the 
transformation of organic intellectuals from a popular workers’ bloc into organic intellectuals of 
the dominant bloc. This transformation weakens the subalterns, who only with difficulty can 
produce their own organic intellectuals, organizational and leadership capabilities, and reinforces 
the power of the dominant bloc insofar as it does not only subtract from but also adds to the 
subalterns’ functions, since they sometimes operate as a symbolic representation of the inclusion 
of the subalterns] (119). 
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“the accent of the preservation/ transformation dialectic of passive revolution is clearly on 
preservation” (1857). He defines the model that has been widely criticized in recent years as one 
of “neoextractivism” as “extractive distribution,” in which the economy remains dependent on 
primary products and there is no structural change in property relations, and which is successful 
in reducing poverty while growing the economy during periods like that of the commodity 
supercycle of the 2000s but is not sustainable over the long term. The positive charge with which 
such notions of “tension” and “plurality” are imbued is reinforced by their association with the 
“plurinational” or “multicultural,” while in fact referring, in the economic sphere, to the 
persistence of the capitalist mode of accumulation despite the emergence of new political and 
economic subjects. Webber alludes to the “often sizable chasm between this government’s 
rhetorical flourish and its routine politics” citing praise for the regime in publications like the 
Financial Times and the Economist (1871), while stressing the structural adaptation of capitalist 
accumulation to new political conditions, new demands, and new actors, in an ideological 
climate in which racism is no longer a viable structuring principles and an emergent indigenous 
bourgeoisie has been integrated into the international circuits, something that, as Rivera and 
Tapia have argued, has a political use: “If the logic of big capital persists, it is legitimated in and 
through petty indigenous capitalists” (1857). Webber’s analysis through the lens of passive 
revolution, while explicitly seeking to shift the discussion from a “politicist” or ideological plane 
to a more structural one, in fact reveals the link between these levels, the rhetorical operations 
through which a transformation, or preservation in new terms, is expressed. 
Gareth Williams (citing an earlier draft of this chapter in his discussion of García Linera 
as a reader of Zavaleta) characterizes the shift toward a state practice of containment and 
“decisionism” in terms borrowed form Rancière, as a police order, in which the problem of state 
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form is reduced to a technical one (10):87 
hegemony over disjointedness seems to take precedence over the hegemony of 
disjointedness. The bourgeois ‘good order’ (or police) deemed to be necessary for 
the extension of extractivist developmentalism (and of renewed dependence on 
external markets, of course, despite all anti-materialist rhetoric) is prioritised over 
the transformation of state-form. Finally, in García Linera’s intellectual and 
political trajectory, it remains to be seen whether Hobbesian decisionism has 
indeed displaced the legacy first opened up in the Bolivian Marxist thought by 
René Zavaleta Mercado. (2015: 15) 
My argument has been that the end of this transition from hegemony of to hegemony over is in 
fact already present at its origin, something that I think is already suggested by Williams’ choice 
of the term disjointedness to translate abigarramiento,88 as well as in the allusion to Rancière’s 
concept of the police, which involves more than a mere sequential passage from transformation 
to conservation or constituent to constituted as discrete steps in a linear process. The order of the 
police, as the opposite or other side of politics, is already that of any hegemony of 
abigarramiento—whether understood as diversity or as disjointedness—which must instead 
remain as a supplement to and interruption of hegemony as reification of the social as an 
ontologically fixed content representable by the state. 
                                                 
87 “The Geopolitics of the Amazon [García Linera, 2012] is a police book. By this I mean that it is a 
book conceived and written from within the state, the main idea of which is to suture a certain 
form of state reason to a fully integrated geography of power in which sovereignty can exercise its 
monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” (2). 
88 This effectively conveys its difference from mere “diversity” (although Williams also uses this 
as a synonym: “state hegemony over diversity seems to be taking precedence over the hegemony 
of diversity” [2015: 12]). 
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What I hope to contribute here is a reading in which the paradoxes of such regimes 
cannot be reduced to mere hypocrisy, to decisionism, or to a simple betrayal. Nor can the debate 
be neatly organized into opposing factions. What has been identified as a “turnaround” in García 
Linera’s discourse is really a reiteration of a similar reasoning from a different subject position, 
within a different political conjuncture, and, of course, in a more coarsely propagandistic 
register, of certain premises—the motley as a plurality of positive identities, integration and 
social totality as desirable political ends—that can also be found in the texts of the government’s 
critics on the left. A critique of this regime of representation cannot merely target the failure of 
effective correspondence, but must remain vigilant against any pretension of total closure of the 






I wrote the first draft of the text that developed into the first chapter of this dissertation in 
2012, before the beginning of the decline of the progressive cycle in the region that is now (in 
2017) well underway (in the past year and a half, Mauricio Macri has been elected in Argentina, 
ending twelve years of Kirchnerism; Evo Morales has lost a referendum seeking to change the 
constitution to allow him to run for a fourth term in Bolivia, and Dilma Rousseff has been 
impeached in Brazil, returning the right to power for the first time since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
was elected in 2003 and setting an alarming precedent for the democratic process). That text, 
which focused on a corpus from the 1980s, already thematized the relation of the intellectual 
production of the left to the position of relative strength or weakness of its project within the 
historical conjuncture from which it emerges. Gramsci, I suggested, had been appropriated by 
the progressive intellectuals of the transitions to democracy in a moment of tempered 
expectations following the military dictatorships as a theorist whose most mature (although still 
entirely provisional and unfinished) writings emerged from a context in which, as Stuart Hall 
stresses, the once plausible prospect of an immanent proletarian revolution in Europe had been 
brutally defeated, and compounded by the more immediate circumstances of his incarceration. 
My argument in this chapter, however, was already one that urged a sustained critical stance; my 
second and third chapters dealt directly with the success of a new left whose origins in grassroots 
social movements and leadership by subjects not belonging to the traditional political caste has 
served a strategic rhetorical function in distancing it from prior regimes while reproducing a 
familiar state-centered populist mode of political interpellation.  
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García Linera has shifted his discourse from one focused on the direct occupancy of the 
state to the task of building hegemony when the revolutionary energy that brought the regime to 
power has waned; critics of the pink tide governments and their allied intellectuals in the U.S. 
academy, including Jon Beasley-Murray and Alberto Moreiras, proclaim the crumbling of Latin 
America’s electoral left of the twenty-first century as proof of the untenability of any hegemonic 
project. There is a sense that the constituted power in its very emergence as such has betrayed its 
constituent base, and is now reaping its due reward. I will not attempt a diagnosis or prescription 
of a strategy for the current conjuncture. It has not been my intention to condemn the state, or 
the constituted power as such in this way, and the identification of a succession of moments of 
defeat and of victory, or insurgent social movements and ruling party, does not imply a 
sequential ordering of the constituent and the constituted, which are simultaneous aspects of any 
socio-political formation. In the current crisis it is imperative that we eschew this kind of dualism 
and that the project for the future, mindful of the gains achieved, nonetheless not seek to repeat 
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